An Interview with Ioan-Marius Bucur

Professor Ioan-Marius Bucur has taught history for more than 25 years at Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj (officially Cluj-Napoca), the largest city in the Transylvanian region of northwestern Romania. He has written extensively on the history of the local Greek Catholic Church—which follows the Eastern Orthodox rite but is in communion with Rome—as well as church-state relations more broadly in post-1918 Romania. This includes two Romanian-language monographs: Culpa de a fi greco-catolic. Procesul episcopului Alexandru Rusu (1957) [The Guilt of Being Greek Catholic: The Trial of Bishop Alexandru Rusu (1957)], (Cluj: Editura Argonaut & Mega, 2015) and Din istoria Bisericii Greco-Catolice Române (1918-1953) [From the History of the Romanian Greek Catholic Church (1918-1953)], (Cluj: Editura Accent, 2003).

For insights into the 20th-century plight of the Romanian Greek Catholic Church, particularly under Communism, the editor of the East-West Church Report met Professor Bucur at the Faculty of History and Philosophy in Babeș-Bolyai University in late November 2023. The interview took place in English.

How did the Greek Catholic Church appear in Transylvania?

 Between 1698 and 1700, a series of local Orthodox synods accepted and then ratified union with Rome. The context is significant: Following the Habsburgs’ victory in the Battle of Vienna in 1683, they slowly gained control over the former Ottoman vassal states of Hungary and then Transylvania. Together with their allies in the Catholic Church, the Habsburgs tried to rebalance the ethnic—and especially confessional—configuration of Transylvania. In those days, there were four “received confessions” here: Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, and Unitarians. While in the majority, Orthodox Christians were not recognized. The solution found was to create a united church in accordance with the principles of the Council of Florence [held 1431-49 and which briefly resolved the differences between Catholics and Orthodox].

One consequence was the possibility for ethnic Romanians—at least the elite—to become involved in political life. As confessional allegiance increasingly became a key element in building national identity—particularly in the late 19th century—both Greek Catholic and Orthodox Churches engaged in the project of Romanian national independence. In the absence of a stable middle class, clerics played a major part in the social activism that drove this national liberation movement, although the circumstances differed between Transylvania and the older Romanian principalities—Wallachia and Moldavia—which united in 1859. In Transylvania, there was a double effort emanating from both the Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches.

What was the fate of the Greek Catholic Church in 20th-century Romania?

When the borders of Romania were extended at the end of the First World War, religion became a key issue in discussions about national identity. Is Orthodoxy a determining factor in being Romanian? In which civilization does our history place us—East or West, or are we in between, on some kind of Middle Earth? (Laughs.) Through political, literary, and media debates, the idea emerged that Orthodoxy was a key element in defining Romanian national identity. The question then arose: What to do about the Greek Catholics? At the level of ordinary believers, such discussions were not so important. At the institutional level, however, Metropolitan Nicolae Bălan of Transylvania and other Orthodox bishops highlighted this issue during the interwar years. Their argument was that political union of the Romanian lands was insufficient, and that something should be done for a spiritual union in order to overcome the division among Romanians created by the Habsburgs’ introduction of the Act of Union with Rome. As a member of the Romanian Senate, Metropolitan Nicolae aggressively pushed the proposal that Greek Catholics should reunify with the Orthodox Church during parliamentary debates on legislation concerning religious liberty, for instance. For the most part, the political elites were glad to use the Orthodox Church as an instrument to consolidate the nation. In far northern Transylvania—then predominantly Greek Catholic—an Orthodox archbishopric was created in 1937, for example.

Such proposals were not specific to Romania: Interwar cultural policies promoting cultural assimilation in Poland were also clearly aimed at homogenizing the nation and sparked tensions between Roman Catholic Poles and Greek Catholic Ukrainians in the early 1920s. There were differences, of course, but in Central-Eastern Europe during that period you generally find that the question of whether to define the nation in politically liberal terms—as a civic nation—or as an ethnic nation becomes a pressing issue. This was the case in newly reborn states like Poland or Czechoslovakia; states expanding their territory, like Romania; as well as within the newly formed Kingdom of Yugoslavia—initially the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

When the Greek Catholic Church in Romania was suppressed by the Communists in 1948, was this on Moscow’s orders?

