Lucian N. Leustean
The fall of the Iron Curtain undoubtedly changed the status quo of Eastern Christianity. With democratic transformations in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Orthodox churches became part of new social and political realities. The issue of religious freedom was one of the main factors across Eastern Europe in defining a break from the atheist, Communist past.
Macedonia, Romania, Poland, and Belarus
The fall of Communism represented a novel opportunity for church leaders to present an alternative to atheist regimes. They were encouraged to do so by both the increasing popular support for religion and by their own concern to promote spiritual awakening within a wider social and political context. For example, in the Republic of Macedonia, the leading Orthodox Metropolitan Mihail was put forward as a candidate for the country’s presidency who, however, declined to run for the office. In Romania, a large number of Orthodox clergy joined newly established political parties and became entangled in electoral disputes. Some Orthodox clergy secured seats in the Romanian Parliament and, in 2000, an Orthodox priest was appointed minister of agriculture. In Poland, during the 1993 elections an Orthodox Electoral Committee supported candidates who were not tainted by Communist affiliation. Similarly, in Belarus, after the 1990 declaration of independence, the country’s Metropolitan Philaret and three priests became members of the new Parliament.
Estonia and Ukraine
Domestic religious changes also increased as a result of international pressures. The legacy of the Cold War came alive when hierarchs in exile returned to their countries, denouncing existing religious leaders and claiming that they were the true preservers of the Orthodox faith. In particular, this situation deeply affected Estonia and Ukraine, which saw battles for recognition between old and new Orthodox churches, dividing the faithful. Prolonged disputes and unclear jurisdictional lines were still visible two decades after the fall of Communism, when Ukraine was in the rather unusually fragmented situation of having three Orthodox churches, each claiming to be the true preserver of Ukrainian religious identity.
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia
The division of Orthodox churches also took a distinct political shape in the case of Bulgaria. In the early 1990s, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church – Alternative Synod emerged, whose leaders challenged the connection between the Orthodox hierarchs and the previous Communist authorities. Both the Bulgarian elite and the faithful became embittered in the division between the two churches, one claiming to be a revived religious body, and the other claiming continuity. The uncertain development of relations between the two Bulgarian churches represented one of the main challenges in the post1989 Orthodox commonwealth. The break-up of a church could have easily become the norm across the region as other Orthodox churches also had had close ties with Communist regimes. For example, a similar pattern was briefly visible in Romania, with Patriarch Teoctist resigning in December 1989; however, with the support of the new regime, he was asked to return to his position in April 1990. Similarly, after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Serbia saw increasing demands of autocephaly from the Macedonian Orthodox Church and the establishment of a Montenegrin Orthodox Church.
The Balkans and Estonia
The changing nature of the main autocephalous Orthodox churches in Eastern Orthodoxy also led to convoluted religious structures. For example, the Ecumenical Patriarchate was not only a strong supporter of religious resurgence in Albania, where it established its own archdiocese, but also in Estonia, where it supported the return of the Estonian Church in exile to the country. Archbishop Johannes of Karelia and All Finland became the locum tenens of the Estonian Church until a suitable candidate could be appointed. The involvement of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Finnish Orthodox Church was at odds with the interests of the local Estonian Church, which was placed under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate after the Second World War, and consequently Estonia still has two parallel churches, the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church and the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.
The Ecumenical Patriarchate’s reissuing of the declaration of the autocephaly of the Czech and Slovak Church and the autonomy of the Polish Orthodox Church complicated matters, as the Moscow Patriarchate perceived these actions as a direct threat to its longstanding relations with Orthodox churches in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the recognition of autocephaly/autonomy of smaller Orthodox churches in the region was carried out with the active support of local political leaders. For example, in Moldova, while Orthodox communities became separated between the Metropolitanate of Chişinău under Moscow’s jurisdiction and the Metropolitanate of Bessarabia under the Romanian Orthodox Church, President Petru Lucinschi proposed that the Ecumenical Patriarchate recognize an autonomous Moldovan Church to unite these churches. In 2002, in Macedonia, President Boris Trajkovski stated that the autocephaly of the local Orthodox Church was indissolubly tied to international state recognition. In Albania, the revival of the Orthodox Church was achieved in 1991 after prolonged negotiations between the Albanian and Greek prime ministers, the latter representing the position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Archbishop Anastasios Janullatos, a professor at the National University of Athens, was appointed as the hierarch of the Albanian Church but had to overcome the concerns of the local community, who claimed that its church could be ruled only by a native Albanian.
