Anastasia Mitrofanova and Zoe Knox
The resurgence of Russian Orthodox ecclesiastical life following the demise of the Soviet Union led to expectations that the church-state arrangement of the Imperial period might be restored. However, enormous politically significant changes have taken place in mass religious consciousness, conditioned by the influences of the subculture of the Soviet religious underground (the Catacombs) on the Orthodox milieu in general. Church historian Alexei Beglov stresses two of its important characteristics. The first is the degradation of traditional ecclesiastic culture. As a result of the extermination of clergy, liturgical life nearly ceased to exist and was replaced by various popular services, often conducted by laymen and even women.1 Reciting acafisti (hymns to God, His Mother, or saints) became particularly popular. In the absence of churches, practices of veneration of water springs and trees moved from the periphery to the center of religious life. Second, Beglov points to the erosion of the church hierarchy and of the hierarchal principle. Instead, believers follow charismatic personalities, including those holding no position in the hierarchy, as primary bearers of grace.2 These changes have profoundly shaped popular religious expression.
Popular religio-political concepts are partly shaped by the fact that the majority of Orthodox believers in modern Russia are relatively recent converts. Their past makes them doctrinally flexible and unwilling to trust the Moscow Patriarchate unequivocally. These intertwining factors have contributed to a decline of the pre-revolutionary church system and the emergence of an “alternative hierarchy” of charismatic “elders” (startzy) who form non-territorial parishes uniting people across considerable distances. Such developments are criticized by the official church hierarchy, labeling alternative leaders young elders (mladostartzy).3 The collapse of the Soviet Union engendered a wave of eschatological expectations, similar in many ways to those caused by the revolutionary turmoil of the early twentieth century. Initially everything associated with the Soviet state (passports, census, elections, trade unions) was seen as a sign of the coming of the Antichrist. Simultaneously, eschatologically oriented groups developed a negative view of the “official Church.” The rejection of the bureaucratic apparatus of the new Russia, most notably the Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN), new passports, and census-taking, is accompanied by a distrust of the Moscow Patriarchate as apostate for cooperating with “godless authorities.”
Tax I.D. Numbers, Passports, and the Antichrist
The most important grassroots Orthodox political movement in recent years was directed against the Taxpayer Identification Number, made obligatory for all citizens of Russia in 2000. A number of radical Orthodox believers supported by certain priests have claimed that TINs were the seal of the Antichrist which, according to the Book of Revelation, would be necessary to sell and buy anything. Protest against TINs included demonstrations and protest letters sent to the Patriarch and other Church hierarchs. On 19-20 February 2001 the seventh extended plenary session of the Synodal Theological Commission was held to discuss the TIN issue. After a lengthy discussion, the commission came to the conclusion that the TIN issue was of no religious significance and that the acceptance or rejection of a TIN should be regarded as the private choice of each individual believer.4 Like many other controversial issues in church life, the TIN continued to be debated on internet chat rooms, discussion boards, and blogs.
An increase of eschatological (and antigovernmental) sentiments occurred in 2002 as a result of the exchanging of old Soviet passports for Russian ones and conducting the national census. Radical traditionalists saw both as signifying the coming of the Antichrist. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) leadership firmly opposed this interpretation. Aleksii II obtained a new passport himself, commenting: “Is the sickled and hammered one dearer for you than the new one with the twoheaded eagle and St. George?”5 Paradoxically, traditionalists still consider the Soviet passport less dangerous than the new one: Some have been fined for refusing to exchange passports.6
Unofficial Canonizations and Venerations
Popular, unofficial canonizations based on political grounds represent another important aspect of lived Orthodoxy. Venerators of unofficial saints have developed complete ritualistic systems, including icons, prayers and acafisti. 7 Acafasti are popular because they provide an opportunity for a service without an ordained priest. Political canonizations mostly reflect the popular veneration of people who have done something significant for Russia, or who suffered for Russia, or were killed on a battlefield for Russia. Evgenii Rodionov (1977-96), an eighteen-year-old conscript killed in Chechnya, supposedly for refusing to convert to Islam, is one of the most widely venerated, though not officially recognized, martyrs. Unsanctioned examples of popular “canonizations” are historic figures such as Ivan the Terrible, Grigorii Rasputin, and even Joseph Stalin. Deacon Maxim Pliakin, secretary of the Saratov Diocesan Commission on Canonization, stressed that in such cases their political activity (which is debatable itself), rather than their Christian virtues, are the criterion of sainthood.” 8
There are examples of non-canonical icons and other forms of veneration of officially recognized saints having political connotations. The “excessive veneration” of Nikolai II and the imperial family has been labeled as “tsar-theism” (tzarebozhnichestvo). Venerators are accused of believing that Nikolai is “the second Christ” who has “redeemed” the sins of the Russian people. Some tsar-theists produce icons of Saint Tsar Nikolai with a cruciform nimbus (Zhertva userdnaya, or “Zealous Sacrifice”), but such a nimbus can be used only for Christ himself; or they paint all tsars and emperors of Russia with nimbuses, including such controversial rulers as Pavel I, or Catherine II.
