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Volume 14, No. 4

CORRECTION

In reference to the table, “Religious Communities in Georgia,” East-West Church & Ministries Report 14 (Winter 2006), 11, the European Values Survey (2001) is the source for the figure of 1,261,500 total active church members. As noted in endnote 1, the rest of the table is the outcome of the research and investigation of Darrell Jackson, author of “Church Strength in Georgia,” ibid., 10-12.

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Volume 14, No. 4

Xenophobia Versus Charity In Contemporary Russian Orthodoxy

Father Georgii Chistiakov

Almost two decades have passed since the era of glasnost and perestroika, when religion in Russia was allowed to escape the “ghetto” to which it had been confined in the Soviet Union. Until the mid-1980s, officially permitted religion existed under harsh state control. Churches were open, but far from all of them. Only 44 of the approximately 1,000churches in Moscow remained open; in Leningrad, only ten, and in provincial regions, typically from one to three (although some had no churches at all).

It is impossible to watch new churches and bell towers being opened, renovated, and appearing in previously empty places without experiencing a feeling of excitement. One recent spring, in a small village about 40kilometers from Moscow where I sometimes spend my free time, a new church began to group. It was a tiny log church, built directly on the banks of a small stream near the forest. This is happening everywhere.

The Language of Worship

However, this idyllic form masks a quite complex reality. Orthodox religious services are conducted everywhere in medieval Slavonic, which is almost completely incomprehensible to churchgoers. The Slavonic language, while marvelous in itself, is analogous to Catholic Latin; for the modern individual it is an obstacle on the path to religious enlightenment. It makes the long Byzantine-style services inaccessible to most people, as they cannot understand what is being read and sung. It is important to understand that neophyte believers predominate in the church today, people who had no ties to Orthodoxy or church life before the start of perestroika. As a model for behavior, they naturally chose to imitate previous generations, that is, those people who preserved Orthodoxy as a confession and way of life in the Soviet era. This hearkens back to the second half of the nineteenth century and the preservationist tendencies of Orthodoxy of that time (in the broad sense, from the late Slavophiles and Konstantin Leontiev to Konstantin Pobedonostsev and the “Black Hundreds”).

Anti-Semitic Tendencies

Such an idealization of the past – and not the past of the apostles and the gospels, or of the great saints like Sergei of Radonezh, but of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries –led to calls for the canonization of Nicholas IIand the members of his family who were killed in 1918. In the 1990s, this became the main issue for many believers and for others who identified their political views and broader worldviews with Orthodoxy. Many of those longing for the quick canonization of Tsar Nicholas and his family demanded that the murder of the tsar be treated as a ritual murder, that is, carried out by Jews for ritual purposes. They praised Nicholas II as the “Tsar-Martyr, ”One Anointed by God,” and the “Preserver of Orthodoxy” who had been “Tortured by the Yids.”

Suspicion of the Other

The above facts raise sharp questions about the self-conceptualization of Russian Orthodoxy. A modern religious society in Russia – not rooted in the life of the divine service, the life of prayer, and the generally mystic life of Eastern Christianity – is beginning to take shape without developing deeper vision of Orthodoxy. Rather, it opposes itself to Christians of other traditions – both Catholic and Protestant - and does so not through Russian or Western concepts but through the Communist paradigm of a“bourgeois, enemy civilization in opposition to us. “Orthodox consciousness quickly becomes xenophobic, closed, and highly intolerant of other faiths and the West in general. This image of the enemy is connected with extreme nationalism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia. Anti-Semitism within the realm of the Church is accepted quite broadly. “Yid-masons” are blamed literally for everything.

