Lauren B. Homer
The Duma, Russia’s legislature, enacted “antiterrorism” legislation on 7 July 2016, which President Vladimir Putin signed into law. It contains significant amendments to the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations (“1997 Law”), further restricting “missionary activities” and “extremist” religious literature. The religious activities provisions in the future Federal Law 374-FZ, here called “the Anti-Missionary Law,” or “AML,” appeared suddenly in mid-June 2016 within a broader package of “anti-terrorism” legislation that had been under Duma review for months. (In Russia this larger legislation came to be called the “Yarovaya Package” after its main Duma sponsor, Irina Yarovaya.) It was adopted without input and despite protests from many Russian religious organizations and legal experts. Even the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC-MP) had no advance knowledge of the provisions before they appeared in the draft law. However, its chief legal officer, Abbess Kseniia Chernega, did state that after changes, the ROC-MP was satisfied with the adopted version.1 leading to a situation in which targeted groups and individuals must prepare to fight in court to achieve even minimal space for religious expression and activities that are not “missionary” in nature.
Fears about the Law Confirmed: A Summary
On 1 July 2016, Mikhail Fedotov, Chair of the Presidential Council on Civil Society Development and Human Rights, had cautioned against its adoption stating that it created “unjustified and excessive restrictions on freedom of conscience.” Its provisions produced an explosion of concern, particularly within Protestant and non-traditional religious groups that now feared that sharing their faith could lead to prosecution and crippling fines.2 Sadly, these concerns have proven to be well-founded due to misapplication of the already overly broad provisions of the law by over-zealous local officials. Believers have been charged under the AML for participation in religious worship (attending and speaking but not preaching), holding worship services without informing authorities of the existence of a religious group (not required under the AML or the 1997 Law), and sharing their faith on an individual basis, not as part of any organized religious group. However, some legal victories have mitigated the effect of state actions, leading to a situation in which targeted groups and individuals must prepare to fight in court to achieve even minimal space for religious expression and activities that are not “missionary” in nature.
A Pattern of Increased Legal Restrictions on Religious Expression
The AML did not come as a complete surprise. Anti-missionary legislation has been proposed on numerous occasions since the early1990s and has been presented to the Duma frequently since 2015. However, Forum 18 News Service reports that as recently as 18 May 2016, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Prikhodko stated that sufficient restrictions on dissemination of beliefs already existed in law and that further legislation would unduly restrict the rights of religious believers. Why the government changed its mind in less than one month is unclear.3
Many other laws restricting religious associations and their adherents have appeared or have been proposed since my previous article on this subject in the East-West Church & Ministry Report in 2014.4 Notably, amendments to existing laws in 2015 give security services the right to conduct “inspections” of religious groups that receive funds from abroad or that engage in “extremist activity.” Originally religious organizations were expressly exempted from these laws. In 2015, a change to the 1997 Law was enacted setting up a procedure for unregistered religious groups (RGs) to notify the government of the existence of their activities. This provision was thought to be entirely voluntary, as registration is not a requirement for group religious activities under the 1997 Law. Instead, these rules were understood as intended to help RGs to begin the ten-year period of activity that is a pre-requisite to registration as a religious organization (RO), which has greater legal rights than an RG. However, concurrent with the passage of the AML, local authorities have begun to claim that filing the notice is mandatory for RGs. A 2015 law on “undesirable organizations” has enabled Russia to ban activities by a large number of prominent NGOs as dangerous to the stability of the government.5 Toward the end of 2015, the ROC-MP held a conference at which some of its representatives recommended including ROs as targets of the undesirable agents and foreign agents laws, arguing that Protestant religious groups were special threats to the stability of the government. Some religious literature has been included on “extremist publications” lists. While sacred texts such as the Bible and the Koran have been exempt from that law since November 2015, translations deemed objectionable by law enforcement have nonetheless been seized as “extremist.”
