An Interview with Anca Șincan

Dr. Anca Șincan is a researcher at Gheorghe Șincai Institute for Social Sciences and the Humanities of the Romanian Academy in the Transylvanian city of Târgu Mureș, also her home town. She was part of the research team for the groundbreaking recent European Research Council project Creative Agency and Religious Minorities: “Hidden Galleries” in the Secret Police Archives in Central and Eastern Europe. [For more on the Hidden Galleries project, see https://hiddengalleries.eu/ and Tatiana Vagramenko, “How the KGB Turned Believers into the Enemy,” East-West Church Report, vol. 28 (2020), no. 1, 11-12.] In 2006 she contributed expertise on religion under Communism to the Presidential Commission for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania [Romanian: Comisia Prezidenţială pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din România].

 In April 2024 the editor of the East-West Church Report interviewed Dr. Șincan in downtown Washington, DC, where she was spending several months as her husband Dr. Ionuț Biliuță—also a specialist in the field of religion in Romania—completed a research fellowship. The original conversation took place in English.

How did you come to research Christian life in Communist Romania?

When I was a BA student one of my professors said to me, “Your father was a priest under Communism. Why not take church life during that period as the topic of your BA thesis?” I worked on how the Romanian Orthodox rewrote Greek Catholic historiography after the Greek Catholics were forced to unite with the Romanian Orthodox Church in 1948. I then did an MA on local ecumenical relations during the Communist period at the Faculty of European Studies of Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj. After that, I completed a second MA and a PhD in the history of church-state relations in Communist Romania at the Central European University in Budapest.

I looked at religion from the state’s perspective. I wanted to see what changed when Communist administrators began to oversee religious life after the Second World War. They borrowed from Soviet textbooks on how to deal with various spheres of life, including religious policy. But the context in Romania was rather different. The church-state relationship they borrowed from the Soviet Union was the one newly implemented in the 1940s, by which time the Soviets had had 20 years in which to demolish religion. When this new policy was created, the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union was almost non-existent as an institution—they had to create a new church structure, leadership, everything. In Romania—as elsewhere in Eastern Europe—the Communists did not have this 20-year period in which religion had been dismantled. Religion was alive and extremely well-established. This was especially the case in rural areas, and Romania was still a largely rural society. The new Communist state in Romania had a dilemma: On the one hand, it was supposed to get rid of religion, but at the same time, the guys in Moscow were saying, “You have to create an understanding with religion that will help you to function.”

Was there a movement in Romania similar to the Soviet League of the Militant Godless?

No, there was nothing like that to help the Romanian state do away with religion. There was an anti-religious campaign corresponding to that of Khrushchev in the Soviet Union [1958-64]. At that time, many Soviet writings offering a scientific way of dealing with religion—“Science will explain how everything works, you don’t need God for that”—were translated into Romanian. By the mid-1960s, however, the Romanian state found it needed religion for legitimation of the regime. In 1964 there was a general amnesty, in which political prisoners were released and integrated into Romanian society. These were people who had been active in the interwar period and who had kept their religious allegiance, and so religion returned to the discourse of nation building.

The political line of “Communism with a national twist”—national Stalinism, if you like—was continued by Nicolae Ceaușescu after he took over as leader of Romania in 1965. The crushing of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968 became a further factor. Ceaușescu was concerned that the same thing could happen in Romania, and so we drifted further from Moscow. This never became a complete break, but it sparked a relationship with the United States, which hoped for greater democratization. Clearly, that did not happen, but Americans’ interest in religion became another reason why it was more tolerated in Romania.

Did the fact that your father is an Orthodox priest give you particular insight into the nuances of how the Romanian Orthodox Church dealt with the Communist authorities?

First of all, it gave me access to the archives of the Romanian Patriarchate, which is not the case for everyone. I received letters of recommendation from several bishops when I started my research. I was able to see material curated by the archivists, whose attitude was, “Little girl, let us tell you how it was… .” Nevertheless, I saw documents from those archives.

 Having a father who is an Orthodox priest also helped because there are questions that the archives cannot answer. Bishops and priests are typically reticent when talking about the Communist period, yet they were more open to answering my questions in that regard. A chapter of my thesis dealt with church construction in the 1970s and ’80s—I found it curious that numerous new churches appeared then, in my childhood. As well as studying local government and church archives, I was able to talk to the priests who built these churches. I could ask them, “Who gave you permission and funding for that?” Those interviews would not have happened without the help of my father.

In 2010 you wrote a paper on that topic: “From Bottom to the Top and Back: On How to Build a Church in Communist Romania” [https://www.icsumures.ro/lucrari/A.Sincan_From-Bottom-to-the-Top-and-Back.pdf]. There you observe that church building in Communist Romania often relied upon family or other personal connections with relevant government officials. That sounds like something which would only emerge if you knew the people concerned.