When I was researching this issue in the late 1990s, gaining access to our relevant state archives was problematic. They were open, but only partially—that is the case even today, actually. I tried to find documents that would confirm that Moscow imposed the idea of dismantling the Greek Catholic Church but I did not find anything. Over the past 10 years some fellow historians have gained access to archives that were closed when I started my research, including plans drawn up by the Ministry for Religious Affairs [Romanian: Ministerul Cultelor] at the request of the Politburo [Romanian: Biroul Politic] in Bucharest. They did not need an order from Moscow, but the decision was consonant with Moscow’s logic of severing all relations with the West. Also in the late 1940s, Cominform [a Stalinist body co-ordinating Communist government policy in the Eastern Bloc] adopted a resolution aimed at diminishing Western—and especially Vatican—cultural influence. The decisions taken by the Bucharest authorities with regard to the Greek Catholics in Romania should be seen in that context.

Was the mechanism similar to that used against Ukrainian Greek Catholics in 1946—the convening of a church council consisting of those Greek Catholic clerics willing to compromise with the Communist authorities?

Exactly. With the forced abdication of King Michael I at the end of December 1947, the last remnants of the old bourgeois political order were swept aside. Romania became a People’s Republic, and 1948 marked the beginning of the institutionalization of Communism in each and every sphere of activity, from the economy to culture, and including religious life. That spring the Ministry for Religious Affairs drew up relevant plans that were implemented between September and December. On 2 December 1948 Monitorul Oficial—Romania’s newspaper of record—published a decree announcing that the institutions of the Greek Catholic Church had ceased to exist due to the return of its believers to the faith of the Orthodox Church. It was presented as self-dissolution, as in Ukraine. The strategy and methodology were identical. First, the authorities engineered a petition from priests in favor of “discussing” a return to the Orthodox Church after 250 years. (Laughs.) But they proved unable to organize a valid synod to replicate the one that created the Romanian Greek Catholic Church in Alba Iulia in 1698.

They could not identify any Greek Catholic bishop who would collaborate?

Yes, unlike in Ukraine. The “synod” they organized was held here in Cluj, at a high-school gymnasium on [George] Barițiu Street, not far from here. The proceedings took place under the supervision of senior officials from the Ministry for Religious Affairs. The delegates stayed at a nearby hotel and were escorted to the gymnasium under armed guard. The 1698 Union with Rome had been adopted by 38 archpriests and priests, as well as one bishop. They attempted to reproduce this, but could find only 36 predominantly parish priests—and no bishop.

What happened to the Greek Catholic bishops?

They were all arrested. At the time of the October 1948 “synod,” there were five bishops: Iulia Hossu [d. 1970] of Cluj-Gherla, Alexandru Rusu [d. 1963] of Maramureș, Ioan Bălan [d. 1959] of Lugoj, Valeriu Traian Frențiu [d. 1952] of Oradea Mare, and Ioan Suciu [d.1953], who was apostolic administrator of Alba Iulia and Făgăraș diocese. After their arrest, they were all imprisoned and/or confined to monasteries until they died—Bishops Rusu, Frențiu, and Suciu died in prison.

Those confined to monasteries were presumably closely monitored.

Of course, although people were able to visit them. Given this very aggressive new policy against the Romanian Greek Catholic Church, the Holy See decided to create a clandestine hierarchy that could continue its activity as titular bishops were repressed. This process began in November 1948, when Ioan Ploscaru was consecrated clandestinely as auxiliary bishop of Lugoj at the apostolic nunciature [diplomatic mission of the Holy See] in Bucharest. Alexandru Todea [d. 2002] was one of the last bishops consecrated in this way before Vatican diplomats were barred from Romania for the rest of the Communist period. He was made Cardinal in 1991.

What would ordinary Greek Catholics have experienced after the October 1948 reunification with the Romanian Orthodox Church? Were they forced to profess the Orthodox faith? Did they continue to attend the same churches?