Since 2014, the Russian government has strengthened its control over all media outlets and has sought to close opposition media and political parties and to muzzle their leaders. Increasingly, the Russian public is left with only official state media as its source of information. Russian government personnel either follow the Kremlin line or suffer consequences for their disobedience. The Yarovaya Package contains additional severe restrictions on social media platforms and mandates that they preserve data for the review of law enforcement authorities. (Labeling male headship of the family as “nonsense” in a Facebook comment led to one person being charged under this law.)
The overall propaganda campaign branding some religious groups as dangerous has increased in the wake of Russian military action in Ukraine. In particular, “foreign” faiths that are non-ROCMP religious groups are increasingly deemed to be unpatriotic and subversive, threatening the unity of the Russian people and the Russian state. False accusations of horrendous misconduct have been leveled at both the Ukrainian government and its presumed Protestant and non-Moscow Patriarchate Orthodox backers, while the ROC-MP has been elevated to the status of the de facto Russian state church.
Despite these reverses, it is still the case that the 1997 Law states that “everyone” in Russia, both Russians and non-Russians, possess the right to believe or not believe in any religion, and to engage in religious activities individually and collectively. The 1997 Law also permits the right to freely profess and disseminate one’s religious beliefs to others and to meet, teach, and worship both as registered religious organizations (ROs) and as unregistered religious groups (RG).
Combatting Terrorism versus Restricting All Non-Orthodox Faiths
The stated purpose of the AML was to address terrorism and public safety concerns, particularly Islamic radicalization in Russia. Of course, terrorism has been a legitimate national security concern for Russia for many years. The Kremlin’s military support for the Assad Regime in Syria, which increased at the end of 2015, has further fueled the enmity of radicalized Muslims. A case in point is the assassination of the Russian ambassador to Turkey by a Muslim radical in December 2016. Russia’s right to protect itself from those intent on overthrowing its government or committing terrorist acts is well established under international law. It has certainly promulgated every type of law that might address terrorism prior to passage of the AML.
The problem is that the AML as implemented targets a quite different type of activity—in violation of international law and Russia’s own laws and Constitution—namely, the sharing of faith by persons perceived as belonging to “non-Russian,” and therefore, undesirable religious groups, primarily Protestant Christians. The AML has become another weapon in Putin’s arsenal of law enforcement measures designed to thwart his perceived opponents. Xenophobic legislation such as the AML is an expression of an anti-American and anti-European political agenda aimed at combatting external and internal opposition to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, and the further consolidation of Putin’s political power.
Provisions of the Anti-Missionary Law
The provisions of the new AML are summarized below.
1. The law adds a definition of “missionary activity” to the earlier 1997 Law: “activity of a religious association aimed at disseminating information about its doctrine among individuals who are not [current members]” for the purpose of drawing “these individuals into the ranks of [members], carried out directly by the religious associations or authorized individuals and (or) legal entities publicly with the help of media, Internet, or other lawful means.” (Emphasis added.) In short, the AML as written applies only to public missionary activities undertaken by religious associations (RAs), whether (ROs) or (RGs), to attract people who are not part of their group. The definition does not mention private dissemination of information about the faith and, by implication, does not apply to it. On its face, the law does not apply to the activity of individuals who are not acting under the legal authority of an RA or on its behalf. Nor does the definition apply to regular religious activities of believers individually or within their religious organization or group, such as worship services and Bible studies.
2. The law adds a documentation requirement for individuals engaged in “missionary activity” on behalf of the RA, but only if it happens outside an RA’s property. This documentation authorizes individuals to conduct missionary activity on behalf of the applicable RA. Priests, pastors, and other church leaders do not require such documentation because they presumably are authorized to act on behalf of the RA by reason of their positions. The required documentation is quite extensive, including proof of authorization by the executive board of the RA, a copy of an RO’s registration document or an RG’s notice of commencement of activity, and the use of official stamps.