You wouldn’t know it from the central archives. Plus, my father served as a priest in the late 1970s and ’80s. He had to deal with the Communist plenipotentiaries for religious affairs, the so-called împuterniciţi. As a result, I was able to speak to some of those who had been plenipotentiaries before 1990.

At that time, you needed planning permission from the county architect if you wanted to build anything. I learned that the architect for Mureș County in Transylvania granted planning permission for many Orthodox churches, which surprised me, as he was ethnic Hungarian, while we researchers were discussing anti-Hungarian and other Romanian nationalization projects emanating from Bucharest. When I first started researching this, I had thought it was an attempt by ethnic Romanians to nationalize territory after industrialization brought many Romanian workers into previously strongly Hungarian parts of Transylvania in the 1970s. However, this Hungarian architect responded, “No, the churches were not built in the cities where the industrial complexes were. They were built or rebuilt in the villages.” So my question became, “Why were they allowed to build churches in the villages? What would the state gain by that?”

When I asked in one village why they had built such a church, the inhabitants explained: “Well, we had an old church which was Greek Catholic.” As I went from village to village, I realized that these were actually Greek Catholic villages that had become Orthodox, and that church construction was an activity through which the community had changed. Essentially, this was the state assisting the Orthodox Church in converting the villagers from being Greek Catholic to Orthodox. The villages did not switch back in 1990 [after the fall of Communism] because they had put such effort into building these new churches.

In Romania there seems to have been considerable contradiction in Communist religious policy, with some aspects of religious life tolerated. 

Officially, for instance, you were not allowed to teach religion—certainly not in schools—but there were ways to bypass this. When I was a child in the 1980s, we had a sort of Sunday school every evening during the two-week fasting period prior to the feast of the Dormition of the Mother of God [celebrated by Romanian Orthodox on 15 August]. The Catholics and Protestants had successfully petitioned the state authorities in Transylvania for the right to conduct Sunday schools. Archival documents show the Orthodox negotiating for the same right as a result, as well as letters from church administrators asking parish priests if they wished to lead Sunday schools. This would be an extra job for the priest—two more hours after Sunday liturgy—so whether or not classes took place might depend upon how dedicated the priest was. The Orthodox Church has also always taught theology through its services, so its ability to do so would already provide an introduction to the Bible.

Another interesting factor determining the limits of toleration was that Orthodox leaders knew the state so well by the 1970s that they would punish people in advance. The state did not need to act, as the church hierarchs already knew what would bother the state and intervened to maintain the status quo. Collaboration with the state was unavoidable… actually, I do not much like the word “collaboration” because it suggests a relationship on equal terms. I prefer “co-option.” The church was co-opted by the state and slowly transformed into a state institution. In Romania, this process started in the mid-19th century, when the Orthodox Church’s lands and fortune were nationalized. It continued between the two world wars, when the state was involved in the selection of bishops and funded religious education. It was completed by the Communists, who turned the church into an uber-centralized institution in the sense that, if the authorities had a word with the church leadership, a priest behaving out of line in a remote village somewhere would be punished. 

There are accounts of especially brutal Communist persecution of Christians in Romania, such as re-education experiments in the early ’50s and early ’60s involving physical and mental torture at notorious prisons such as Aiud and Gherla. [See, for example, Alexandru Popescu, Petre Țuțea: Between Sacrifice and Suicide, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004, 62-75.]     

On coming to power, the Communists first embarked upon a process of de-Nazification. A lot of Orthodox held interwar allegiances to the fascist Iron Guard. The new Communist regime did not know the Orthodox Church, and everything looked bad to the young officials at the Ministry for Religious Affairs [Romanian: Ministerul Cultelor] and the Securitate secret police. People could be sent to jail for even the most minor transgression. At the same time, the regime made use of people even if they had collaborated with the fascists because they could be blackmailed into doing whatever the state needed. Many functionaries were retained—within the Ministry for Religious Affairs, almost 60 percent of personnel were kept on from the pre-Communist period.

Whenever a change of regime takes place, it is common to retain specialists from the previous one. This even happened under the Communist regime—especially in the sphere of church-state relations. While many clergymen went to jail, many sympathizers with the fascist Iron Guard movement [founded in 1927 as the Legion of the Archangel Michael] were picked up by the Communist authorities and employed in the second or third tiers of state administration. There were not enough Communists to run the Ministry for Religious Affairs, basically. Many elements of policy from the interwar period ended up being re-used, as these lower-level administrators could not simply become faithful followers of a new ideology which they had fought against for 20 years. 