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria A distinctly separatist voice within the Orthodox commonwealth has been the discourse of religious leaders in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria, three former Soviet regions which aim to achieve statehood and are facing uncertain religious affiliation. The 1992-93 Abkhazian War led to the emergence of a small Abkhazian Orthodox Church which claims an autonomous status, situated between the authority of the Georgian and Russian Orthodox churches. Similarly, in 1992, the Orthodox communities in South Ossetia refused the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church and, after a brief period in which they were part of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia, became integrated in the Holy Synod in Resistance, a Greek Old Calendarist church. At the same time, Orthodox communities in Transnistria have been torn between Moldovan churches and appealed to the Moscow Patriarchate, which in 1998 set up a canonical bishopric on its territory.
Close Church-State Ties
After the fall of the Iron Curtain a number of Orthodox churches proclaimed themselves “defender of the nation.” They enjoyed state financial support and acquired influence in the decision-making of their countries. In Russia, for example, Orthodox Church hierarchs have often been close to political leaders. The 1997 reconstruction of the Church of Christ the Savior in Moscow, which was demolished on Stalin’s orders in 1931, became the centerpiece of close relations between religious and political realms. In Romania post-1989 polls showed the Orthodox Church had “the most trusted institution” above the Army or Parliament. As a general trend, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, churches which initially attracted a large number of the faithful emerged stronger.
Clergy Collaboration with State Security
At the same time, the collaboration of clergy with state security services has remained controversial. After 1989 a number of clergy and top hierarchs publicly admitted working for security services, though most hierarchs opposed public enquiries into the matter. In a number of cases collaboration with the security services came at the expense of church unity. In Bulgaria, for example, it was confirmed in 2012 that during the Cold War period the majority of Orthodox hierarchs making up the Holy Synod were also working for state security services. As a general trend, Orthodox churches have been reluctant to deal with past collaboration with Communist authorities and have opposed the process of lustration (the removal of individuals with ties to former Communist regimes). When hierarchs and ordinary clergy were exposed as working for the state security apparatus, they made references to “patriotism” and “national interest” in support of their activities. Although collaboration with state security apparatus remains controversial, analysis on this topic has to take into account the ways in which Communist states worked. In some cases, membership of state security increased the possibility of becoming a hierarch, while in other cases clergy were coerced into compiling information.
The Re-emergence of Greek Catholicism
The legacy of the Cold War has perhaps become more evident at the beginning of the 21st century with the re-emergence of Greek Catholic churches in Eastern Europe. After the Second World War, most Greek Catholic churches were integrated into the structures of Orthodox churches, their hierarchs were imprisoned, and they operated underground throughout the period. After 1989, their public recognition brought tension between Orthodox and Greek Catholic faithful, particularly around the issue of property restitution. From marginalized communities during the Cold War period, Greek Catholicism became a prime religious identity marker closely attached to the concept of the “nation,” such as the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (the largest in the world, counting around 5.5 million faithful) and the Romanian Greek Catholic Church.
Symphonia in Russia, Serbia, and Romania
Church-state relations in Eastern Christianity have been based on the concept of symphonia, which goes back to the Byzantine Empire and argues for close cooperation between the religious and political spheres. While references to the concept of symphonia have continued in the discourse of churches since 1989, particularly in that of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, most Orthodox churches claim that the concept does not fully represent their approach to contemporary social and political realities. Symphonia remains a controversial concept mainly because it does not impose a clear distinction between religious and political rulers, while the boundaries between the spiritual and profane remain unclear.
