Roman Lunkin
The Crimean Peninsula became a testing ground of religious politics after joining Russia in 2014. Religious organizations faced challenges they never could have imagined previously. The international community has shown little interest in the fate of persecuted Christians in Crimea. Their churches became outcasts in the eyes of the rest of the world. At the same time the political problems faced by Crimean churches have become a subject of discussion in Ukraine.
In 2014-2016 Crimea became subject to Russian religious legislation on freedom of conscience and religious politics as interpreted by local authorities and law enforcement agencies. The new order consisted of copying Russian federal support for Orthodox churches of the Moscow Patriarchate, manipulation of Islam and its leaders, and restrictions on most Protestant church development. Security measures have included the deportation of certain Evangelical and Muslim leaders, church searches, and the liquidation of religious groups already banned in Russia, such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir.
Crimea’s “transition” to Russia, the term locals use when speaking of their joining Russia in 2014, has been the peninsula’s third major trial in the past 100 years. First, the Crimean population endured the dreadful shock of the Red Terror of the Bolsheviks in 1917-1921. Second, they endured the devastation of the Second World War, including Stalin’s deportation of Soviet citizens of German and Italian origin in 1941-42, the German conquest and occupation, the Red Army expulsion of German forces, and Stalin’s subsequent 1944 deportation of Tatars, Armenians, Bulgarians, and Greeks, which drastically changed the ethnic composition of Crimea. And third, Russia’s move into Crimea in 2014 proved to be a shock for a number of reasons. Thousands of Ukrainians and Tatars emigrated, including many Christian believers who moved to Ukraine proper or other countries. (Estimates range from 20,000 to 100,000 people.)
Every church and religious association has been searching for its own way of survival under new political circumstances. Many church leaders feel they have been left alone to face the authorities. Ties between Crimean and Ukrainian believers have been broken as the latter have accused those who have remained in Crimea of “collaborating” with Russian “occupation authorities.” Each church is living in isolation, looking for its own way to accommodate new “Russian patriotic” norms, trying not to become at the same time an enemy in the eyes of Ukrainian, European, and American fellow believers.
Orthodoxy and State Politics
The new order in Crimea did not mean loss and persecution for everyone. As often happens during a power shift, some institutions and individuals even strengthen their position. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) enhanced its influence in Crimea after 2014. Moreover, it became the main ideological basis for and the symbol of Russia’s presence in Crimea. Fundamentally the Moscow Patriarchate stresses the inviolability of its canonical borders and non-interference in its internal affairs.
The UOC MP is divided into three independent dioceses in Crimea: Simferopol, Dzhankoi, and Feodosia. Even though Crimea has three bishops, the leading role, in fact, belongs to Metropolitan Lazarus, head of the Simferopol and Crimean Diocese. Situated in the center of the peninsula, this diocese is home to Crimea’s wealthiest parishes and monasteries. It should be mentioned that prior to 2014, Metropolitan Lazarus was not the defender of Russian culture and did not support Crimea joining Russia, but rather attempted to navigate a more-or-less neutral position. Russian activists even considered him to be pro-Ukrainian, especially compared to the well-known supporter of Russia and enemy of Ukrainian independence, Metropolitan Agafangel of Odessa. Crimean Cossacks were also unhappy with Metropolitan Lazarus, accusing him of pro-Ukrainian sentiments and an absence of support for Russian patriots. Mass media also accused Metropolitan Lazarus of insufficient opposition to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP), which Ukrainian authorities were attempting to support. However, once Russia gained control of Crimea, the bishops of the three UOC MP dioceses, and Metropolitan Lazarus especially, instantly and with no reservations began collaborating with Russian authorities.
Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, personally supported the completion of the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Simferopol. Since 2014 Crimea’s UOC MP dioceses have become an active part of the region’s educational, cultural, and social programs. Russian federal programs and new donors from Russia have also provided substantial support for UOC MP monasteries as part of the program to encourage tourism and spiritual pilgrimage to Crimea.
UOC MP laity and clergy have been active in helping refugees from Ukraine. Some of those who have fled from the Donbas Region have temporarily moved to Crimea, while others have chosen to live in Crimea permanently. Even before 2014, the Sevastopol Deanery of the Simferopol Diocese of the UOC MP exuded Russian patriotism and fortified its links with the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
Orthodox jurisdictions other than the UOC MP have not fared well in the wake of Russian annexation of Crimea. The Ukrainian Orthodox Autonomous Church (UOAC), which did not have a strong presence in Crimea prior to 2014, has virtually disappeared, and its clergy and activists have departed for Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyiv Patriarchate in the person of Archbishop Kliment, head of the UOC KP Crimean Diocese, continues to struggle to hold on in Crimea. Russian authorities and police in Crimea are in the process of gradually transferring UOC KP churches to UOC MP jurisdiction, even without the direct involvement of the UOC MP itself. As Archbishop Kliment notes, only nine out of 15 parishes of the UOC KP continue to function in Crimea, and most priests have departed. UOC KP churches in Krasnokopsk, Kerch, Sevastopol, Perevalny, and Saki no longer function.
