A Ukrainian Christian Response to “A Russian Christian Perspective” on Ukraine 

Sergiy Tymchenko

Charges of Russian Chauvinism and Imperialism 

According to its title, Sergey Osokin’s article does not attempt to present a general Christian perspective on the Ukrainian crisis, but rather a Russian Christian perspective which, as he later states, is also his own subjective opinion. Osokin - not the author’s real name - begins with a soft, friendly voice explaining that Ukraine and Russia are “almost one nation,” being tied together historically, culturally, and ethnically. He is certain that Ukrainians could never have come to view Russia as an aggressor by themselves without the help of some of Russia’s enemies. Closer to the middle of his article, Osokin, full of resentment against Russia’s detractors, speaks without reservation that Ukraine’s political protest was the work of United States’ special services and did not have anything in common with the free expression of the Ukrainian people. For Osokin Ukraine is no longer a nation to which he is emotionally and culturally attached. Instead, Ukraine is now simply a place where geopolitical interests of Russia and the U.S. collide. At this point he speaks with a chauvinist and imperialist voice, defending Russia’s intervention by assuming the Kremlin’s right to control the politics of a neighboring state: “It would be strange if Russian leaders had passively watched the alarming political changes in Ukraine.” 

Osokin’s Russian political partiality and chauvinism meshes seamlessly with the Russian story line regarding the Ukraine crisis. The simple plot identifies the United States and Ukraine as the villains, while Russians (including Russian separatists in Ukraine) are the victims and heroes. Osokin gives his readers a stereotypical version of this plot, noting that this view dominates in Russian society, and that it also is his “subjective” and personal “understanding of the situation.” Most of the details of this narrative have been exposed as distortions of truth in a number of texts. For the sake of space, I will not discuss here the whole narrative, but instead challenge key details of it with documentation pointing to helpful articles available on the Internet that give alternative perspectives. 

A Summary of the Russian Narrative on the Ukraine Crisis 

According to the Russian narrative, Kyiv’s Maidan demonstrations in late 2013 and early 2014 were the beginning of all the problems in Ukraine. These protests, in turn, brought about an unconstitutional seizure of power in Ukraine.1 This coup d’état was orchestrated by the United States which has a geopolitical interest in Ukraine. All this was made possible with the help of certain Ukrainian oligarchs2 and Ukrainian nationalist propaganda that infected Ukraine’s youth.3 The current crisis is the result of a chain of events that followed Maidan: the replacement of one set of oligarchs with another;4 the annexation of Crimea (illegal, but justifiable because there were “infringements upon…[Russia’s] geopolitical interests”),5 genocide being carried out by the Maidan “junta” and its Ukrainian army, and the unleashing of a civil war in Donbas (eastern Ukraine) in which local militiamen decided to defend the Russian-speaking population.6 

Osokin’s Discomfort with Portions of the Russian Narrative 

While Osokin repeats the essence of the Russian narrative, he still is not fully comfortable with it and does not give it unreserved endorsement. For example, he does not directly support the Russian propaganda accusation that the Maidan junta and the Ukrainian army are guilty of genocide. Also, rather than directly declaring Ukraine a fascist state, he gives the impression that Ukrainian youth revere the memory of World War II Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera. He, like the Nazi Germans, fought Red Army troops, thus implying that Ukrainian youth are pro-fascist. As a result, Osokin leads his readers to imagine Ukraine as a state that has tolerance and sympathy for fascism. This image, however, is incorrect. In fact, the opposite is true: “The right-wing presence in Ukraine’s post-Yanukovych government has been so slight as to be virtually invisible.”7 The government’s democratic structure, its vigorous multi-party system, free elections, a free press, and protection of human rights make Ukraine a place where Tatars, Jews, Russians, and many other minorities feel safe and at home in Ukraine.8 These democratic safeguards do not fit the image of an intolerant state with sympathies for fascism. 

In contrast, in Russia a growing number of ultranationalist and xenophobic groups akin to fascism are among Putin’s most vocal supporters.9 Alexander Dugin’s ultra-nationalist Eurasia Party, Edward Limonov’s Other Russia Party, the Black Hundred, and the neo-Nazi Russian National Unity Party are known for their close connections with separatist leaders in eastern Ukraine.10 Not surprisingly, separatists are often acting in accordance with fascist practice, abducting, torturing, and killing proUkrainian activists and viewing captured Ukrainians as “filth,” much as Nazis had viewed Jews as “dirty.”11 

To his credit, Osokin also expresses some doubts regarding the morality and legality of Russia’s actions during the Ukrainian crisis. However, his reservations concerning the morality and legality of Russia’s invasion of Crimea and Russia’s “inspiration and support” of the military conflict in Donbas last for only a few lines, thus ensuring that the official Russian narrative is not called into question. Instead, very soon Osokin comes to the conclusion that “both Russian and Ukrainian media are biased in their portrayal of the present situation in Ukraine,” and that the information war prevents finding the truth. So what is his proposal for dealing with propaganda? 