Tensions between Moscow and Constantinople on jurisdictional matters in Eastern Europe and the diaspora, exaggerated claims of the actual number of Russian Orthodox believers worldwide, and President Putin’s 2012 suggestion of involving the Russian Orthodox Church in the proposed Eurasian Union of countries of the former Soviet Union denote the increasing political influence of the Moscow Patriarchate at home and abroad. Other Orthodox churches have their own view of the concept of symphonia. Close relations between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the state after the fall of Slobodan Milošević’s regime in 2000 and the loss of church influence in Kosovo have been criticized by intellectuals. In Romania, where the Orthodox Church retains a prime position of religious influence and is building a mega-Cathedral of National Salvation in Bucharest, symphonia seems to have shifted towards a German model of cooperation between church and state.
Religious Education in Schools
In an increasingly secularized world, what role does religious education play for both church and the state? How do churches view the latest technological advances in mass media, the internet, and television? A significant number of churches have launched their own television and radio channels and have a strong internet presence which may mobilize the faithful on social and political issues. As a general trend, after the fall of Communism, Orthodox churches supported the introduction of Orthodox teachings as part of the national curriculum at both primary and secondary levels of education. The demand, although successful in a number of countries, such as Bulgaria (where it is elective) and Romania (where it is mandatory), was criticized by intellectuals and the impact of religious education remains uneven in Eastern Europe; in Bulgaria less than two percent of pupils have opted for religious classes.
Orthodox Churches and the European Union
How do Orthodox churches engage with the process of European integration and the political system of the European Union? How have Orthodox churches perceived the process of European integration? After the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the European Commission encouraged dialogue with a number of “churches, religions, and communities of conviction.” As a result, many churches have opened offices in Brussels and Strasburg engaging in direct contact with European institutions. In 1989, as part of the dialogue with church leaders, President Jacques Delors of the European Commission met two metropolitans of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In 1994, the Ecumenical Patriarchate opened the Liaison Office of the Orthodox Church to the European Union, a title which suggests that it represents the whole Orthodox commonwealth in relation to European institutions. However, in the following years other churches opened their own representations, namely the Orthodox Church of Greece in 1998, the Russian Orthodox Church in 2002, and the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Church of Cyprus in 2007. In addition, the Serbian Orthodox Church has a representative working for the Church and Society Commission of the Conference of European Churches.
In 2010, Orthodox leaders from these offices decided to set up a Committee of Representative of Orthodox Churches to the European Union in an effort to coordinate a trans-Orthodox response to the political evolution of the European Union. It remains unclear if this Committee will have a long-term impact on relations with European institutions and among national churches or merely represents a church-based organization raising awareness of Orthodox values among civil servants in Brussels and Strasburg. That Orthodox churches regard the Brussels offices as key bodies in dialogue with the European Union was underscored by the appointment of Bishop Hilarion Alfayev, formerly head of the Representation of the Russian Orthodox Church in Strasburg from 2002 to 2007, as chairman of the Department of External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate.
The Impact of Nationalism
The new Orthodox churches that have been established after the fall of Communism have taken into account the national character of their communities. Their names reflect this emphasis on ethnicity with, for example, Macedonian in the Macedonian Orthodox Church, and Ukrainian in all three major churches (the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate).
At the beginning of the 21st century, the process of globalization raises a question of the diversity of Eastern Christianity. Will Eastern Christian churches continue to divide or will they unite? Will other churches be accepted in the communion of the 15 recognized churches? These are open questions. However, the history of Eastern Christianity and, in particular, religious and political developments after the fall of Communism, suggest that Eastern Christianity will continue to be a “family of churches” which is prone to division and new configurations. F Edited excerpts reprinted with permission from “Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-first Century: An Overview” in Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Lucian N. Leustean (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 2-5, 10- 12, and 15-16.
Lucian N. Leustean is a senior lecturer in politics and international relations at Aston University, Birmingham, England.