Growing Russian Restrictions on Religious Activities 

Lauren B. Homer 

In recent years Russia has dramatically increased restrictions on activities of religious and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Negative attitudes of the public toward “nontraditional” religious groups have also increased. These trends are due to propaganda campaigns and the overall consolidation of power by security service forces in the government. President Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer, clearly believes that Soviet-style suppression or manipulation of religion serves as the proper blueprint for the future. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), and favored Muslim, Jewish, and Buddhist religious minorities are again used to support nostalgic nationalism and obscure the authoritarian nature of Putin’s goals. 

Like all repressive regimes intent on total political hegemony, the government has used restrictive laws, propaganda, and pliable and compliant parliamentarians to silence dissenting voices, create common enemies, and secure power. NGOs were a primary source of independent ideas and hopes for the development of Russian civil society after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Unfortunately, a virtual avalanche of laws enacted since 1997 now seriously restricts these NGOs and non-Orthodox faiths. The Ukrainian uprising of 2013-14 has given Putin the opportunity to further extend his personal control and solidify his popularity. It has also provided the rationale for additional repressive laws adopted or pending at the time of this writing. Putin’s strong hand can only be expected to tighten in the near future within Russia and in territory once part of Ukraine. 

Timeline of Restrictive Legislation on Religion 

This article provides a timeline of key Russian legislation (enacted and proposed) that undermines freedom of religion and thwarts even-handed law enforcement. It then seeks to assess possibilities for ameliorating current trends from inside and outside Russia. 