The Difficulty of Achieving Consistency 

Osokin does concede the need for a determination of the truth “by dismissing fake and misleading information, by searching hard for independent reports and investigations, and by listening to first-hand witnesses.” By the end of his article, however, Osokin makes a sharp turn and argues that finding the truth in political matters is not at all important for Christians. Apparently, from his point of view, the moral task of choosing right and wrong may simply be dismissed after all of this. Why? Mostly because of this task’s complexity, but also because of his theological perspectives. Osokin believes that politics belong to worldly matters, while Christians are called to be “not of the world.” He calls for a “rejection of black-andwhite judgments” and even attempts to find biblical support for denying the need for moral judgments. He thinks that Romans 13:1 (“All authority comes from God”) can be interpreted as “every nation has the very government it deserves.” Apparently, Osokin does not see the contradiction inherent in his two theses: 1) that God is concerned about justice in political issues, giving every nation the government it deserves, and 2) that Christians should not be concerned about justice in political issues since they are not of this world. As a result, Osokin does not see that Christians are justified in helping their nations understand the difference between right and wrong in political matters, so that they would “deserve” better governments. 

Another example of Osokin’s theological confusion concerns his juxtaposition of non-violence and justice. In his understanding, “Christians… belong to two worlds: one that says that violence can never be justified, and the other that says standing for justice is patriotic.” Does he mean here that those who belong to the Kingdom of God do not stand for justice, one of the most essential features of this Kingdom? And to which world, from Osokin’s perspective, does Jesus belong, Jesus who violently drove out those who were buying and selling in the Jerusalem Temple? 

Osokin is not only inconsistent theologically, he is also inconsistent logically and emotionally. For example, he stresses that the people of Ukraine are very special to him, but he also coldly insists upon Russia’s right to pursue its imperialistic, geopolitical interests, ignoring Ukraine’s right to pursue a course of its own choosing. Osokin also rejects the possibility that Russian special services were involved in actions against Maidan protesters.12 He considers the idea of Russian interference “laughable,” yet with all seriousness he contends that “there are many reasons to believe that U.S. special services were involved” in Maidan. 

One of Osokin’s problems is his choice of sources upon which to build his case. Thus, he cites the notoriously unreliable U.S. filmmaker Oliver Stone as a source to accuse the U.S. of improper meddling in Ukraine. In the West, however, Stone’s credibility as a political analyst is about the same as that of the mercurial and unpredictable Vladimir Zhirinovsky in Russia: entertaining at times, but frightening if taken seriously.13 

Russian vs. Ukrainian Versions of the World War II and the Holodomor

At the beginning of his article Osokin discusses several historical episodes which are particularly painful for Ukrainians. For example, in arguing that the Germans, not Soviet secret services, blew up Kyiv’s Dormition Cathedral in 1941 he quotes a Ukrainian newspaper article. His goal is to expose Ukrainian propaganda, yet he also implies that this disclosure will prove that Soviet forces were not responsible for the destruction of historic buildings on Kyiv’s Kreschatik Street during World War II. However, well-documented sources confirm the Soviet role in the city’s devastation.14 The fact that Osokin quotes a Ukrainian newspaper from 2012 demonstrates that Ukrainian media are free to speak their mind without reference to any party line as is the case in Russia. It is also telling that Osokin challenges the Ukrainian charge that Soviet troops destroyed the Dneproges Dam on the basis of “a relevant article” on a particularly tendentious and untrustworthy website. 

Osokin is also satisfied with the sources he cites to deny the Holodomor (Stalin’s genocide of Ukrainians in the 1930s). The fact is that neither Myroslava Berdnik nor Douglas Tottle are recognized experts in international academic circles. In 2014, the EuroAsian Jewish Congress described Berdnik, known for her support for the Ukrainian Communist Party,15 as “a pro-Russian propagandist.”16 Today the Holodomor is well documented17 and recognized as genocide by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.18 It is worth noting that Raphael Lemkin, the author of the word genocide, described the “destruction of the Ukrainian nation” as the “classic example of Soviet genocide” in  a speech given in New York City in 1953.19 Faith and Politics Osokin, in addition, manages to muddle the issue of Christians in politics. He condemns believers who mix faith and politics, but in reality he himself does precisely that. Thus, Osokin tries to avoid making moral judgements by hiding behind an apolitical position “not of the world,” but simultaneously he supports Russian imperial ambitions. His justification for Moscow’s territorial moves in Crimea and eastern Ukraine is that Russia, in certain cases, has a natural, geopolitical right to annex territories previously part of the Soviet Union. 