There is a political belief that after the elimination of the monarchy in 1917 the Virgin Mary became the mystical custodian of the Russian throne. The popular veneration of the Virgin sometimes becomes (at least from the viewpoint of the ROC) excessive. For example, in some icons she is dressed in an episcopal robe holding a chalice like an “archpriestess.” The ROC opposes such unauthorized venerations and canonizations, while some clergy hope for a gradual change of the official position in response to pressure from below.
Bishop Diomid
Among priests openly expressing their political positions one may find both liberals such as Hegumen Petr Meshcherinov, Fr. Alexandr Borisov, Fr. Georgii Mitrofanov, and Fr. Georgii Kochetkov, and traditionalists such as Fr. Alexandr Shargunov, Archimandrite Petr Kucher, and Fr. Oleg Steniaev. Bishops normally do not express clear adherence to this or that camp. The only exception in recent decades has been Bishop Diomid (Dziuban, born 1961), who became the head of the new diocese of Anadyr and Chukotka in 2000. His first “Appeal,” signed by several other clergy from his diocese, was published on 22 February 2007. The document criticized church leaders for their ecumenical and inter-religious contacts; submission to mundane (“anti-people”) authorities; unwillingness to protest against the TIN and other initiatives, which, taken together, formed a general accusation of apostasy against the Moscow Patriarchate.
This “Appeal” caused wide public discussion, and the traditionalist camp of the ROC for a while was enthusiastic about Diomid’s leadership. But the bishop soon switched from general criticism of the Church to personal accusations directed at Patriarch Aleksii. Bishop Diomid’s second “Appeal,” issued 6 November 2007, signed by Diomid alone, accused the Patriarch of apostasy for participation in the veneration of the Holy Crown of Thorns in Notre-Dame Cathedral, Paris, together with Roman Catholics. Diomid demanded he repent. The two appeals actually promoted ecclesiastical democracy by advocating handing power over from the Bishops’ Council to the Local Council. As a result, the 2008 Bishops’ Council, held from 24 to 29 June, not only condemned Diomid’s activities but committed to defrock him unless he repented. On 17 July 2008 Diomid published his third “Appeal,” signed only by him. He accused the leadership of the ROC and Patriarch Aleksii of heresy and apostasy and declared the Church “the great whore.” Diomid excommunicated the Patriarch and all the hierarchs of the ROC and declared anathema on them unless they repent. By doing this, he proclaimed himself the head of the Russian Orthodox Church.
Until that time he had enjoyed relative support from various respectable traditionalist organizations and communities. But excommunicating the Patriarch changed everything. On 6 October 2008, the Holy Synod defrocked Diomid himself. This did not cause a schism or any protest from the traditionalists. Only a small number of them joined Diomid’s “jurisdiction.” The majority accused him of being a provocateur aiming to force traditionalists out of the Church. Diomid’s fall demonstrates that traditionalists, even when highly critical of the hierarchy, do not want a schism. Eschatological expectations with anti-governmental and anti-church connotations are widespread but in most cases not transferred into practical action.
Patriarch Kirill
Patriarch Kirill was enthroned as Aleksii II’s successor in February 2009. Since then he has initiated a number of interconnected reforms. By 2012, five of these appeared to be particularly significant. First, new Synodal departments were established, namely the Department of Inter-relations between Church and Society, the Department of Penitentiary Diaconia, and the Information Department. The Church also opened a doctoral and postdoctoral school. Second, since 2010 the positions of staff social worker, catechist, and youth organizer have been made obligatory for every parish, although there are still not enough specialists to occupy all vacancies. Third, the Patriarch has promoted members of the laity and married priests. For example, on 22 August 2010 at Solovetskii Monastery he sharply criticized “monastic careerism” (when young men use monastic vows for social mobility),9 the widowed Archimandrite Panteleimon (Shatov) was consecrated bishop, and in 2009 Vladimir Legoida became the first layman to head the Synodal Information Department.