• 1997: Amendments to the 1992 Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” restrict religious rights. The “15-year rule” requires re-registration of religious bodies but only allows those that existed in 1982 or earlier (the Soviet period) to re-register. Substantial external pressure resulted in rules waiving the 15- year rule for religious groups registered by 1997. Many other groups were still unable to re-register due to other adverse provisions in the law.
•  2002: A new law restricts foreigners’ visas and rights to engage in religious activities and imposes a quota system for temporary residence permits. This legislation and the high cost of frequent visa renewals abroad has caused numerous foreign missionaries, mission organizations, and NGOs to discontinue work in Russia
•  2002: The “Extremism Law” criminalizes “incitement of religious animosity,” advocating “superiority or inferiority” based on religion, advocating the overthrow of the state, acts dangerous to health or safety, vandalism based on religious hatred, possessing “extremist” literature, and participating in banned “extremist” groups. Penalties for violations were increased in May 2013.A federal list currently identifies over 2,000 works as extremist, including many Muslim writings, virtually all Scientology literature, and some translations of the Bible and Christian tracts. Authorities regularly seize and destroy religious literature deemed extremist or printed by unregistered groups.
• 2006: Legislation creates extremely burdensome legal and regulatory requirements and oversight of NGOs. Even unregistered “public association activities” require prior government notification. Special restrictions are placed on foreign NGOs and foreigners, including targeted amendments to the Extremism Law. A new registration chamber for foreign NGOs, including faithbased organizations, has made it impossible for many of them to re-register or comply with new rules. 
•  2011: Proposed amendments to the 1997 Law on Religion would further restrict the rights of non-Orthodox faiths and possibly bar unregistered religious activity. Registration would require “expert analysis” of religious beliefs and approval by a centralized religious organization of the same faith. Rights of religious organizations that are not part of a centralized religious organization would be reduced for 10 years following registration. They could not operate educational institutions or Sunday schools, invite foreigners for missionary purposes, hold religious ceremonies in hospitals, prisons, or schools, or publish or distribute religious literature. Distribution of all religious literature would be restricted, and grounds for liquidation of smaller religious organizations would be expanded. Objections from the Russian Orthodox Church caused the proposals to be withdrawn.
•  June 2012: A law “On Public Assemblies” requires advance government approval of all “public assemblies” and imposes harsh fines and restrictions on organizers of unapproved assemblies. The new restrictions apply to outdoor religious events and festivals and indoor events that interfere with public order, providing authorities with many possibilities to impede the free exercise of religion
• July 2012: A new “Foreign Agents” law requires any NGO that “influences public opinion” and receives funding from foreign sources to register as a “foreign agent.” NGOs designated in this way must submit financial and other reports to several government bodies and brand their offices and publications (including websites) with the term “foreign agent.” NGOs believe that this requirement implies that they threaten Russian national security. Religious organizations and educational institutions are expressly exempt from the law but still undergo inspections and enforcement actions under this law. The “Foreign Agents” Law severely restricts civil society, democracy, and religious freedom advocates. A number of NGOs have closed in protest
• July 2012: A new “Libel Law” criminalizes and increases fines for “knowingly disseminating false information defaming the honor and dignity or undermining the reputation of another person.” This legislation makes challenging government officials and other public figures quite dangerous.
• July 2012: A restrictive Internet law enables the government to blacklist websites and monitor Internet use. 
• October 2012: A new “Treason Law” expands criminal treason to include assisting international or foreign organizations in acting against the security of the Russian Federation and sharing “state secrets,” including publicly available materials. Activists are concerned that reporting human rights and religious freedom violations to international bodies and foreign governments could be considered treasonous. 
• November 2012: President Putin orders increased and burdensome inspections of all NGOs for compliance with extremism, foreign agents, and other laws. 
• December 2012: The “Dima Yakolev” Law bans adoption of children by U.S. citizens and bans NGOs that engage in “political activities,” receive U.S. funds, or threaten Russia’s interests. Russia may prosecute U.S. officials who violate the human rights of Russian Federation citizens. Here Russia is responding to the U.S. Magnitsky Act requiring visa bans and confiscation of assets of Russians and other foreign nationals if U.S. officials decide they are responsible for human rights violations of Russian citizens. The law led to the closure of the Moscow offices of the United States Agency for International Development, among other NGOs, and ended U.S. citizens’ adoption of Russian orphans. 
• December 2012: Proposed amendments to the 1997 Law on Religion would require special educational qualifications for clerics and religious personnel and written labor agreements with religious organizations. Many religious workers could be disqualified based on their lack of formal education, their education abroad, or their lack of formal working relationships with registered religious organizations. 
• March 2013: After the Ministry of Justice publicly refuses to implement the Foreign Agents Law and other agencies fail to act on his November 2012 order, Putin holds a news conference demanding NGO inspections. The State Prosecutor then orders tax, Ministry of Justice, and other authorities to inspect all NGOs for legal noncompliance, including religious and educational organizations, which are exempt from the Foreign Agents Law. 
•  June 2013: Proposed restrictions on renting property for religious purposes would require religious bodies to use only facilities that they own. 
• July 2013: Amendments to the 1997 Law on Religion bar persons previously convicted of extremism, money laundering, or terrorism, and foreigners previously barred from entering Russia from holding leadership posts in religious organizations or attending services. Religious bodies convicted of violating these restrictions or of extremism are forbidden to operate on either a registered or unregistered basis. Thus, allowing a convicted “extremist” to attend a worship service or publishing materials deemed “extremist,” even once, could result in the closure of a religious body. 
•  July 2013: Responding to serious acts of desecration and destruction of church property and lesser insults, a new “Blasphemy Law” criminalizes “offending the feelings” of religious believers or destroying religious books, sites, or symbols. This legislation could potentially criminalize exclusive truth claims (“my faith is the one true path”) by clerics or believers. To date, enforcement has been limited. 
• July 2013: A new law further facilitates government inspections of NGOs. At least 528 inspections in 49 regions occurred in 2013. Organizations with foreign funding faced intense scrutiny, and many were closed due to minor non-compliance issues. 
•  November 2013: Proposed amendments to the 1997 Law on Religion, similar to the 2011 proposals, would restrict locations available for worship and religious activities to properties owned by registered organizations, eliminating religious use of rental or loaned, non-residential property
•  November 2013: A proposed amendment to the Russian Federation Constitution would designate Orthodoxy as the basis of the national and cultural identity of Russia. 
•  March 2014: The Anti-Sect Working Group of the Duma and the Prosecutor’s Office proposes that the Russian Supreme Court clearly define the term “sects” in order to combat “destructive religious organizations.” Among other claims, proponents contend that “sects” assist foreign intelligence services and undermine the state, acting as a “fifth column.” As proof, they assert that the new acting president and prime minister of Ukraine are respectively a Baptist (true) and a Scientologist (false). “Sects” are described as religious groups “formed within the last 200 years, mainly in North America” and as “a secluded religious group that positions itself against the main culture-forming religious community…of a country or region”—in short, groups outside the four “traditional” religions (Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism) named in the 1997 Law on Religion. 
• March 2014: Proposed amendments to the 1997 Law on Religion would delete the 15-year rule and remove redundant reporting requirements. However, substantial new restrictions would be added: (i) unregistered religious activities become illegal; (ii) unregistered religious “groups” must notify government authorities of their existence and provide detailed information about their beliefs, meeting places, leaders, and members; (iii) “groups” may meet only in places specifically approved by the government for such use; (iv) “groups” that are not affiliated with centralized (national) religious organizations must prove prior compliance with point (ii) in order to register and will have restricted rights for 10 years; (v) only centralized religious organizations may invite foreigners to engage in religious activities. 
• April 2014: New legislation requires all foreigners seeking temporary or permanent residency in Russia to prove competency in the Russian language, history, and legislation. Other foreigners will be unable to obtain work-related visas, with exceptions for persons over the age of 60 and a few others.
• Effective in August 2014: Laws bring Internet content under stronger government control, with civil and criminal penalties for violations. Those involved in website creation, hosting, or blogging must register with the government, keep records of published materials for six months, and cooperate with government surveillance. Website owners must determine the truth or falsity of published material and immediately remove false information as well as barred content which include violations of election laws, invasion of privacy, and information that offends individuals, discredits religion, reveals state secrets, or promotes extremism or terrorism. Pornography and foul language are also banned. Bloggers must disclose their full names and contact information online. The Internet has been one of the few remaining outlets for often anonymous criticism of Kremlin policy. The new rules will stifle dissent and could justify closure of sites used by religious bodies and religious freedom advocates. Russia is already blocking or closing many websites and prosecuting popular bloggers, and for some time the government has strictly controlled television and radio programming. 