3. The law designates where missionary activity can occur without restriction and where it needs special permission. No restrictions on missionary activity apply if it happens in an RA’s “premises, buildings, and structures,” nor on the land on which it is located, nor in places of pilgrimage, cemeteries, and crematoria, educational institutions “historically used for religious ceremonies,” nor in places rented or loaned to an RA. If another RA’s property is used for missionary activity, that RA must give written consent to those conducting the missionary activity. If an individual conducts missionary activity outside those named places, they need the documentation mentioned above authorizing them to act for the RA. The AML does not prohibit RAs or their leaders from conducting missionary activity outside the list of named places. By implication they can, but in Russia what is not expressly permitted is often forbidden— unlike U.S. law in which the reverse is true. Some interpret the law as forbidding missionary activity outside the enumerated locations, but this is not what the law says.
4. The law allows missionary work in residential premises only if they are “made available to [registered] ROs for divine services and other religious rites and ceremonies.” By implication, the failure to mention RGs in this sentence means that RGs cannot hold missionary services in residential buildings. However, prohibiting missionary activity in residential buildings contradicts provisions of the 1997 Law that expressly permits their use for meetings of unregistered RGs. The 1997 Law also expressly permits individuals, both Russian citizens and foreigners, to share their faith. On its face, this section of the AML dealing with missionary activities in residential spaces does not apply to private religious (non-missionary) services conducted in residential spaces by ROs, RGs, or individuals, just to missionary activities aimed at drawing in new members.
5. The law adds the word missionary to existing law that requires RO-produced audio, visual, and printed religious literature and objects to bear a marking with the official name and information of the RO that produces and distributes them. Unregistered RGs do not have the right to produce their own religious literature. This provision assumes that all religious literature used or distributed by RAs is produced by the specific group that is using that literature. In reality, ROs often use and distribute literature produced by other organizations, and RGs must do so because they cannot legally produce their own.
6. The law restricts missionary work by foreigners in the same way the 1997 Law, as amended, already restricted “professional religious activity” by foreigners. (a) Visas to visit Russia for missionary work are granted only based on an invitation from an RO (not an RG) with which the foreigner has a written civil or labor contract to engage in missionary activity as part of “professional religious activity.” (b) Foreigners may engage in missionary work only in the geographical territory where the RO they work for is registered or where a notification of establishment has been filed by an RG indicating a foreigner with a missionary visa secured by an RO can conduct missionary activity under the auspices of an RG. (By implication, Russian citizens can engage in missionary work outside these geographic borders.) (c) Foreigners who enter Russia on other types of visas cannot engage in missionary activity. (d) A registered “representation” or branch of a foreign religious organization is not empowered to carry out missionary activity. (e) RGs cannot invite foreigners for missionary work in Russia.
7. The law specifically bars missionary activity that violates this law, including activity by liquidated ROs, and by those suspended or barred from activity based on violation of anti-extremism and antiterrorism legislation. The law also adds a list of barred missionary objectives that are already prohibited by other legislation (violating public order and safety, extremism, destroying families, infringing others’ rights, damaging morals or health, encouraging suicide or refusal of medical assistance, obstructing compulsory education, coercing people into turning over property, threatening those who seek to leave the RA, and refusal to carry out civic duties.) RAs are liable in cases where their agents engage in prohibited activities.
8. The law imposes very large fines upon both individuals (from the age of 14 up) and upon RAs for violations of the AML—up to 50,000 rubles for individuals and up to one million rubles for ROs and RAs. These are ruinously large sums for most individuals and organizations.
Reactions of Russian Churches and Legal Experts
Leaders of major Protestant denominations in Russia began expressing great concern as soon as they became aware of the AML. As noted above, legislators rebuffed efforts to derail or amend the legislation, while the Russian Orthodox Church took a wait-andsee attitude, reserving its right to object based on how the law was implemented. Staff of Moscow’s Slavic Center for Law and Justice and other Russian religion law experts noted that the AML was ambiguous and subject to arbitrary enforcement due to its lack of specificity. Some legal experts noted that it appeared that the law was written by persons unfamiliar with the way religious groups operate and the nature of religion itself. For example, as explained above, the law only applies on its face to a very restricted type of conduct—efforts to attract new members by an RA.