On the other hand, the Communists wanted institutions they could manage. I have a theory that the state was creating a second, parallel hierarchy for the Orthodox Church within the Ministry for Religious Affairs. This included Patriarch Iustin [Moisescu, 1977-86], who succeeded Patriarch Justinian [Marina, 1948-77] and was a theology professor on the payroll of the Ministry for Religious Affairs. When a suitable vacancy appeared in 1956, he went from being a layman to an archbishop in less than a month.

Is it clear from the archives to what extent Patriarch Iustin was a churchman prepared to compromise or a creature of the state?

He was entirely a creature of the state. On the other hand, the regime could have forced Patriarch Justinian into retirement, but they kept him and waited for his natural death. During that time, Iustin remained in Iaşi as Metropolitan of Moldova and Suceava for 20 years.

Do the archives refer to him by a codename?

 All the bishops are referred to by codenames, even if they did not collaborate. Both Patriarch Iustin and Patriarch Justinian collaborated with the state in the sense that they went back and forth negotiating and compromising. However, Iustin is someone whose origins are within the state administration and the theological sphere, whereas Patriarch Justinian began as a rural priest with some leftist political connections.

A KGB archival document in Kyiv from the late 1940s indicates that the degree of collaboration by Soviet-approved Orthodox bishops in newly occupied Ukraine varied hugely. While denunciations by some resulted in multiple arrests, others were vocally critical of the Soviet regime, even while Stalin was alive. [See Geraldine Fagan, “Christians as Targets of the KGB: A Peek into the SBU’s Historical Archives,” East-West Church Report, vol. 28 (2020), no. 1, 4-5.]

 We did not have such critical voices—at least, not in the public sphere. They could be found in monasteries—where many people went who were ideologically opposed to the regime—but not at the level of the church hierarchy. Any independent voices were taken out by the Communists and replaced with someone acceptable to the regime. After that, Romanian hierarchs were either men who collaborated willingly and happily, or men who took care of their flock and did nothing that would spark confrontation with the state.

There were also attempts within the Romanian Orthodox Church to ostracize people known to be collaborating with the state. Archival correspondence can give interesting insights into this. After one former Greek Catholic signed the forced union with the Orthodox Church in 1948, the Communists installed him as auxiliary Orthodox bishop of Cluj. Wary of his ties with the state, the bishop of Cluj refused to allow him into senior diocesan meetings. This former Greek Catholic then wrote to officials in Bucharest: “I cannot give you information if the bishop does not allow me into his meetings. You must force him somehow [to let him into the meetings].” The archives preserve the state’s response in the form of officials’ letters to that bishop, saying: “You must allow this man to participate in your meetings because he is your auxiliary bishop!” From such documents you start to realize how the church gradually learnt what the state wanted and tried to do the bare minimum.

Have there been any repercussions since 1990 for Orthodox hierarchs who collaborated with the Communists?

Bishop Emilian Birdaș of Alba Iulia [d.1996] was forced out immediately after the revolution, although he was soon reinstated as auxiliary bishop in Arad. My father was a dean in Târgu Mureș at that time: Clergy in Alba Iulia diocese became rather revolutionary and decided to remove Emilian for collaborating with the regime. Their thinking was that this would be the beginning of a wider process, but that did not happen—I think Bishop Emilian was the only hierarch who was ousted. It really came down to likeability: He was a bishop who behaved tyrannically towards his priests, and they used the opportunity of the revolutionary mood within the country to get rid of him.

You have also conducted research into the role of Greek Catholic women.

In the archives of departments for religious affairs, you will find women being counted—300 women participating in a particular service, for example. There are seldom names, only numbers, making it possible to do sociological reviews of how many women attended church or how many were nuns, for example. But the secret police archives deal with private life, and so women pop up there. With those archives, you can start to put faces to the numbers.

Greek Catholic women are some of the best examples for a researcher. Regarded as heads of the family, only Greek Catholic men had to sign in support of reunification with the Orthodox Church in 1948—other members of the family transferred with them automatically, apparently. Men who did not want to accept the reunification went to jail, which suddenly created a space for women. Women had to continue Greek Catholic religious life, and so you start to see a different church. The Virgin Mary starts to have a more prominent role, for example, and women start to teach religion. They have to create underground networks in order to find the nearest priest if there is no longer one available in their village. In order to do that, they have to turn to Roman Catholics, who are Hungarian in Transylvania. Most of their priests barely speak Romanian, and so women act as translators.

 In one Transylvanian village I interviewed two Greek Catholic women who set up a Sunday school at home in the early 1950s. They invited a priest from a nearby town to come every Sunday to teach, but as he was Hungarian, they told him just to sit there while they taught whatever he requested, and to correct them if they made any mistakes. In this way, they became empowered through their role as intermediaries. In the 1990s—when there were not so many archives open—we usually talked about the role of women in the church under Communism as a domestic one: They taught their children religion at home, and this is how religion survived. It is now clear that this was not the case—at least not in Romania, but also in Poland and some other Eastern European countries. Women might have taught the basics of religious precepts in a domestic environment, but that was not the only thing they did. Some of them were steering an underground church that continued to function.