The Gradual Curtailment of Dissent 

Enacted over the past 17 years, these increasingly restrictive laws and decrees provide myriad grounds for harassing and prohibiting activities of “non-traditional” and “foreign” religions, as well as traditional groups, and impose crushing regulatory burdens on registered organizations. Proposed legislation to remove existing rights to freely express religious ideas and organize religious activities without registration and to restrict locations of religious activity is potentially devastating. The gradual elimination of public forums for expressing dissent ensures that Russia will move in a nationalistic, anti-Western direction. In the current climate, few government officials will moderate the trend of increasing infringements on freedom of religion for religious minorities. 

Pentecostals and Charismatics Under Assault 

The avalanche of restrictive legislation has been accompanied by numerous incidents that have seriously violated the religious freedoms of Russian citizens and have often resulted in court cases. It is impossible to do more here than provide an overview of these events, with primary focus on Christian minorities. Prosecutors have frequently attacked Pentecostal and Charismatic groups, particularly in Siberia and the Russian Far East where they were until recently numerically and socially prominent, characterizing them as “extremist” or harming citizens’ health. Religious activities considered normal outside Russia are targets: healing prayer, weekend spiritual retreats, video presentations on the Christian faith, and praying in tongues. Some video and audio materials are alleged to manipulate worshippers through hidden visual and audio messages. One pastor was sued for causing a psychotic breakdown of a parishioner through prayer. Church-sponsored alcohol and drug rehabilitation, housing of orphans and street children, summer camps, and other outreaches to orphans, the elderly, the ill, and students, have been prohibited. Many other pretexts are used to close churches and their ministries. Authorities have asked “harmful” churches to produce detailed identification information on their leaders, clergy, and members, echoing classic Soviet abuses. 