Fourth, several large dioceses of the ROC have been divided into smaller ones and new bishops consecrated. Finally, at the end of 2011, the Patriarchate put forward a project to make catechization compulsory for the sacraments of marriage and baptism (in the case of infants, this was for the parents). These five reforms, although they may seem disparate, have in common a desire to draw Church and society closer together. In parallel, Kirill seemingly intends to narrow the gap between clergy and laity and between monks and married priests. He also aims to raise the religious consciousness of nominal Orthodox and persuade them to live in accordance with Christian ethics. If these ambitious aims are achieved, the Church may become an independent political actor able to implement its ideological position in the national political agenda.
A Punk Rock Protest
As Diomid posed a threat to the ROC from the right, so the Pussy Riot punk rocker protest against close ties between Putin and the Church illustrates a threat to the ROC from the left. On 21 February 2012, five members of this feminist punk group, wearing brightly colored outfits complete with balaclavas, danced in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, jumping up and down and kicking and punching the air. The women later explained that they were protesting against the Russian Orthodox Church’s support of Putin in the Duma elections the previous December. Footage of the protest was made into a video and uploaded to YouTube. The lyrics included sacrilegious profanity.
Pussy Riot’s central objection – the close links between church and state – reflected debates about the appropriate relationship between the Orthodox Church and the Russian state which are as old as the introduction of Byzantine Christianity to the Rus’ lands.The protracted detention, trial, and conviction of the punk demonstrators for hooliganism motivated by religious hatred, coupled with Western media’s intense interest in the Putin regime, meant that the fate of the protestors became a cause célèbre for human rights campaigners and for those critical of the Moscow Patriarchate’s links with state authority.
The wide range of views within Russia on the incident demonstrates the diversity of opinions on the issues of freedom of conscience, church-state relations, and the status of sacred space in a secular state. Though many political figures opposing Putin became vocal supporters of the punk rockers, there was generally less sympathy for the group in Russia than internationally. The guerrilla performance was condemned by some as obscene and blasphemous, and there remains limited support for their broader political agenda.
Notes:
- Alexei Beglov, ‘V poiskakh ‘bezgreshnykh katakomb’. Tserkovnoe podpolie v SSR [In Search of the ‘Sinless Catacombs’.The Church Underground in the USSR] (Moscow: Arefa, 2008), 205.
- Ibid., 210.
- On the tradition of spiritual elders, see Irina Paert, Spiritual Elders, Charisma, and Tradition in Russian Orthodoxy (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010).
- “Itogovii document zasedania rasshirennogo plenuma Sinodalnoi Bogoslovskoi komisii [The Final Document of the Expanded Plenary Session of the Synodal Theological Commission],” Mosksovskii Zhurnal No.4 (2001), 31.
- “Alexei II prizyvaet ne iskat priznakov kontza sveta [Aleksii II Calls Not to Look for the Signs of the Apocalypse],” Mir religii; http://www.religio.ru/ news/4049.html.
- “Zhiteli Tylskoi oblasti otkazyvaiutsya ot poluchenia rossiiskogo pasporta [People from the Tula Oblast Refuse to Receive Russian Passports],” Religia i SMI; htttp//www.religare.ru/2_86627.html.
- Various non-canonical icons can be found at: A.V. Slesarev, “Sovremennye psevdopravoslavnye ikony’ [Modern Pseudo-Orthodox Icons],” Anti-Raskol; http://www.anti-raskol.ru/pages/1251.
- Quoted in Julia Zaitseva, “Akafisty Ivanu Groznomu, Iosifu Stalinus i Igoriu Talkovu kak forma okolotserkovnogo folklora [Acafisti to Ivan the Terrible, Joseph Stalin, and Igor Talkov as a Form of Para-ecclesiastical Folklore],” Kievskaya Rus’; http:// www.kiev-orthodox.org/site/worship/2136/.
- “Sviateishii Patriarkh Kirill: samoe otvratitelnoe v Tserkvi eto monasheskii karierizm [His Holiness Patriarch Kirill: Monastic Careerism is the Most Disgusting Thing in the Church],” Official Website of the Moscow Patriarchate; http://www.patriarchia.ru/ db/text/1256252.html. Edited excerpts reprinted with permission from Zoe Knox and Anastasia Mitrofanova, “The Russian Orthodox Church” in Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Lucian N. Leustean (London; Routledge, 2014), Editors note: This chapter, although originally published in 2014, was written in 2011 - 12.
Anastasia Mitrofanova is chair of political science, Russian Orthodox University, Moscow. Zoe Knox is senior lecturer in modern Russian history, The University of Leicester, United Kingdom.