However, it fails to address the fact that religious activities that are not missionary in nature could have non-member participation. This omission leaves room for inappropriate enforcement actions, treating regular religious activities without a missional focus as missionary activity. The AML ignores the fact that Christians are subject to a personal biblical mandate to share their faith with others, which is expressly permitted by the 1997 Law. By associating missionary activity with terrorism, the law implies that such activity is intrinsically suspect and destructive to the Russian state. Thus, local officials feel justified and emboldened in prosecuting religious believers and organizations for activities that are clearly not covered by the law. The idea that minority faiths sharing their religious beliefs endangers the rest of society is sadly the same rationale used to justify vicious persecution of Christians in many Muslim-majority countries—actions condemned by the ROC-MP and the church worldwide.
Because of widespread concern among Russian believers that they could be prosecuted for even a casual conversation with a neighbor in a stairwell or inviting a non-member to visit their church, the Slavic Center for Law and Justice wrote to the Presidential Apparat describing its concerns. It received a reply from the legal department of the Presidential Apparat, which contained substantial reassurance that the law did not apply to ordinary church activities such as preaching, teaching, and Sunday schools; it only applied to specific missionary activity by a specific RA that was conducted by its authorized representatives; and it did not apply to faith sharing by individuals or those unaffiliated with an RA. However, enforcement actions brought under the AML run counter to these reassurances. Several senior religious leaders and legal experts noted that the test of the law would be in its implementation and that it would be necessary to challenge its enforcement in Russian courts and before the European Court of Human Rights.
In September 2016, the Russian Federation Public Chamber held a meeting to discuss the need for implementing regulations or directives concerning the law due to the lack of understanding and expertise as evidenced in law enforcement activities related to the AML. The Deputy Director of the Chief Directorate for Combatting Extremism of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) responded to critics by stating that “persons whose activity is not aimed against our people and our motherland have nothing to fear,” and then cited statistics on the rise of membership in the Islamic State among Russian citizens. However, AML prosecutions discussed in the meeting had nothing to do with such extremist groups.
Recommendations to create a set of implementing regulations for the law and even repeal of the AML have been made. However, in a December 2016 report on intelligence agency directives, religious affairs specialist Roman Lunkin of the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis concludes that implementing regulations and discussions of specific details of interpretation are pointless because it has become increasingly clear that the AML and similar legislation are designed for propaganda against and control of non ROC-MP religious groups, not as measures to combat terror threats to the Russian state or society. On 7 February 2017, the Human Rights Council under the President of the Russian Federation, of which religious freedom advocate and attorney Vladimir Ryakhovsky of the Slavic Center for Law and Justice is a member, issued a formal opinion recommending repeal of the AML. It further recommended that more careful attention be given to legislation that would in fact address matters of public safety in Russia. The Human Rights Council also noted that the law had been applied against groups that could not even theoretically present a danger to the Russian state. It is possible that the Duma may heed this recommendation. Mr, Lunkin, however, fears that any new law drafted to replace the AML might be even more repressive.
Statistics on Enforcement of the AML
The enactment of the AML has been a factor in an accelerating wave of government prosecutions targeting the religious activities of Protestant Christians and their organizations across Russia. Forum 18 recently reported that Russian prosecutions related to freedom of religion and belief increased dramatically from 35 in 2014 to 122 in 2015.6 A total was not given for 2016, but Forum 18 states that it had identified 31 prosecutions and 15 convictions based on the AML between July and December 2016. Of these, most have targeted Protestant Christians, with others involving Buddhists (1), Jehovah’s Witnesses (5), and Hare Krishna devotees (5). Many other prosecutions of religious believers occurred in 2016 based on pre-existing laws, primarily cases based on extremist religious literature legislation. According to Forum 18, they targeted mainly Jehovah’s Witnesses and Muslim followers of the Turkish cleric Said Nursi. Additionally, shortly after the AML was enacted, six Mormon “missionaries” (renamed “volunteers” after passage of the AML) were deported from Samara in early August 2016 for technical violations of the terms of their visas (failure to register at their residential locations as required by Russian Federation law). Local officials linked the case to a dramatic increase in Mormon missionary activity in the region. In addition, Russian authorities continue their ongoing efforts to close particular churches on grounds not related to the AML.