In September 2012, religious groups were shocked by the nighttime demolition of the Pentecostal Church of the Holy Trinity in Moscow, which began while parishioners were inside. Authorities charged that the congregation’s land lease had expired. Recently, the Russian Supreme Court denied an appeal from St. Petersburg’s Harvest Church, which was closed based on alleged illegal educational activities—allowing use of its property for children’s classes. Even the Salvation Army was closed for “extremist” activities, for the alleged creation of military units. It did not regain legal status as a recognized religious organization until it successfully appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. Property, Rental, and Other Restrictions Rental of public and private spaces for religious events is increasingly difficult for churches that are not part of the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate. They often face major government hostility, and sometimes opposition from local Orthodox clergy, when they seek to build new churches or purchase property. In contrast to Russian Orthodox parishes, Protestant congregations almost never receive government land or subsidies for new church buildings. Proposed legislation barring them from using public or private rental properties or conducting services in homes would make corporate worship difficult or impossible. Limits on religious activities and visas for foreigners have had a particular impact upon Catholic parishes and other churches dependent upon foreign priests. Orthodox churches that do not accept the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate have suffered. In some cases, government officials have arbitrarily “returned” Catholic, Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, and Old Believer churches to the Russian Orthodox Church because local congregations had lost registration rights due to lack of clergy. Newer religious groups have been primary targets of extremism prosecutions, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, Scientologists, Hare Krishna devotees, and Mormons. Muslim groups not affiliated with the centralized Muslim religious organization formed during the Soviet period are regularly accused of terrorist links and extremism. Jewish groups not affiliated with the one government-favored centralized Jewish organization have also lost rights and properties. Although the government has spoken out against anti-Semitism, Jews are once again targets of racial slanders and their temples are targets of vandalism. 

Alexander Dvorkin, Anti-“Sect” Activist

 Many government officials are considerably misinformed or ignorant of religious beliefs, leading to erroneous conclusions about the activities of minority groups. Local officials are also reluctant to permit activities of minority faiths for fear of being accused of allowing violations of the law. Since 2009 Orthodox anti-sect activist Alexander Dvorkin, Chairman of the Ministry of Justice’s Expert Council for Conducting State Religious Studies and advisor to the Duma Working Group on Sects, has had a major negative impact upon the treatment of religious minorities. On his own organization’s website, Dvorkin chronicles and lauds prosecutions of minority religious groups. 

Federal and regional expert council members and other bureaucrats have been trained to accept Dvorkin’s far-reaching definition of “sects,” along the lines the Russian Supreme Court is now asked to adopt, which he has also successfully propagated in Europe. The head of the Duma Committee on Public and Religious Organizations is a member of the Liberal Democratic Party, one of Russia’s most extreme nationalistic parties. If xenophobia prevails in Russia, its minority religions are likely to suffer to the extent that they are viewed as having western origins, even if they have existed in Russia for hundreds of years. 

Guardians of Religious Rights 

Nonetheless, as of now, Russians retain rights of religious belief and association under their 1997 Law on Religion, their Constitution, and international laws and treaties signed by Russia. The most meaningful guardians of the rights of Russian religious organizations and believers are lawyers who have courageously defended them since the early 1990s. In particular, the Slavic Center for Law and Justice led by Anatoly Pschilentstev and Vladimir Ryakhovsky has had a huge impact in maintaining the rights of minority believers through litigation, expertise, and education of political leaders and other lawyers. Religious freedom think tanks and websites run by other specialists in the field, such as Roman Lunkin and others at the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, Credo-Portal.ru, and Forum 18, monitor developments and contribute analyses and ideas that influence opinions in political and religious circles. 