As a result of archival documents in which Communist officials concluded: “We have defeated religion because there are only old women going to church,” there has also been a tendency to assume that religion became a preserve of the elderly under Communism. This was really not the case in Eastern Europe. It was usually young nuns who took up intermediary roles, for example. In the early 1950s they were able to travel from one place to another, to connect a bishop under house arrest in one village with another elsewhere. This happened because the state officials were biased against them. They did not think that women were capable of doing this. It was only late in the Communist period when secret police officers figured out, “Hey, we have to pay attention to these women.”

Would such women look like Greek Catholic nuns?

No, because it was illegal to wear the habit. They would dress in a certain way—-a long skirt, head covered—but you would not automatically recognize them as nuns.

Were they still able to live in community?

Most of them were engaged in social work in hospitals, old people’s homes, and the like, so they requalified as social workers, doctors, nurses, or teachers. An underground Greek Catholic community led by a group of nuns that was broken up in Cluj in the 1960s used to gather inside a hospital. Its members were converting young people, preaching about family life and against divorce and abortion. Even once the state authorities realized this was happening, they still thought there had to be a man or men behind it!

What are some of the challenges of working with this archival material?

The main problem is that these archives are basically anti-biographies—all the negative parts of a person’s life are assembled against them. The underground church is not necessarily a good or holy place—and if bad things happen, you cannot turn to the state for protection. If you were to report a priest for rape, for example, you would immediately be jailed because you had visited that priest in the first place. Who will punish the priest? Nobody. When you see such a story in the archive, you think, “If I bring out this story now, won’t I be doing more harm to the victim? Am I not doing the same thing as the secret police when they first found out about this rape and instrumentalized it?” What is and is not for public consumption is complicated for a researcher, and you usually have to take several steps back and consider the documents from a different, ethical perspective.

The archives contain a lot on infidelity and sexual matters, for example. When the Securitate opened a file on a priest, among the first entries in his biographical information—after his place of birth and parents’ names—was “he likes women” or “homosexual, deviant.” The state was particularly interested in privacy and sexuality when dealing with priests because it could be used immediately as blackmail. Is it important to point this out? I think it is, because people’s lives were reduced to this and it meant that decisions were taken based upon sexual behavior.

Given such content, it seems extraordinary that these archives are publicly accessible.

The rules regulating access to the archives in Romania are very open in the sense that a researcher can see a file in its entirety—nothing is hidden. However, you cannot make copies of the files. When you request a copy, any details connected with sex, as well as disease, are blacked out in the copy.

But you still know what is there if you have seen the original?

Yes. If you go back to the original file in the archive, you can see what has been covered over in the copy.

Including any names?

Except for those of spies or informants—they are given aliases. If you research in these archives for a long time, however, you can figure out the identities of church figures. We do have some of the most accessible secret police archives in the former Communist bloc. 

Is this now an accepted part of public life in Romania, or do people try to sensationalize the contents?

Every darn day! That typically happens to public figures, such as Nadia Comăneci, the famous Olympic gymnast who defected to the United States in 1989. Nobody goes into the archives to look for files on ordinary people—except those in the church. When the archives were opened in the 2000s, I recall an Evangelical church starting to purge itself of collaborators with the regime. Then at some point, one of its members came out and said: “We will have to stop because, if we continue, there won’t be any church left to speak of!”

Another ethical problem we have with these archives is that they tell us nothing about the secret police officers who compiled them. They tell us only about the lives of the people being surveilled and demonized—the victims, as well as the informants, who may also be victims sometimes. I do not believe in the uncovering of informants. They were sometimes blackmailed into informing, or consented so that their children could go to university, for example. If you look at these files from an ethical point of view, you can have a really difficult time justifying being able to see them as a researcher. The Hidden Galleries project in which I participated was conducted in a way that bypasses this. We do not necessarily need the stories contained in the files in order to examine the collections of material objects confiscated from a religious community by the secret police.                 

As a researcher you therefore oscillate between Stanford historian Stephen Kotkin, who says you should not delve into the “den of iniquity” contained in these files, and Yale historian Laura Engelstein, who points out that we would not have the stories of some communities without them. There are people who have never seen their parents because the secret police confiscated all their family photographs, for instance. For some of these underground church communities, the archives are the only place in which their lives have been preserved. If you get rid of that, they no longer exist in the historical record. So, bearing these two perspectives in mind, you must navigate a way of reading these files that is not just telling the story the secret police wanted to tell.

 
 
 
 

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