Ill-Informed Enforcement
Prosecutions under the AML itself have almost all been unfounded in light of the actual provisions of the law, primarily because prosecutors and bureaucrats lack proper familiarity with religious beliefs in general and provisions of the AML in particular, and therefore cannot be expected to properly implement this law. Based on prosecutions to date, the term missionary is understood to include any expression of adherence to a religious belief or any communication of one’s religious beliefs, including preaching in a church service, at a location legally leased by a religious group, reading the Bible, or handing out religious literature by individuals unaffiliated with a particular faith. Presumably the target of the AML was to be public activities such as large-scale evangelism campaigns carried out by church members without proper credentials or carried out by foreigners without religious worker/ missionary visas. No such cases have been brought, possibly because believers have abstained from actions clearly prohibited by the AML.
A Baptist Pastor, a Hare Krishna Devotee, and Two Youth on a Train
The first prosecution for unauthorized missionary activity was against a Baptist pastor whose church was conducting a children’s camp in Noyabrsk in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Region. Authorities raided the camp on July 20, the very day the AML went into effect. The AML should not have applied in this case because the pastor was a leader of a church with an apparent legal right to use the facility. He nevertheless chose “as a Christian” to pay a 5,000 ruble fine and not litigate the matter, thus leaving legal issues unresolved. The next prosecution involved the arrest of a young Hare Krishna devotee who was handing out religious literature on the streets of Cherkessk, also in July 2016. He was acquitted based on his lawyer’s argument that he was acting on his own, not on behalf of any religious association. (However, in other cases Hare Krishna devotees have been prosecuted for individual activity such as dancing in the streets.) Some months later, on 7 October 2016, Orthodox activists detained two young people who shared their faith and distributed Gideon Bibles on a Moscow-bound train. Charged under the AML, they still were exonerated on grounds that they were not acting on behalf of any organization. These cases stand for the proposition that individual “missionary activity” is not governed by the AML. Still, courts in other cases have rendered convictions in dealing with similar situations of individual activity.
A Christ Embassy Leader from Ghana
The third case involved the arrest of a Ghanaian citizen, Ebenezer Tuah, who was conducting religious services, including baptisms, in a sanatorium in which his unregistered church, Christ Embassy, had rented space. He also had a Facebook page that gave information about his church’s activities. Raided on 31 July 2016, this church leader was heavily fined after the court found he was conducting missionary activities without having notified the authorities of the creation of his RG or having documented authority from an RG to conduct missionary activities. Under the 1997 Law, however, the RG was not required to file such notice, and because it had not, it could not issue documents of authorization. Tuah was also accused of holding services in an educational institution in which religious services could not be held under Russian law. He argued that he was not engaging in missionary activity, but authorities argued that the very fact that baptisms were occurring proved otherwise. In short, in the court’s view any attracting of new members (allowed under the 1997 Law and the Russian Constitution) is missionary activity.
An American Teacher
A fourth, well-publicized case involved Donald Ossewaarde, an American teacher in Russia who for many years conducted a small, private worship service and Bible study in his rented apartment in Oryol. On 5 August 2016, authorities detained and charged Ossewaarde without giving him timely access to a lawyer. (Ultimately, he was represented by the Slavic Center for Law and Justice.) As in the Tuah case, it was claimed that he should have filed a notice of the creation of an RG, and that he needed written authorization documents from the non-existent RG. Ossewaarde countered that the gathering was private, by invitation only, and that advertisements of the service on a notice board in his apartment building could have been posted by undercover police using tracts he had given them when they had visited his apartment. Despite the testimony of several experts that individuals not affiliated with any religious group were not in violation of the AML for holding religious services in their own homes, Ossewaarde was convicted and fined. He is appealing, but he is unable to continue working in Oryol. The publicity related to the case and the presence of U.S. diplomats in the courtroom, as well as Russian secret service representatives, resulted in what appeared to be a politically motivated verdict, according to witnesses present in the courtroom.