Surprisingly, litigation does work: many churches have won court cases, and NGOs have won most lawsuits involving the Foreign Agents Law. Unfortunately, litigation is not always feasible because of financial constraints and the limited time and energy of lawyers willing to fight these battles. Also, an effort is clearly underway to reduce the independence of the judiciary. The European Court for Human Rights in Strassburg is overwhelmed with cases from Russia. Even when it takes a case and rules in favor of Russian religious organizations, authorities on the ground do not always comply with its decisions. 

Orthodox Conformity to State Policy 

The Russian Orthodox Church has been given an increasingly high public profile as it functions as an arm of state religious and social policy and as a supporter of government political positions. In addition to substantial government subsidies for construction and repairs of hundreds of churches, a December 2011 law provides the Orthodox Patriarch secret service protection, like high-level governmental officials. Orthodox prominence, however, has come at the price of reduced autonomy. During the 2011 pro-democracy rallies, Patriarch Kyrill commented that the Russian government should listen to the “legitimate aspirations of the Russian people, ” which reportedly resulted in harsh threats of an anti-clerical campaign and a direct assault upon Orthodoxy’s public standing. In response, Kyrill and other Orthodox leaders hastened to support Putin’s re-election enthusiastically. As recently as 2013, one could find dissenting Orthodox voices and proponents of church reform advocating more energetic approaches to outreach, including an increased emphasis on discipleship and education of the general public and of Orthodox believers. Today, however, the more open and tolerant elements of the Orthodox Church seem to have been silenced. 

Church Tensions Over Ukraine

 The Ukrainian conflict has produced complex developments for relations among Russian religious organizations and their counterparts in Ukraine and the rest of the world. The Moscow Patriarchate and the three Orthodox jurisdictions in Ukraine have leveled charges against each other, including allegations of the seizure of each other’s churches and participation of priests of the opposing jurisdiction in terrorist activities. Their hierarchs have made public professions of patriotic loyalty to their respective governments, as have leaders of evangelical organizations in both Russia and Ukraine. Deeper divisions based on nationality in Orthodox and Protestant churches are increasingly in evidence. Certainly, continuing military conflicts could quickly erode church bonds and trust carefully rebuilt following the collapse of the Soviet Union. They could also stoke the fires of propaganda against religious minorities, which are increasingly characterized as disloyal and untrustworthy. 

Possibilities for Inter-Confessional Cooperation 

Dialogue and cooperation between the Russian Orthodox Church and other Christian churches within Russia have been limited in recent years, in stark contrast to the 1990s. Metropolitan Ilarion, head of the Russian Orthodox Department of External Relations, did meet with his counterparts in the Catholic and Evangelical Christian-Baptist churches on 14 February 2014 to discuss, among other topics, religious freedom. However, Orthodox officials meet more often with leaders of non-proselytizing Muslim, Jewish, and Buddhist religious organizations that are favored by the Kremlin. 

One issue has the potential to unite efforts of the various Christian confessions within Russia and their counterparts outside Russia despite their differences: the defense of persecuted Christians in the Middle East, Africa, and other parts of the world. These communities are suffering existential threats from hostile Islamist groups and are experiencing massive deaths and casualties. The Moscow Patriarchate has taken numerous public and private steps to bring attention to the plight of Christians in the Middle East, particularly Syria, during the last year. In a major interview on 29 April 2014, Metropolitan Ilarion expressed concern that the conflict in Ukraine was being allowed to overshadow the need to focus on the terrible assaults on Christian communities in the Middle East. He emphasized the need for interreligious cooperation to stop the violence directed against Christians there, in Nigeria, and in Muslim majority countries. These expressions of concern are sincere and could open the door to ongoing communication and collaboration with the Russian Orthodox Church on these issues, and such cooperation could lead to improved interfaith dialogue within Russia about other concerns. 