Is Osokin correct in claiming that many Ukrainian Christians mixed faith and politics because they supported Maidan’s protests and now view Russia as an aggressor state? No, if he means that the political judgements of Ukrainian Christians compromised their faith and trust in God. Yes, if he means their faith compelled them to seek the truth before making political judgements. And as for mixing faith and politics, Osokin and a host of other Russian believers do just that as they carefully mimic the Kremlin’s official line. Ukrainian Christians believe that to be “not of the world” means not to hold values that are accepted in the world. In application, it also means to bring God’s values to the world, including the sphere of politics. Ukrainian and Russian Christians share the belief that the values of Communism and atheism imbedded in the Soviet Union stood in opposition to God’s values. Protests on Maidan in 2004 and 2013- 14 to a large degree were in fact protests against the values “of the world” inherited from the Communist past, such as corruption, authoritarianism, and an imperialistic and messianic ideology disseminating from the capital of Russia.

 Ukrainian believers who stayed with protesters on Maidan (mostly carrying on ministries of prayer, counseling, and charity) are in a much better position to judge the nature of the protests than are Russian believers.20 They were there witnessing people’s voluntary self-organization, and they observed that the part played by Ukrainian ultra-nationalist and non-Ukrainian leaders was rather modest. Participating as volunteer chaplains, praying with soldiers and for soldiers, organizing and operating relief efforts for refugees and for suffering people in the war zone, Ukrainian believers know that the unleashing of a civil war in Donbas was indeed organized and led by Russian military specialists and with Russian weapons.21 They also recognize that from the very beginning of the current crisis the Russian government did not tell the truth about its involvement in Ukraine. Thus, President Putin has recently admitted, contrary to his previous statements, that the plan to annex Crimea was ordered almost a month before the referendum of selfdetermination.22 Ukrainian Christians, living in a state of undeclared war for many months, also recognize that many of the shortcomings of their post-Maidan Ukrainian government that Russians criticize are in good measure because of Russian interference in Ukraine.23 

The Difficulty of Russian and Ukrainian Christians Finding Common Ground 

Osokin concludes his article with pleasant words of hope for peace and harmony between Russians and Ukrainians. He reminds us of the high value God places on each human life, and of Christ’s power to destroy “the dividing wall of hostility.” He writes: “We need to distance ourselves from propaganda, political differences, and ambitions” so that “despite these trying times,” we can see “what we have in common.” I could not agree more. However, it is very hard to see what we have in common when Osokin expresses his “understanding” that my native Ukraine is simply a subject of the political ambitions “of a large state” like Russia. Evidently, some work still has to be done so that we can clearly see what we have in common. For example, we still need to learn the difference between truth and propaganda, between imperialism and democracy, between a Christian perspective and a nationalistic Russian Christian perspective on matters that demand our moral judgment.

Notes: 