In both Moscow and St. Petersburg, Sergei Nilus’s well-known book, It is Near, At the Gates (2000), has been published and reprinted many times, most recently in a print run of 7,500 copies, and is sold in many Orthodox churches and in kiosks in the Moscow metro. This book includes the infamous “Protocols of the Elders of Zion,” an anti-Semitic tract which Hitler used extensively in Mein Kampf. Orthodox traditionalists Anatolii Makeev and Ruslan Bychkov go even further: “We Russians are in captivity in our own land.” After condemning mixed marriages, they state, “Let the world ‘get kinky-haired, dark-skinned, and speak with an accent,’ but Vanya’s blue eyes must never darken. Therefore, we repeat again and again: Purity of Faith and Purity of Blood!”

Orthodoxy: Universal or Particular?

One of the basic forms of xenophobia is intolerance in relation to other Christian faiths. In Soviet times, Catholics and Protestants were seen as brothers whose support helped Russia’s Christians survive under state atheism. Now, however, they are seen as enemies, threatening the very existence not only of Orthodoxy, but of Russia itself. Orthodoxy is declared the Russian national religion, and calls for Christian unity are understood to be directed against Russia, against her past and future, against her national identity. In this way, Christianity becomes a means with which to express a national soul and a national spirituality. In this situation it inevitably loses its universal character, setting aside Christ’s call to “let all be as one” and becoming, as one Orthodox priest from America put it, a Russian tribal religion.

In addition to this intolerance of other Christian traditions, today in Russia many feel defensive about Orthodoxy itself. When believers know little about their own Orthodox faith, about its depth and spiritual treasures, they begin to think that they can prove their righteousness only through aggressive struggle against other confessions. This leads them to a constant, forceful rejection of Catholics and Protestants, which reinforces an image of the enemy in their own consciousness. For example, a young artist announced on Russian national television that “Not a single other people has icon painting that can compare to ours.” He made this statement and yet knew nothing about the religious art of other traditions, including that of other Orthodox peoples(Greeks, Cypriots, Romanians, and Bulgarians).

Why could he not have stated this in another way, for example, that Russian icon painting is such that any people would admire it? This would be true, and still very flattering for the Russian people. It is not an accident that a copy of Andrei Rublev’s “Holy Trinity” became the primary sacred object and a symbol of the SteTrinite Catholic Church in Paris, while reproductions of the icon Our Lady of Vladimir can be found in Catholic churches almost everywhere.

Orthodoxy as Substitute Ideology

The religious situation in Russia today results primarily from the almost blind search for a new, mandatory ideology by a society raised on Marxism-Leninism now seeking the next “one true path.” As a result, in the minds of many, including pure and honest believing people, Orthodoxy has become a new ideology just like the old one. Apart from this, the situation can be explained by the extremely low level of knowledge about faith, about God, about the gospels, and, most importantly, about the nature of Orthodoxy itself. So, most people see the Julian Calendar, 13 days behind the modern (Gregorian) one, as a major symbol of

Orthodoxy even though the majority of Orthodox churches, including Constantinople, rejected it long ago. When Metropolitan Vladimir (Kotliarov) suggested during a sermon few years ago in St. Petersburg, that the Russian Church should follow the examples of the Constantinople, Alexandrian, and Antioch Orthodox churches and adopt the new style, a scandal ensued. In the pro-Communist newspaper Sovetskaia Rossiia (Soviet Russia),religious activists subsequently called the Metropolitan a heretic and an enemy of Orthodoxy.

This same newspaper and its regular contributor, K. Dushenov, called MetropolitanFilaret (Vakhromeev) of Minsk and Slutsk a heretic for his consistent ecumenism. Paradoxically, the same Communist Party that for 70 years cultivated a warlike atheism, destroyed churches, and shot believers, now adopts the role of defender of Orthodoxy. Of course, Communists are not interested in Orthodoxy itself, but they do support those who favor a politics of national, spiritual, and cultural isolationism. For this reason, the interests of some Orthodox fundamentalists coincide with those of today’s Communist leaders.