The picture is very complex and nuanced. One important factor is that, being Eastern Rite Christians, Greek Catholics have the same canon, saints, and church calendar as the Orthodox. Another is that the union was very much a formality in many areas, at least initially. The Communists mainly looked at the process of reunification from a political point of view—putting an end to the institution of the Greek Catholic Church was seen as a way to eliminate a source of opposition. From the point of view of senior Orthodox hierarchs, Greek Catholic believers were actually Orthodox, so they did not pay much attention to them.

In some communities—especially in rural areas far from the cities—the process was also a formality because the Communist regime did not have the resources to monitor what was happening there. A priest might consent to reunification with the Orthodox Church while remaining Greek Catholic in his heart and continuing to serve as a Greek Catholic priest. In some cases, priests decided not to consent. This was very difficult psychologically: They had to give up their parishes and find alternative employment, such as in agriculture. They could be arrested, beaten, or threatened with eviction from their homes. As in Ukraine, there was strong political pressure.

To what extent did Greek Catholics preserve their connection with Rome?

It remained very important. There are various forms of piety deriving from Roman Catholicism which were adopted by Greek Catholics in Romania with the tacit consent of their bishops—the cults of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and St. Anthony of Padua, for instance. As far as their liturgical books and ritual were concerned, people became Orthodox, but such influences persisted in terms of lived religion. In some Transylvanian villages, you will find reproductions of the Sacred Heart or rosaries in the homes of some Orthodox believers even today.

Were you raised in a community that retained its Greek Catholic identity?                    

No. My parents were blue-collar workers with very modest social origins. My father was the first—and my mother the second—generation to live in a city. Having transitioned from poor housing with no plumbing to apartment blocks, employment, and social security, the new way of life—not religion—was what mattered. They followed a daily routine that was identical for millions of Romanians in the 1960s and ’70s.

This socioeconomic perspective is another part of the complicated explanation of what happened to Greek Catholics. When the Communist regime was established in 1948, Romania was still a rural, traditional society—almost 80 percent of the population lived in rural areas and drew their revenue from agriculture. There were very few cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Romanian society underwent rapid modernization as the economy was industrialized according to the directives of those in power. As the rural population was absorbed into the new, urban areas, links with memory and identity—including religion—were severed. In Cluj, for instance, there was no new church built between 1948 and 1990. Religion was left aside by many young people, who were the ones moving into the cities.

While my mother grew up in Cluj, my father was born in a small village where the Greek Catholic priest decided to sign the union with the Orthodox Church and continued to serve in the same parish. My father did not have very good memories of that priest! Ways of punishing pupils in Romania were harsh in those days, and one of them was being made to kneel on nutshells. When I was a child, we visited the wooden church in the village. I tried to ask my father about his childhood, but he replied, “I don’t care to remember, because we had a priest who made me kneel on nuts for not learning some prayers!” He was marked by that experience.

I also remember, as a child, watching my maternal grandmother following what I considered a very strange routine. On Sundays she used to listen to a Vatican Radio Romanian-language broadcast of a Greek Catholic Mass on an old-fashioned radio with funny lights and noises. I would watch her kneel down to listen to this service. At that time, I did not ask about this, and neither did my family raise the subject. When still at elementary school, I also discovered a booklet of prayers to St. Anthony at our home. I asked my mother about it, but she said something like, “That’s not your business.” She probably had a protective instinct not to open up what could be a sensitive issue at school: “Let him take care of his schooling, and we’ll deal with that later.” In other families, experiences could be quite different, of course.

What was it like for Greek Catholics in Cluj who tried to maintain their faith?

 It was much more complicated in the cities, as government surveillance was far more present—it was not like a village away in the hills where no one knew what was going on! If you were also part of the old intellectual world—if a parent or grandparent had been a university professor or lawyer, for instance—your family may well have been targeted for repression in the early Communist years, and you could experience discrimination as a result. You might be forbidden access to university, for example. That was the case for many thousands of young Romanians due to their social origins.

Some urban Greek Catholic believers who decided not to attend Orthodox worship chose to go to Roman Catholic churches. This was rather complicated in Transylvania, because here Roman Catholicism is culturally associated with the Hungarian community. As this was prior to the Second Vatican Council [1962-65], however, there was also an advantage, as the Mass was said in Latin.

That would be easier to understand than Hungarian, given that Romanian derives from Latin?