New Generation Pentecostals
Two additional cases in early August 2016 involved pastors associated with New Generation Pentecostal churches. In Mari-Turek, a New Generation church leader spoke from a stage at a festival that displayed the name of his church on a banner. He was charged for engaging in missionary activity outside a permitted location and for not having credentials from a registered RO or an RG that had given notice of its existence. Since he was not affiliated with either type of organization, he could not obtain written credentials, did not represent one, and did not need credentials. Also, the AML does not require that missionary activity be confined to church property.
In the second case in Kemerovo, a female Ukrainian pastor visited several unregistered New Generation congregations, but spoke in only one of them, reportedly to congratulate the pastor’s wife on her birthday. A person disturbed by the Ukrainian’s presence videotaped the meeting, claiming he felt her remarks were intended to “draw him into membership” in the church, thus constituting missionary activity. She was detained while on her way to the airport and fined the very large sum of 30,000 rubles. The church is unregistered and had not notified authorities of its existence. As in the church banner speech case, the group could not have credentialed her, nor could it have given her a religious worker visa. If she engaged in professional religious activity, she arguably violated her visa. This Ukrainian pastor paid the fine and left Russia, foregoing any appeal. Authorities successfully prosecuted another pastor of an unregistered New Generation church in October 2016 and fined him 40,000 rubles for violation of the AML, apparently because he had failed to inform the government of the existence of the church and had not registered it. He is not required to do so under existing Russian law, and regular church preaching should not be considered “missionary activity.”
A Russian Messianic Jew
In late August 2016, a Russian citizen was accused of violating the AML after preaching at a Messianic Jewish congregation in St. Petersburg. Despite being an invited, visiting preacher, he was fined, and his appeal was denied. Sergei Zhuravlev, formerly a Russian Orthodox priest, was the founder in Ukraine of the Reformed Orthodox Church of Christ the Savior (Kyiv Archdiocese). Based on the facts available through press reports, none of his actions violated the AML: a Russian citizen may engage in professional religious activity in any place in Russia, particularly on premises leased by a religious group.
An American Pentecostal Family
In September 2016, an American couple traveling with their young daughter visited a church in Kaluga that has suffered substantial harassment from local government officials. The couple gave public greetings in the church and participated in worship. Local authorities detained them for violations of the law on entry to Russia, were fined, and were released. Presumably local officials believed that going to church is not permitted under a tourist visa.
The Gideons and the Salvation Army
In many cases prosecutors exhibit an ignorance of the law. For example, both the Gideons and the Salvation Army were targeted near the end of 2016 for importing the Synodal Version of the Bible, the edition authorized and published by the ROC-MP. In the case of the Gideons, the organization was accused of being part of the Jehovah’s Witnesses—showing total ignorance of the religious tenets of both groups.
In the Salvation Army’s case, authorities seized Synodal Bibles, hymnals, and other standard Christian publications and came close to destroying the literature because it did not bear the official imprimatur of the Salvation Army. However, the Salvation Army was not the publisher of these books and had no right to claim to be. The notion that Bibles would be burned to satisfy the AML sparked a sharp objection from a legal official of the Russian Orthodox Church. This prosecution was expressly contrary to the 2015 amendment clarifying that the extremist literature law exempted “sacred texts” from its application. In the case of the Salvation Army, it is evident that the literature was not the real problem, but the fact that the Salvation Army had possession of it. If possession of religious literature printed by other organizations becomes a basis for prosecution under the AML, it would mean that use of Synodal Bibles by churches other than the ROC-MP would be illegal—a senseless conclusion.
What Is Behind the Anti-Missionary Law?
Based on my review of the cases brought thus far under the AML (in which, admittedly, the facts are derived only from news reports, not from a review of court records), none of the defendants actually violated the law. That is small consolation to those who had to pay fines to avoid incarceration or large legal fees. A larger concern is that the AML represents another success in the overall state propaganda campaign to brand non-Orthodox Christianity as something alien to Russia and hostile to its national security, requiring strict control and preferably elimination. The insertion of this way of thinking into law enforcement actions, regardless of the content of actual law, is alarming. It is clear from quotes from law enforcement authorities that the defendants are guilty primarily because they exhibit unusual, unfamiliar “Pentecostal tendencies” or because they are foreigners. None of the prosecutions have demonstrated that those charged did anything injurious to the Russian state or its citizens.