There is hope that with time these “growing pains” will be overcome. Over the last few years, the tendencies described above have become somewhat weaker. But the tortuous, slow, and inconsistent development of civil society in Russia means that an isolationist worldview, rather than a vision of life rooted in the New Testament, which opposes all xenophobia and feelings of exclusivity, still predominates.

Signs of Hope

What are the prospects for the progressive development of the religious situation in our country? They are, on the whole, not as bad as they may seem. Over the past 20 years, Christianity in the Russian Orthodox tradition(within Russia as well as beyond Russian borders) has given the world such glorious people as Father Aleksii Mechev and Archimandrite Sofronii (Sakharov), Father Sergei Bulgakov and Mother Maria (Skoptsova),Fathers Nikolai Afanas’ev and Aleksandr Shmemann, Archimandrite Tavrion, Metropolitan Antonii (Blum), and Father Aleksandr Men.

The joyous Orthodoxy of the recently canonized Father Aleksii Mechev, the spiritual teachings of Sofronii(Sakharov), the holy life, literary work, and icon painting of Mother Maria (a Russian nun from Paris) – all this is spiritual capital indicating that Orthodoxy lives and still possesses the evangelical spirit that makes Christians true disciples of Christ. Mother Maria, a philosopher, poet, and scholar, dedicated herself completely to the poor and destitute. During the war she saved Jews in Paris and for this was sent to the gas chamber.

Let us also recall the literary renaissance connected with Father Nikolai Afanas’ev in Paris and Aleksandr Shmemann in New York, as well as the teachings on prayer of Metropolitan Antonii (Blum). Think of the living, service-oriented communities that they created. According to Jesus in the twenty-fifth chapter of the Gospel of Matthew, it is precisely work among those who are sick, who suffer, and who have been cast into the streets that heals Christians from spiritual illness and keeps our faith from corruption. Finally, it is impossible to forget the works of Father Aleksandr Men, killed in the time of perestroika.

His scholarly and pastoral activities epitomized the work of those mentioned above and, of course, we remember his openness to Christians of other faiths, and indeed to all of humanity. We must keep in mind that there are as well many spiritually healthy people in the Church today. It is important only that they do not fear the “Black Hundreds” who announce themselves much more loudly than do quiet and diligent believers. Faith is not an ideology and not a call to battle with ever-present enemies. Orthodoxy cannot accept racist, anti-Semitic, or xenophobic attitudes because such attitudes are contrary to the gospel which Christ gave to all peoples without exception.

Society in Russia is developing and tearing away the isolationist ideology that today attracts mainly those on the margins. Aggressive nationalism is not the ideology of the majority. The main task facing the community of academic religious scholars, historians, and political scientists is therefore to ensure that people receive serious, factual information on religion and on the essence of the faith (the gospels and church history). Russians must be fed not on propagandistic myths, but on concrete facts. Myths lose their attractiveness once people possess information about what phenomenon actually represents. It is vital to build an open society in Russia. Once that occurs, the situation in the Church will normalize as well, and quite quickly.

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Volume 14, No. 4

NGOs on Russia’s Leading Edge

John A. Bernbaum

During the course of my work in Russia, a number of truths have become evident to me about the future of this long-suffering nation. First and foremost, it is clear that Russians themselves are going to be the ones to determine their future – not Americans and not Europeans, as well intentioned as they may be. Second, Russia’s future society will probably not look like those in the West. It will be distinctively Russian, with some borrowings from the West and some uniquely Russian structures. Third, any productive Western helping the rebuilding process must be through communicating experiences and lessons learned, both positive and negative. Finally, constructive, long-lasting change in Russia will only come from the bottom-up, and not from the top-down.

