Roman Lunkin
Editor’s Note: The first half of this article was published in the previous issue of the East-West Church & Ministry Report 25 (Winter 2017): 1-3.
Lutherans
Historically, Lutherans in Crimea came under the jurisdiction of the German Evangelical Lutheran Church (GELC), but in the past 20 years several new Lutheran jurisdictions have emerged on the peninsula. After 1991, American missionaries in Ukraine founded the Ukrainian Lutheran Church (ULC), which in Crimea is centered in Sevastopol. It has managed to survive following the political changes of 2014. But during the transition to Russian rule, two new Lutheran jurisdictions have emerged. One is the Lutheran Church of Ingria in Simferopol which absorbed the local ULC congregation when its pastor left for Ukraine in March 2014. The second is the Lutheran Church of the Augsburg Confession (ELC AC), which is officially registered in Yalta and is now trying to take possession of a disputed church building there. Yalta authorities registered the ELC AC in 2015 separately from the German Lutheran jurisdiction. It maintains relations with the Russian ELC AC. Many Evangelical Lutheran pastors believe the ELC AC, established in 2008 with active support from Russian authorities, was formed in order to bring division in the Lutheran Church in Russia. The ELC AC claims church buildings in different regions of Russia that belong to the German Evangelical Lutheran Church.
The largest German Evangelical Lutheran Church, located in Simferopol with over 100 active parishioners, benefits from people who are interested in German language and culture. Since 1992, new GELC congregations have been established in Simferopol, Yalta, Sudak, Evpatoria, Kerch, and Koktebel.
German Lutherans departed the former Soviet Union in two waves. In the 1990s almost half of all German Lutherans emigrated to Germany. Then in 2014-2015, additional German Lutheran believers left Crimea for Ukraine proper or Germany. In contrast to those German Lutherans dissatisfied enough to emigrate abroad, the German Lutheran Church is one of the most patriotic churches in Russia and has been the most supportive of the Russian government next to the Russian Orthodox Church. Its loyalty is explained partially because of the social structure of its congregations (mostly elderly women) and the historic Lutheran worldview.
Since the time of Martin Luther, the Lutheran Church has tended to cultivate close ties with state authorities. The Evangelical Lutheran Church, for example, traditionally has supported the Russian government from the tsarist era forward. In addition, German Evangelical Lutheran believers live primarily in the southern part of Crimea which historically has been heavily influenced by Russian culture. In fact, German Lutherans in Crimea were the Christian believers who were the most enthusiastic supporters of the 2014 shift from Ukrainian to Russian control, and who welcomed the referendum that joined Crimea to Russia. After 2014, the overall number of Lutheran churches in Crimea did not decrease, but actually increased. German Lutherans have joined the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Russia, have accepted several Russian pastors from Russia, and in addition have promoted missionary outreach. Lutherans in Crimea now have new opportunities to grow and to regain buildings which they were not able to retrieve during the Ukrainian period.
Other Protestant Denominations
The consequences of Crimea joining Russia were the most tragic for the peninsula’s Pentecostals and Baptists. Hundreds of their churches and thousands of their believers have suffered discrimination in the transition. Protestants historically have often supported democratic governments, and their leaders in Crimea do not idealize the Russian power system headed by President Putin. The question at hand in Crimea is: Should the church oppose and criticize new authorities, or should it find a way to compromise?
Representatives of Ukrainian “Maidan theology” make an idol of Ukrainian patriotism. (Orthodox and Greek Eastern-Rite Catholics are among them, but Protestants are the most active.) For pro-Ukrainian Protestants, people are patriots only 1) if they call Russia an “aggressor”; 2) if they call the war in the Donbas a civil war; 3) if they reject the idea that Ukraine has discriminated against Russian speakers and Russian culture; and 4) if they regard Crimea as suffering under Russian “occupation” and “annexation.”
Since Russia and Ukraine have been closely tied for centuries, most churches in Crimea in 2014 found themselves deeply divided between proUkrainian and pro-Russian adherents. The conflict in the Donbas and southeastern Ukraine deepened this division. Now in Crimea, in addition, even conventionally Russian churches are divided between those who fully support Russian authorities and those who are already disappointed with them.
The emigration of Crimean pastors and missionaries who had given many years to their ministry proved a serious psychological shock for the peninsula’s churches. Usually ministers left based on their personal choice, not willing to live under new authorities or understanding that foreigners and people with a pro-Ukrainian orientation might have problems in the new Crimea.
Since Russia views Pentecostals as supporters of the 2004 “Orange Revolution,” they were the first targets in 2014 of intimidation from law enforcement agencies. These believers have been subjected to deportation, church searches, document checks, and rude interruptions of church services by police and FSB officers. In an atmosphere of Russian xenophobia and patriotism under the “Crimea is ours!” slogan, all Protestant churches (together with Catholics, Greek Catholics, and the UOC KP) are seen as symbols of Western influence, which has led to persecution and suspicion for these churches. Some of these church communities have been destroyed while others have survived, but with their influence and strength noticeably weakened. Protestants in Crimea have lost their former social status and have become members of suspect “sects” in the eyes of pro-Russian Crimeans.