1. G.C., “Ukraine’s Government: Faltering, but Fully Legit,” The Economist, 25 April 2014; http://www.economist.com/blogs/ easternapproaches/2014/04/ukraines-government. On the historical background of the current crisis see Timothy Snyder, “The Battle in Ukraine Means Everything,” New Republic, 11 May 2014; http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117692/ fascism-returns-ukraine. Maidan is the shortened name of Kyiv’s central square - Maidan Nezalezhnosti or Independence Square.
2.  Timothy Snyder, “Ukraine: The Haze of Propaganda,” New York Books, 1 March 2014; http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/ nyrblog/2014/mar/01/ukraine-haze-propaganda/.
3. Alexander Motyl, “Is Ukraine Fascist?,” The World Post, 5 March 2015; http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alexandermotyl/putin-calls-ukraine-fasci_b_6600292.html. See also helpful thoughts on Stepan Bandera by Russian historian Andrey Zubov in Paul Goble, “Stalin Was a Greater Fascist Than Bandera or Mussolini,’ Zubov Says,” The Interpreter, 28 July 2014; http://www.interpretermag.com/stalin-was-a-greaterfascist-than-bandera-or-mussolini-zubov-says/. 
4. Alexander J. Motyl, “Ukraine’s Election Exposes Putin’s Lies,” World Affairs, 28 May 2014; http://www.worldaffairsjournal. org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/ukraine%E2%80%99s-electionexposes-putins-lies 
5.  For a helpful discussion of realist arguments in politics around the conflict in Ukraine see Alexander J. Motyl, “The Surrealism of Realism: Misreading the War in Ukraine,” World Affairs, January/February 2015; http://www. worldaffairsjournal.org/article/surrealism-realism-misreadingwar-ukraine.
6. A brief outline of events is given, for example, in: http://www. globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/politics-2014. htm. Interestingly, the violence in eastern Ukrainian to date has been limited to the regions controlled by pro-Russian separatists. See also Alexander Motyl, “Putin’s Russia as a State Sponsor of Terrorism,” World Affairs, 14 April 2014; http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/ putin%E2%80%99s-russia-state-sponsor-terrorism. 
7.  Alexander Motyl, “Is Ukraine Fascist?;” Motyl, “Ukraine’s Election Exposes Putin’s Lies,” World Affairs, 28 May 2014; http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/ ukraine%E2%80%99s-election-exposes-putins-lies.
8. Goble, “Stalin Was a Greater Fascist.”
9.  Ilan Berman, “Why Russia Is Growing More Xenophobic,” The Atlantic, 22 October 2013; http://www.theatlantic.com/ international/archive/2013/10/why-russia-is-growing-morexenophobic/280766/.
10.  Halya Coynash, “G20 Putin Pack: Russia’s Fascist ‘AntiFascist’ Crusade,” Human Rights in Ukraine, 4 November 2014; http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1415930855.
11.  Alexander J. Motyl, “Loose Cannons and Ukrainian Casualties,” World Affairs, 27 August 2014; http://www. worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/loosecannons-and-ukrainian-casualties; Christopher J. Miller, “More Abductions, Torture Seen in Separtist-held Eastern Ukraine,” Kyiv Post, 11 July 2014; http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ ukraine/more-abductions-torture-seen-in-separatist-heldeastern-ukraine-355674.html.
12. Daniel Mattera, “Modus Operandi of Russian Security Service(s) in the Ukraine Conflict;” https://www.academia. edu/9606619/ Modus_Operandi_of_Russian_Security_ Services_in_the_Ukraine_Conflict. 
13. Roger Aronoff, “Oliver Stone ‘History’ Rebutted at PCA Conference,” Accuracy in Media, 5 April 2013; http://www. aim.org/on-target-blog/oliver-stone-history-rebutted-at-pcaconference/#.
14.  David Stahel, Kiev 1941: Hitler’s Battle for Supremacy in the East (Cambridge: 2012), 257-59. A number of photos and descriptions of relevant documents are found also at http:// borisfen70.livejournal.com/27225.html.
15.  For example, http://www.qwas.ru/ukraine/kpu/V-Kievesostojalas-prezentacija-knigi-laureata-premii-imeni-JaGalana-Miroslavy-Berdnik-Peshki-v-chuzhoi-igre/. 
16.  See http://geography-en.eajc.org/page32/news44081.html. 
17.  See, for example: Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 225- 52; Ray Gamache, Gareth Jones: Eyewitness to the Holodomor (Cardiff: Welsh Academic Press, 2013).
18. See http://www.holodomoreducation.org/UserFiles/File/pressrelease10-2008.pdf.
19. See http://www.uccla.ca/SOVIET GENOCIDE IN THE UKRAINE.pdf
20. Aleksey Gordeev, Tserkov’ na Maidanye (Kiev: Knygonosha, 2015). On the historical background of the current crisis see Timothy Snyder, “The Battle in Ukraine Means Everything,” New Republic, 11 May 2014; http://www.newrepublic.com/ article/117692/fascism-returns-ukraine.
21.  A brief outline of events is given, for example, in: http://www. globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/politics-2014.html. Interestingly, the violence in eastern Ukrainian to date has been limited to the regions controlled by pro-Russian separatists. 22 
22. arch 2015; http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-31796226. 
23.  Alexander Motyl, “Putin’s Russia as a State Sponsor of Terrorism,” World Affairs, 14 April 2014; http:// www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/ putin%E2%80%99s-russia-state-sponsor-terrorism. 

Sergiy Tymchenko is director of the Realis Center, a Christian training, publishing, and counseling ministry in Kyiv, Ukraine.