Russia Rebuilding

While Western media tend to focus on the negative, much good news, in fact, can be reported on the rebuilding process in Russia since 1991. It is this part of the story, the good reasons for hope for the Russian people that has not been adequately told. This good news can be highlighted with a set of statistics. Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev did not tolerate voluntary organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The state, not independent organizations of citizens, where to care for all human needs. Mikhail Gorbachev began to make changes in this policy of prohibiting popular initiatives. During perestroika and glasnost, small networks of grassroots organizations began to form. By 1987, for example, the state sanctioned the registration of 30 to 40 civic NGOs. Within a little more than ten years, approximately410,000 NGOs legally registered with the Russian Ministry of Justice. In addition, of course, many unregistered local groups came into existence as well.

It is estimated that 60 percent of these NGOs are independent civic associations; the remaining 40 percent are other types of noncommercialentities.1 These NGOs are the “seedlings” of an open, democratic society. They create the opportunity for citizens on the local level to take responsibility for their neighborhoods, for the needy around them, for the “untouchables” in their community. And the vast majority of social service NGOs are faith based. In January 2005, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that the number of NGOs in the world is “increasing rapidly and has grown over 40 times over the past ten years.” He said this could mark the beginning of “the era of the NGOs. About two million people in Russia are involved in these organizations and their activities affect some 20 million, or one in seven, in our country.”2

Grassroots Initiatives

Clearly Russians on the grassroots level reorganizing themselves. In other words, for the first time in decades – maybe even centuries –the Russian people are taking the initiative to rebuild their nation, to make it a normal society.

The country may be on the brink of a transition to democracy, without change forced on people through the threat of violence and terror administered by agents of the state. Similar initiatives have emerged within the Russian Orthodox Church. Librarian ofCongress James Billington, one of America’s leading scholars of Russia, has noted that small but significant group of local clergy are focused on meeting the spiritual and physical needs of their parishioners. He calls this group “pastoralists” and has described how they reorganizing parishes as social, educational, and cultural centers. These Orthodox priests are “beginning the general process of building democracy from the bottom up,” using the same methods that Protestant churches used in nineteenth century America.3Let me share another ray of hope, this one anecdotal. In 2001, the staff of the Russian-American Christian University (RACU) was looking for a new campus facility in Moscow.

During the course of a site visit, the staff toured an unfinished four-story structure that was originally designed to be a hospital, but was never completed. The staff arrived at the site early one cold spring morning and entered the property through a broken-down barrier. As they entered the first floor of the building, they discovered a group of frightened boys, ten to thirteen years old, who had been sleeping in piles of straw and rags. As they stood watching, more than a dozen young boys fled this empty building that had become their home. They were among some 35,000 street kids reported in The Russia Journal that year who live on the streets, beg for food, and prostitute themselves to survive.4

Aiding Children at Risk

One month later, I was invited to observe conference of faith-based organizations that were committed to helping these children living on the streets. I sat at a table of Russians– Protestant and Orthodox, mostly women –who had gathered to discuss efforts by their respective organizations to respond to the crisis of homeless children in Russia. I heard story after story, shared in meek and humble tones, outlining the approaches, experiences, and lessons learned by these outreach initiatives: “In my town, we bought a small cottage and put some beds in the house.” “When we discovered this problem in our province, we renovated the local church basement so we could house a number of the kids, with beds and showers.”5It was a remarkable and moving experience for me, listening to the conviction of these Russians, hearing the passion with which they discussed the problem and what they could do to solve it. As I sat listening, I wished the Russian minister of social services had been there to hear their stories, or the American ambassador. I wanted these leaders to hear how modest Russian people were rising to meet the challenge in front of them, with meager resources, without state funding or foreign aid. As I sat observing these people of faith responding to a crisis in their society, I felt deep surge of hope.

Russians across the country are taking the initiative to deal with pressing social issues in their communities. They are no longer waiting for the government to act in their place. For example, Risk Network is a group of 69 Russian based organizations working with children atrisk.6 Another parallel network of NGOs identified on the CoMission for Children at Risk’s website gives the names of 188 groups involved with vulnerable, needy children inRussia.7

The establishment of the Russian-American Christian University in Moscow is another example of a reason for hope. It was October1990 when Russia’s minister of higher education extended an astonishing invitation to establish a faith-based Christian liberal arts university in Moscow. Only two years prior to this historic meeting, a person of faith could not even have been admitted into an institute of higher education. This new Russian leader had the vision to recognize that teaching democratic and free market values in a faith based framework could play a pivotal role in equipping Russia’s future leaders, and this is cause for great encouragement. That the Russian-American Christian University has thrived in this context sends a continuing message of great hope.

Building Civil Society in Russia

The media rarely report on these initiatives that are happening at the grassroots level in Russia. Yet these newly formed NGOs are laying the foundation for a new society in the Russian Federation. They are building private voluntary networks that can eventually develop checks and balances to reign in governmental institutions. Unlike the structure of Soviet society, or even pre-revolutionary Russia under the Romanovs, these community organizations have the potential to fence off political power from cultural power and economic advantage and prevent officeholders from enriching themselves at citizens’ expense. Over time, these NGOs can help Russia develop a free society in which elected representatives and the press restrain the state and the law restrainseveryone.8

People-to-People Diplomacy

At present, the opportunities for Americans or Europeans to partner with Russians are endless. Those of us in the West have opportunities to work with our former Cold War enemies in true partnerships that can help both societies. In a recent analysis, Dmitri renin made the following insightful observation: “The West needs to realize that its most powerful instruments with respect to Russia are not its king-making abilities at the very top, but human contacts of all kinds at all levels, especially among the youngergeneration.”9 Russian officials need to come to the same conclusion. It is people-to-people diplomacy that builds the promise of a peaceful future and that creates an environment in which both America and Russia can learn from each other.

Thomas Graham, President George W. Bush’s Senior White House Director for Russian Affairs, emphasized the same point when he stated that the United States needs “to continue to pursue policies that help integrate Russia into rules-based institutions, support civil society in Russia, and expand contacts between our two societies, particularly among youngpeople.10 This is what is happening with NGOs in the Russian Federation and that is why they really are “the leading edge” in terms of making a difference in Russia’s future development.

It is vital that the leaders of both nations get the message that people-to-people diplomacy and private sector initiatives need to be encouraged, not blocked, and that private-public partnerships need to be formed where this is mutually beneficial. Forming partnerships between Russians and Americans, building people-to-people coalitions, is of great strategic significance for both countries.

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Volume 14, No. 4

Russian Philanthropy Now Making a Difference

Alexander Livshin

Editor’s Note: The U.S.-based Hudson Institute provided the following introduction for its May 2006panel on “NGOs, Philanthropy, and the Fate of Democracy in Russia,” which included comments by Alexander Livshin.

On 10 January 2006 President Vladimir Putin signed into law a controversial bill regulating Russia’s on-governmental organizations (NGOs). This act requires NGOs operating in Russia to register again with the government, disclose their sources of aid, and undergo expanded state auditing. Citing human rights concerns, the U.S. Department of State has promised to monitor very carefully the implementation of the law’s provisions. The Russian government declared 2006

“The Year of Philanthropy.”

NGOs and Philanthropy

There is no inherent contradiction between philanthropy and Russia’s current political system of “managed” or sovereign democracy. The government is apparently seeking to make philanthropy more centralized in order to exercise greater control over it. In addition, current regulations make it very difficult for an individual citizen to make a charitable donation: a potential benefactor must fill out a complex form at a branch of the Savings Bank of Russia.

Analysts traditionally see philanthropy as contributing to the development of civil society and social capital. In practice, philanthropy has become important in helping to maintain social stability in Russia, including the alleviation of social problems. Yet strengthening an independent civil society in Russia requires making philanthropy more independent of the state and more of an individual and middle-class phenomenon.

Growing Philanthropy – Despite Government Policy

Philanthropy has been growing rapidly in Putin’s Russia despite the government’s policies. For example, although a 2001 law ended virtually all tax breaks for charitable giving, approximately 60 percent of people

making charitable donations have increased their contributions since 2001. This growth in philanthropy is occurring notwithstanding the condition that, especially for small-to-medium companies, charitable giving often attracts unwelcome attention from the authorities. Theater often suspects that philanthropic donations seek to conceal shady business practices or other illicit activity. For this reason, much of Russian philanthropy is not publicly reported.

Some facts about philanthropy in Russia are, nevertheless, evident. First, Russian corporations make the most donations, accounting for about 70 percent of the total. The remaining 30 percent is split between foreign donors and individual benefactors. The fact that foreign donors constitute only 8.4percent of total Russian philanthropy dispels the popular myth that Russia’s NGOs depend completely on the West for support.

Over 80 percent of all Russian companies make charitable donations, equaling 17 percent of their total profits. Many of them have established a special “social budget” to fund charitable giving. In contrast, the typical Western company gives only one to two percent of its profits for philanthropic purposes.

Russian philanthropy has many distinct features. First, almost all charitable donations flow to secular groups. Second, almost all donations stay in Russia. Russian philanthropists are overwhelmingly concerned with solving Russian domestic problems. Not even a catastrophe on the scale of last year’s tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia induced them to give money to foreign recipients.

Third, very few philanthropists use NGOs to deliver aid to fellow citizens. Most Russian donors see NGOs as inefficient if not thievish; most NGO leaders share common Russian prejudices against capitalists and rich people. It would be a gross misconception to characterize the Russian NGO community as predominantly liberal or pro-Western. Finally, the most striking piece of information is that almost 90percent of donations in Russia go to state-run institutions such as local orphanages.

Why is Russian Philanthropy Growing?

What are the reasons for the recent growth of philanthropy in Russia? Social patriotism motivates much Russian philanthropy. Many philanthropists give money because they genuinely want to improve the lives of their fellow citizens. They understand that the state is fundamentally inefficient in terms of providing social goods, so private individuals feel duty-bound to fill this gap. The younger generation is especially inclined to support strong Russian society, despite their predominantly pragmatic, rational, and materialistic nature. In addition, some large Russian corporations, seeking to gain access to international markets and capital, are trying to improve their global image through acts of philanthropy.

Official coercion accounts for additional contributions. Three-fourths of Russian philanthropists report experiencing pressure from local authorities to donate to public projects. Ironically, half of this group looks

Favorably on such overtures since they see such solicitations as strengthening their ties with the local bureaucracy. In addition, over 70 percent said they would donate to public projects despite this pressure, though often they would choose different recipients for their largesse –meeting urgent social needs rather than paying to sustain decaying public infrastructure.

Three Types of NGOs

Currently, Russia has around 600,000NGOs, although not all of these groups are active. Russian NGOs tend to fall into one of three categories. “Elite” NGOs are relatively wealthy organizations. They are often associated with big Russian businesses or serve as “VIP landing grounds” where former government politicians can use a “golden parachute” to occupy an influential and prominent position after they leave office. Some influential Russians create organizations to occupy family members. Intermediary institutions like museums or social welfare organizations have characteristics of both government and nongovernment bodies. Finally, grass-roots organizations are increasingly numerous and varied. Many of them can be considered political if the definition encompasses on-partisan social advocacy.

The Effect of the New NGO Law

The new NGO law will not greatly affect Russian philanthropy. It will affect foreign donors, but they constitute a minor share of philanthropic activity in Russia. The new law will have the negative consequence of allowing the bureaucracy to decide arbitrarily which group constitutes an NGO. It will also increase substantially the operating expenses of small foundations, potentially driving some of them out of business. In the end, however, no one knows how the law will work in practice since so much depends on how it is implemented.

Edited excerpt published with permission of the Hudson Institute and Dr. Alexander Livshin.

Dr. Alexander Livshin is a professor at the School of Public Administration, Moscow State University.