Sergey Golovin, pastor of an independent church of Evangelical Christians in Simferopol, left Crimea almost immediately after he realized that Crimea would become Russian territory. In his interview with the present author he noted: “[Differing] attitudes toward the present situation [in Crimea] caused a split in my church. For me, this was a sign of my unsuccessful ministry as a pastor. For 20 years I was teaching a biblical understanding of righteousness and truth, but in vain. The illusion of receiving a little bigger [Russian government] pension was more appealing for many. Before annexation the question of Russian identity had never been an issue in the churches. There were no problems with the language [or between] Russian or Ukrainian identity. The division was only between those who wanted to build the future and those who wanted to rebuild the past. We came out of the Egypt of communism and entered the desert of democracy, so those who murmured were happy that Pharaoh caught us.”
Charismatic Pentecostals and the Salvation Army
Many churches became the target of Russian security services, first of all those charismatic Pentecostals who were connected in some way with the Embassy of God Movement in Kyiv whose pastors especially supported “EuroMaidan” and who engaged in pro-Ukrainian preaching. The main source of trouble for pastors in Crimea beginning in 2014 was political. Pro-Ukrainian statements led to the expulsion of such ministers, many of whom continue preaching to their nowdistant congregations via Skype. Russian authorities deported New Generation Pastor Oleg Trikoziuk (now in Genechesk), Embassy of God Pastor Anton Litvin (now pastor of God’s Cover Church in the Kyiv suburb of Borispol), and after threats from the FSB in June 2014, Simferopol Salvation Army officer Ruslan Zuev (now a Salvation Army major in Lviv). Zuev was an activist in the “EuroMaidan Crimea” organization (now the “Ukrainian People’s House”) which, together with Crimean Tatars, took part in anti-Russian demonstrations. Nevertheless, the Salvation Army Corps in Simferopol has managed to continue in place, and its leaders have been able to build relationships with the new authorities.
Russian Protestant Associations Move into Crimea
Russian Protestant church unions began penetrating into Crimea almost immediately after March 2014. Many Protestant associations in the nearby Krasnodar Region had close relations with the peninsula’s church communities even before 2014, such as the Evangelical Christian Missionary Union, which now has a Crimean Diocese consisting of several churches. In January 2015, the Russian Union of Evangelical Christians (Pentecostals) also created a Crimean diocesan administration. Most Pentecostal communities joined the Russian Church of Evangelical Christians, with some connecting directly with the union headed by Eduard Grabovenko, not just with regional associations. In August 2016 the Russian Church of Evangelical Christians held its conference on the Crimean coast with the approval of local authorities. Evangelical Christians-Baptists Baptists in Crimea are also split between the Union of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, headquartered in Moscow, and another autonomous regional Russian Union of Evangelical ChristiansBaptists. The Baptist split occurred earlier in the 2010s over financial issues, but deepened after 2014. Veniamin Yuhimets in Yalta, head of the autonomous Evangelical Christians-Baptists, represents evangelical churches in the official, inter-religious board, “Peace Is God’s Gift.” He notes that an uneasy attitude exists in Crimea toward the Russian Evangelical Christian-Baptist Union in this crisis:
We were against the Russian Baptist Union’s declaration on Ukraine in 2015 condemning Maidan. That declaration was made out of fear. We actively help Donbas refugees, but our principle is that we don’t help the war, we only help the people. During 2014 our churches assisted several thousand people. In the Ukrainian period the situation was easier, but then Crimean authorities also favored the Orthodox Church. Many questions are solved thanks to an inter-religious board, with children’s camps, for example. On some issues we can call directly upon Father Lazarus who is a very wise and educated man. But the Orthodox still call all Protestants [members of] sects. There are increasing numbers of cases in which Orthodox priests put pressure on local authorities in order to cast out Protestants, which is pretty usual in Russia.
In April 2015, Kyiv Bishop Anatoly Kaluzhny, pastor of New Life Church, said that “There is a deliberate displacement of Protestants in Crimea,” but it is obvious now that this was an exaggeration.
Politics and Inter-Religious Dialogue
In 2014, Sergey Aksenov, a key agent of Russian rule in Crimea, attempted to maintain the status quo in terms of state collaboration with major confessions. For example, he continued cooperation with the interreligious board “Peace Is God’s Gift.” This body played a significant role in the peaceful transition of Crimea from Ukrainian to Russian rule, many times asking the people of the peninsula to solve all conflicts in a peaceful manner and calling for an end to fighting in eastern Ukraine. The board consists of Orthodox (UOC MP), Catholics, Lutherans, the Armenian Apostolic Church, Baptists, Adventists, Muslims, Jews, and Karaites.
The Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) found a way to be present but invisible in Crimea. In October 2015, Bishop Tikhon (Shevkunov), secretary of the Patriarchal Council of Culture and Dean of Sretenski Stavropegic Monastery in Moscow and considered by some to be Putin’s confessor, joined the Crimean Republic’s Board of Expert Counselors headed by Sergey Aksenov.
Deportations and Discrimination
Supervision of religion is also overseen by the State Committee of International Relations, which deports citizens of Crimea, and the local FSB. Crimea’s power structures, controlled directly from Moscow, also carry out policy independent of local authorities and administration. Law enforcement agencies also maintain religious “order” by deporting Muslims and Protestants they consider threatening.
Methods of discrimination against religious minorities include invalidating leases for quarters used for worship, preventing the purchase of land for new churches, and making official registration cumbersome or impossible. For the most part, discrimination against Catholics and Protestants stems from the desire of officials to profit during the period of confusion beginning in 2014 when not all property was registered according to Russian law. Local authorities, who usually are the same clerks who worked during the Ukrainian period, now feel free to behave rudely and indifferently toward non-Orthodox churches.
Beginning in 2014, as western churches ended all connections with Crimean churches or were prevented from maintaining such ties, humanitarian aid from American and European fellow believers evaporated. Some church-affiliated NGOs were not able to re-register because they were not ready for the strict organizational accountability required in Russia since 2009. Some Crimean believers working for NGOs were and are frightened by the new situation. As church leaders note, the value and reach of churchbased social work drastically decreased beginning in 2014, down 80 percent. The main reason is that Russian authorities in Crimea (just the same as in the rest of Russia) are afraid of “non-traditional confessions” and actually forbid Protestants from conducting public social and missionary outreaches and ban them from prisons and hospitals.
Public activity of the churches is now actually banned. Mass protests in Moscow in 2012 against unfair elections led to tougher Russian legislation restricting demonstrations, meetings, and processions. Any actions on the streets that are undertaken without official permission are now punished with fines. In Crimea, Baptists and Jehovah’s Witnesses suffered first from this stricter regimen. In May 2015 authorities in Crimea punished nine Baptists with fines for extending Easter greetings in public and for passing out pamphlets. In June 2015 authorities fined Jehovah’s Witnesses for manning a booth with religious literature. Amendments to the federal law on freedom of conscience in July 2016 added new restrictions to missionary activity throughout Russia. Missionaries must now have an ID from an officially recognized religious body. “Illegal” missionary activity is punishable by fines of 50,000 rubles for individuals and one million rubles for organizations.
Church Re-registration
The re-registration process for Crimean churches under Russian law has visibly impeded church activity. But it cannot be said that it is totally so because of the unwillingness of Russian authorities to register some churches. To date Crimean churches have suffered almost no direct denials of registration. Instead, the process of re-registering churches simply has been poorly organized. Very few officials understood under what rules religious organizations were to be registered. The situation has been complicated by the fact that in 2014 many Protestant churches (unlike Orthodox) were terrified and suspicious of Russian authorities. In addition, in 2015, judicial authorities were overwhelmed with registration applications. It turned out that registration is proving to be a very important step in obtaining legal entity status, re-registering property, and in order to conduct public activity of any sort under the new political circumstances. The re registration deadline was extended to 1 January 2016. By the middle of 2016 almost all Protestant, as well as Orthodox, churches were registered. Surprisingly, even 20 communities of Jehovah’s Witnesses managed to secure registration. Discrimination in registration occurred primarily in the case of Muslim associations. Their numbers declined sharply compared to the Ukrainian period.
At the beginning of 2014, according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture, 2,083 organizations existed in Crimea, 1,409 of which possessed legal entity status and 674 possessed the right to engage in religious activity without state registration. Sevastopol alone accounted for 137 registered religious organizations. However, because of the transition to Russian rule in Crimea, the number of functioning religious associations has been reduced by half.
In Crimea, Russian legislation in the religious field has led to greater discrimination toward Evangelicals and Muslims. The restrictive July 2016 “Yarovaya Law,” signed by Putin, if fully applied, will ban free missionary activity in Russia and will further inhibit the free exercise of all non-Orthodox Russian citizens, not only in Crimea but throughout Russia.
Roman Lunkin is Director of the Center for Religious Studies of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia.
Corrections
The full biographical note for “Religious Politics in Crimea, 2014-2016,” East-West Church & Ministry Report 25 (Winter 2017), 3, should read: Roman Lunkin is Director of the Center for Religious Studies of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia. The full biographical note for “The Slavic Bible Commentary,” East-West Church & Ministry Report 25 (Winter 2017), 5, should read: Peter Penner, Bielefeld, Germany, is Director of Advanced Studies of the Euro-Asiatic Accrediting Association.