Exactly, especially for Romanians with a moderate level of education. The sermon would be in the local language—in this case, Hungarian—but all Catholic services had to be in Latin until the Second Vatican Council.

In cities like Cluj, would Greek Catholic families who decided to attend churches that had become Orthodox actually become Orthodox over a couple of generations, given the slight differences between the two forms of worship?

The issue of Greek Catholic identity is a very complex one. I can cite my own family as an example: I was baptized in a small historic church named Bob Church after the Greek Catholic bishop, Ioan Bob, who built it around 1800 [https://bisericabobcluj.ro]. This was the church of my mother’s family, and she and her sisters were baptized there. At the time of my birth, it was an Orthodox church. My mother also married there, but with an Orthodox priest, as the family continued to regard it as their own church. It was returned to the Greek Catholic Church in 1995.

 I first attended Greek Catholic worship in the early 1990s. At that time, the Greek Catholics held open-air Sunday Masses in Cluj city center, in front of the monument to King Matthias Corvinus on Union Square [Romanian: Piața Unirii]. This was because they had not received back any historically Greek Catholic churches at that point. They won back the Transfiguration Cathedral [a Roman Catholic church donated to the Greek Catholic Church in 1926] only in 1998. That was  after a huge protest, including some small but violent confrontations between Greek Catholic and Orthodox theology students.

That was just one conflict over the restitution of Greek Catholic church buildings at the time. Were these generally instances where a single parish contained opposing opinions about what should happen? Or did more senior Greek Catholics claim the church building even if the parishioners were mostly content to continue as Orthodox?

We may find all kinds of situations, including the ones you describe. Again, I will cite the history of my own family. My mother, God rest her soul, decided to remain Orthodox. One of her sisters, also deceased, said, “No, I was baptized Greek Catholic, and I am going to attend a Greek Catholic church.” My mother’s response was, “Okay, go there—that is your decision.” In other cases—especially in rural areas—a few families considered themselves Greek Catholic because of their mothers or grandmothers, but they did not represent the majority within their community, and so there was friction. Given the possibility to do in-depth sociological research, I am sure that the whole picture would prove extremely complex.

 In order to examine church property disputes, I think we need a framework of reference, for which we still need to answer certain questions. For instance, what do the terms “politics of memory” [how collective memory of history is addressed politically] and “transitional  justice” [how societies respond to the legacies of egregious human-rights violations] mean in countries like Romania, bearing in mind what happened in 1948 and under Communism in general? From what vantage point are we going to judge the past, and how are we going to ensure that justice is done, both for those who are alive and in memory of those who are no longer with us? This is key, I believe—how do you reflect upon your past, bearing in mind what Communism meant for the whole of society, not just the Church?

If we take this approach, I think it becomes obvious that the first constructive attempts to address the past in Romania occurred only after 1996, when the first coalition opposed to the neo-Communists was elected. Prior to that, there was ambiguity on this issue: A decree recognizing the legality of the Greek Catholic Church was adopted, but the authorities were extremely evasive concerning the issue of church property restitution. They followed the Orthodox position that the believers of each parish should decide whether to remain Orthodox or not. However, the process is very complicated from that perspective, given the changes to Greek Catholic identity over four decades of Communism.

After three post-Communist decades, is confessional identity now more settled?

I had hoped to research this point, but it proved very difficult to ascertain why few Romanian Orthodox whose parents and/or grandparents were Greek Catholics decided to join the Greek Catholic Church again after 1990. This occurred despite the fact that the Romanian Greek Catholic Church had succeeded in retaining its institutional identity at great cost. I still have no answer. I believe the explanation partly has to do with how believers internalized the differences between being Greek Catholic and Orthodox under Communism. In Ukraine, Greek Catholicism was very important in terms of cultural and national identity. This was also the case in Romania, of course, but in our case the Orthodox Church was similarly Romanian—and not Russian.

 
 

ewcr footer logo

PO Box 76741
Washington, DC 20013   
USA

Contact

Home  |  Site Map  |  Site Feedback  |  CONTACT 
Cookies user preferences
We use cookies to ensure you to get the best experience on our website. If you decline the use of cookies, this website may not function as expected.
Accept all
Decline all
Unknown
Joomla
User
Accept
Decline
Joomla
Accept
Decline
Save