The greatest challenge faced by the UOC KP in Crimea is the possibility of the loss of its Prince Vladimir and Princess Olga Cathedral in Simferopol. In Soviet times this building was turned into an officers’ club, but after 1991 Ukrainian authorities gave the property to the UOC KP for perpetual lease. After 2014 local authorities increased the previously nominal charge for lease on the building and rented parts of the premises to other tenants. On 14 June 2016 the Sevastopol Court of Appeal ordered the Crimean Diocese of the UOC KP to vacate the premises of the Cathedral (112 square meters) and pay a 500,000 ruble fine to the Ministry of Property and Land Relations of Crimea. The Kyiv Patriarchate has appealed the ruling.
Since Crimea joined Russia, Archbishop Kliment has become a well-known media figure. He regularly speaks via publications that oppose Russia, gives interviews to Ukraine’s Radio Svoboda and the website Crimea.Reality (ru.krymr.com) and travels to Ukraine, sharing that believers in Crimea are persecuted. Even though Archbishop Kliment has been critical of Russian policy, local Crimean authorities have not taken measures of repression against him that might be expected. Nor did Russian authorities immediately abolish the UOC KP in Crimea in 2014. The fact is, even though UOC KP Patriarch Filaret has been most aggressive in his rhetoric towards Putin and the Kremlin, Russia hesitates to liquidate the UOC KP in Crimea because it would instantly put the UOC MP in harm’s way in Ukraine. The UOC MP in Ukraine is under constant suspicion for having its center in Moscow, capital of the “aggressor” nation. Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill in Moscow, together with the UOC MP under Metropolitan Onufry in Kyiv, try their best to stay neutral and pacify those of their Ukrainian bishops who might consider breaking with Moscow. Still, a high level of confrontation in Crimea may yet lead to the UOC KP losing its cathedral in Simferopol and the closure of all its remaining churches in the peninsula.
Eastern-Rite and Roman Catholics
After the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Russia considered Roman Catholics, the UOC KP, Eastern-Rite Greek Catholics, and Protestants to be westernized and unreliable confessions. But Moscow since 2014 unexpectedly has intervened to help the Catholic Church secure its legality in Crimea, progress it would never have gained had the territory not become Russian. Curiously, Moscow has even allowed the formation of a new Catholic diocese in Crimea, in addition to four other dioceses in Russia, but formally the new structure is called a pastoral district.
Bishop Yatsek Pyl of Odessa and Simferopol was appointed on 22 December 2014 to head the new pastoral district. Its formation became possible after negotiations between the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Vatican. In the end Moscow sent a direct order to Crimean authorities to register Catholic parishes as autonomous organizations which, de facto, constituted the pastoral district. This district unites not only Roman Catholic communities, but surprisingly also Eastern-Rite Greek Catholics who are registered as Catholics of the Byzantine Rite. (They have 12 parishes and three churches in Crimea in Evpatoria, Yalta, and Kerch.) Ukrainian Greek Catholics in Crimea made a wise choice in uniting with the Roman Catholic pastoral district because they were in danger of suppression by Russian authorities in 2014. (Greek Catholics took an active part in Maidan demonstrations, and Ukrainian Greek Catholic Archbishop Svyatoslav was also a fervent critic of Russia as the “aggressor” in Crimea.) One incident could have—but did not—lead to Greek Catholic banishment from Crimea. During the most difficult period in March 2014, pro-Russian forces found 10 bulletproof vests in Ukrainian Greek Catholic Father Nikolay Kvych’s residence in Sevastopol, at which point he fled Crimea. Father Bogdan Kostetski now serves as dean of Ukrainian Greek Catholic parishes in Crimea.
As for Roman Catholicism, after World War II none of its churches existed in Simferopol, and its previously secularized sanctuary was demolished in 1974. The community revived in 1993, but only in 1997 did Simferopol Catholics obtain a small private house for their worship needs on the outskirts of the city: the Chapel of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary. In the past 10 years this parish has experienced significant growth. Some 300 people attend Mass in three Sunday services in order to accommodate all worshippers. In addition, a special Mass is held for medical students from Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and India. In all, Simferopol is home to approximately 1,000 baptized Catholics of Ukrainian, German, Polish, and Czech nationalities.
At the same time, attempts to obtain land for church construction from the mayor’s office in Simferopol have not succeeded. On 24 March 2014 Father Daniel Maslentsev picketed in protest by himself in front of the city administration building, an act condemned by representatives of the mayor. In December 2015, as Father Daniel explained to the author, when a delegation from the European Parliament and European journalists came to Crimea, local officials gave their relations with the Catholic community as an example of religious tolerance. Father Daniel was promised a meeting with Mayor Gennady Bacharey to discuss building site options for a Roman Catholic Church, but after the European delegation left, no meeting with the mayor was forthcoming. Simferopol officials, Father Daniel related, “never do anything unless they are told from above or they anticipate profit for themselves.”
Despite all the difficulties faced by Roman Catholics, Father Daniel Maslentsev nevertheless believes “much more religious tolerance exists in Crimea than in Russia proper.” Presumably the centralized structure that the Roman Catholic Church possesses in the Vatican has allowed its congregants in Crimea to more ably put forward their claims to authorities than has been the case with the peninsula’s smaller, decentralized religious communities.
Editor’s Note: The concluding portion of this article will be published in the next issue of the East West Church and Ministry Report. Roman Lunkin is Director of the Center for Religious Studies of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia.