Kristina Stoeckl
One set of challenges which Orthodox churches face with regard to international migration concerns the nature of the Orthodox communities abroad. Are these communities simply an extension of the mother churches, located at the periphery but with a strong link to the center, or are they developing a new form of transnational Orthodoxy, independent from national ties?
National versus Transnational Models
Each Orthodox Church relates to its émigré believers through the establishment of dedicated parishes abroad. These parishes keep canonical ties with the mother churches and function as linguistically and culturally homogenous outposts, where Orthodox believers from one and the same country or from one and the same patriarchal jurisdiction gather. This is the model of the diaspora, of which the Russian, Greek, and Serbian diasporas in Western Europe and in the United States are primary examples. This diaspora model is opposed by a transnational model of religious community, according to which national and linguistic divisions are less important than shared faith. In contemporary Orthodoxy, we find that the two models are in competition.
Rising above Ethnic Identities
The model of an Orthodox Christian diaspora separated along national and linguistic lines has been challenged by members of the diaspora itself. In his book The Orthodox Church: Its Past and Its Role in the World Today, first published in 1981, RussianAmerican Orthodox theologian John Meyendorff (1926-91) discussed the overcoming of national divisions among Orthodox emigrants: “All national groups in the United States, with the exception of the Greeks, are gradually adopting English more and more as the liturgical language, a factor which will help the process toward unification.”1 Orthodox communities, he writes, should rise above their ethnic and nationalist limitations. Sergei Hackel (1931-2005), a priest of the Russian Orthodox Church in Great Britain, wrote: “The diaspora takes on a new identity and ceases to be a mere extension of its parent body.”2
Both statements express the desire for a new form of Orthodox community, independent of national and linguistic separations and open to newcomers. Meyendorff even speaks about the emergence of a “Western Orthodoxy” made up of converts and of second- and third-generation “Orthodox youth who had adopted the language, culture, and customs of the countries where they were born, and are to all intents and purposes as Western as their Latin brothers.”3
Russian Opposition to Diaspora Independence
The emergence of a Western or cosmopolitan Orthodoxy is perceived as a threat by some Orthodox mother churches because it may result in a relative “loss” of believers. The Russian Orthodox Church is the primary example of an Orthodox Church that seeks to avoid this risk and therefore tries to intensify its links with the diaspora. In a speech to Russian emigrants, Patriarch Kirill expressed his concern about the weakening of faith, patriotism, and language competence in the Russian diaspora, blaming in particular the post-1991 generation of emigrants for losing their roots.4
The Russian Orthodox Church is actively seeking to regain control over those Russian Orthodox communities abroad which developed a largely independent and Western character during the 70 years of Soviet rule. In 2006, a controversy between the Moscow Patriarchate and the local diaspora community caused a split in the Russian Orthodox Diocese of Great Britain and Ireland Sourozh. The incident made clear that the Russian Orthodox Church is seeking to increase its control over Russian Orthodox communities in the West and that it meets with suspicion English-speaking Orthodoxy that developed in the West during the Cold War.5
A Fear of Losing Influence
One explanation for the reluctance of the Russian Orthodox Church vis-à-vis the emergence of a transnational Orthodox community abroad could be its desire to maintain a high level of political influence. A severance of the ties between the Church and its émigré believers could eventually lead to the decline of political influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, both in the home country and in its external relations. Patriarch Kirill, who frequently meets heads of states of Western countries, regularly presents his church as a representative institution for Russians living abroad.6 The Russian Orthodox Church has adopted recommendations to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, proposing to build a systematic cooperation between the ministry, the Department of External Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Federal Agency for Compatriots, and Russian Orthodox dioceses and parishes abroad in order to protect the rights of Russians living abroad regarding their religious, linguistic, and cultural identity and to create a “united information space of the Russian World.”7
The strong position of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russian external relations would be relatively weakened if Orthodoxy in the West became transnational. The other critical aspect of transnational Orthodoxy regards questions of jurisdiction. If Orthodox believers abroad no longer organize themselves in neatly separated diasporas, but in the form of a transnational faith community, ecclesiastical jurisdictions and loyalties are no longer automatic.8 Historical precedence, such as the Archdiocese of Great Britain (founded in 1922) or the Metropolis of France (founded in 1963), suggest that the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople is the most likely home for such a transnational Orthodoxy.
Additional Reservations about Transnational Orthodoxy
Further explanation for the reservations about transnational Orthodoxy may be found in doctrinal issues. In her study of the reception of an icon of the Tsar-Martyr Nicholas, which entered Russia in the 1990s from the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia, Nina Schmit shows how religious practices that have matured abroad may return to the home country and challenge the Church’s teaching there. The case of the icon demonstrated that doctrinal developments in the diaspora (the canonization of Tsar the Church in the home country.
The Russian Orthodox Church only canonized Tsar Nicholas in 2000, after the practice of venerating him had already become established thanks to influence from abroad.9 Another example is given by a recent study of the globalization of the Orthodox prayer practice of hesychasm (incessant prayer), which shows how new forms of communication (online discussion forums, blogs) create multiple interpretations of traditional practices, which may even disregard established theological teaching.10 These examples demonstrate that Orthodoxy today is as much a global religious movement from below as it is in the hands of its representative institutions. The challenge for Orthodox churches in the 21st century will lie in finding a balance between the traditional model of national religious diasporas and new claims for a transnational community of Orthodox believers.
Notes:
- John Meyendorff, The Orthodox Church: Its Past and its Role in the World Today, 4th rev. ed. (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1996).
- Sergei Hackel, “Diaspora Problems of Russian Emigration” in Michael Angold, ed., The Cambridge History of Christianity, Vol. 5, Eastern Christianity (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 539-57.
- Meyendorff, Orthodox Church.
- Russian Orthodox Church, “Patriarchate Kirill’s Address to the Third Congress of Compatriots,” Official Website of the Department for External Church Relations, 2 December 2009; http://www. mospat.ru/en/2009/12/02/news9586/.
- The controversy surrounding Great Britain’s Russian Orthodox Diocese of Sourozh is emblematic of the problems that may emerge between an Orthodox mother church and its diaspora community in the West. See Maria Hammerli and Edmund Mucha, “Innovation in the Russian Orthodox Church: The Crisis in the Diocese of Sourozh in Britain” in Orthodox Identities in Western Europe, ed. by Maria Hammerli and JeanFrancois Mayer (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014).
- These meetings are duly documented on the website of the Department for External Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church (www.mospat.ru/).
- Russian Orthodox Church, “Third World Congress of Compatriots Section Meeting on ‘The Role of the ROC and Other Traditional Confessions in Consolidation of United Space of the Russian World,’” Official Website of the Department for External Church Relations (www.mospat.ru), 2 December 2009; http://www.mospat.ru/en/2009/12/02/news9603/.
- Hackel, “Diaspora Problems,” 541.
- The Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia canonized Tsar Nicholas II in 1981. Nina Schmit, “A Transnational Religious Community Gathers around an Icon: The Return of the Tsar” in Victor Roudometof, Alexander Agadjanian, and Jerry G. Pankhurst, eds., Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age: Tradition Faces the Twenty-First Century (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2005), 210-23, describes how the Russian color photocopy reproduction of an icon of Tsar-Martyr Nicholas produced in the United States becomes miraculous (myrrh-streaming) in Russia. The gatherings of Orthodox believers around this icon are seen with suspicion by the Patriarchate in Moscow, which had, at that time, not yet canonized the Tsar. A documentary film about the events was produced for U.S. Orthodox believers.
- Christopher D.L. Johnson, The Globalization of Hesychasm and the Jesus Prayer: Contesting Contemplation (London and New York: Continuum, 2010).
Kristina Stoeckl is a fellow of the Austrian Academy of Sciences at the University of Vienna, Austria, and author of The Russian Orthodox Church and Human Rights (2014).
Edited excerpts reprinted with permission from Kristina Stoeckl, “Orthodox Churches and Migration” in Eastern Christianity and Politics in the TwentyFirst Century, edited by Lucian N. Leustean (London: Routledge, 2014), 724-26.