Roman Lunkin at Moscow’s SOVA Center has said in a series of articles and interviews that he believes the government is turning administration of religious affairs over to the intelligence services for purposes of propaganda and social control. He reported that the Russian Information Security Doctrine in force as of 5 December 2016 warned that foreign intelligence services may use religious organizations to undermine the state and cause a lessening of morality among Russian citizens. On 28 November 2016, a handbook for employees of executive authorities and law enforcement agencies was issued on the interaction between the state and religious organizations, stating that the “absorption” of non-Orthodox religions is harmful to citizens, decreases their commitment to national unity, and produces psychological stress among its adherents.
At the end of 2016, additional troubling news surfaced. Duma deputies are seeking to require registration of all religious group activities, or at least require a filing of notification by all unregistered religious groups. Mandatory registration was a particularly hated feature of Soviet-era regulation of religious life in Russia, giving authorities the ability to closely monitor believers. Forces hostile to true freedom of conscience are also reportedly pressing for legislation that would set up a process for identifying and repressing undesirable “sects.” Such a measure necessarily would include many of the groups already being targeted by local authorities and would raise fears that “undesirable” groups could be banned based on the content of their religious beliefs. The Ministry of Justice also announced at the end of 2016 that in 2017 it would conduct hundreds of “inspections” of Protestant churches for compliance with laws, including the “foreign agents” law. In that regard, the SOVA Center was recently placed on the “foreign agents” list, which will subject it to mandatory reporting of funding sources from overseas, if any. Also, it now is required to publicly identify itself as a foreign agent—a term implying actions contrary to Russian interests.
On the positive side, ROC-MP Patriarch Kirill has made a number of public statements on the need for Christian unity, particularly regarding the need for a united Christian voice to protest the persecution of Christians in Muslim-majority countries. Protection for Christians in Muslim-majority states was a central point in the Patriarch’s meeting in Cuba with Pope Francis, and in ROC-MP plans to join with the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association in holding a meeting in Washington, DC, in May 2017 addressing worldwide Christian persecution.
The Best Hope for Improved Treatment of Non-Orthodox Believers
My belief is that the best hope for an end to the demonization and groundless state prosecution of nonOrthodox churches in Russia is an overall lessening of tensions between East and West. As long as Putin and his allies see themselves as threatened by Western nations, the more they will continue to identify nonOrthodox churches as forces that must be resisted and eliminated. Whether a lessening of East-West tensions is possible will depend upon a complex set of competing strategic interests, including resolution of the situation resulting from Russian backing for separatists in Ukraine and the war against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. In the meantime, people of faith in the West should continue their efforts to maintain positive relationships with their Russian brothers and sisters and to support the heroic work of the Slavic Center for Law and Justice, the SOVA Center, and other Russian religious human rights activists that have waged a long battle for religious freedom in Russia with frequent success.
Notes
- “RPT Considers Adopted Law on Control of Missionaries’ Activity to be Acceptable,” RIA Novosti, 24 June 2016.
- “Christians in Russia Fear KGB-Style Crackdowns after Putin Signs Law Banning Evangelism,” Christianity Today, 12 July 2016.
- “Putin Signs Sharing Beliefs, ‘Extremism’, Punishments,” Forum 18, 8 July 2016.
- Lauren Homer, “Growing Restrictions on Russian Religious Activities,” East-West Church & Ministry Report 22 (Summer 2014), 17=21.
- Federal Law No. 129-FZ, 19 May 2015, which was condemned by the Venice Commission of the European Union in a detailed report dated 10-11 June 2016.
- “Russia: Religious Freedom Survey,” Forum 18, 13 January 2017.
Lauren B. Homer is the founder of Law and Liberty Trust, Washington, D.C.