The Legacy of Religious Repression 

It must be said that the effects of 70-plus years of communism, with its systematic efforts to suppress religious belief and subjugate religion to the will of the state, is still having a negative impact 23 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant churches were decimated by the murder and imprisonment of clergy and lay believers, the closure of seminaries and churches, and the systematic marginalization and demonization of believers and clergy. Believers today still suffer from lingering antireligious propaganda, unhealthy traditions of church submission to state power, and fear of outsiders and other religious traditions. Too often churches turn inward to avoid confrontation or criticism. Much Orthodox energy has been devoted to reconstruction of church physical structures and institutions rather than encouraging others to follow Christ. Since 1992 these legacies have seriously undercut outreach, the training of members, and the church’s potential positive social influence. 

In a recent discussion, the former heads of Evangelical Christian-Baptist Unions in Russia and Ukraine both stated that they felt that their churches had failed to take full advantage of the opportunities they had had in the 1990s to influence their societies. Russian Orthodox leaders have similar regrets and have begun to look to Protestant churches for models for evangelism and discipleship, educational programs, and ways to increase their positive impact on Russian society. Russia has never been more in need of true people of faith to help restore the downtrodden, the addicted, the orphaned, and the abandoned and to give hope to masses of hopeless and despairing people. Russia’s political and social order still bears the scars of the brutality of the Soviet period with now an overlay of excessive materialism and self-centered ways of living. Most Russians need to learn basic Christian moral teachings as an antidote to corruption, materialism, moral decline, and apathy. Cooperation between Orthodox and nonOrthodox Christians is essential to meet these enormous needs. 

Recent Acceleration of Restrictive Legislation

The current trajectory of events within Russia is alarming.It is extremely significant that restrictive legislation accelerated so quickly after Putin’s May 2012 reinstatement as President and again after the Ukrainian crisis began. Repressive regimes typically impose authoritarian control through unjust laws to present the appearance of being law abiding. They initially focus on disfavored groups, including minority religious groups, and then turn to the task of eradicating political opponents. This was certainly true of the Nazis, and Soviet and Chinese communists, among others. As many of us in the human rights field are fond of saying, religious freedom is like the canary in a coal mine; when it dies, all freedoms are likely to soon meet their demise. 

In fact, the Russian Orthodox Church is in as much peril as other faith groups. All churches in Russia are endangered minorities in a sea of secularism and unbelief, as in so many other parts of the world. The precarious position of churches is particularly true in an authoritarian environment when one day’s favorite may quickly become tomorrow’s villain. It is important to remember that legal restrictions and persecution of Russian Christian religious minorities were quickly followed by legal restrictions and severe persecution of the Orthodox Church after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. The Russian Orthodox Church is the one religious institution with the strength and moral authority to steer the government away from efforts to re-impose controls on religious life that are reminiscent of the Soviet period, and it should do so. 

In Defense of Religious Liberty 

Ultimately, the fate of religious freedom in Russia, and of Russian civic life as a whole, is in the hands of the Russian people and their political and social leaders. They have had 23 years since the Soviet Union collapsed to learn to think without ideological manipulation, to enjoy freedoms provided by postSoviet laws, and to accumulate financial assets and electronic devices that enable life and communication independent of their government. From the perspective of people of faith, an entire generation has had the opportunity to learn about God and explore life’s spiritual dimensions. In the days to come, it will be up to Russian citizens of faith to defend themselves, propagate their beliefs, and fight for their rights.They received freedom in 1992 as the result of what most viewed as a sovereign act of God and will now have to struggle to keep it through actions and prayer. As Paul noted in his Epistle to the Galatians, “It is for freedom that Christ has set us free. Stand firm, then, and do not let yourselves be burdened again by a yoke of slavery.”

 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the great German theologian, witnessed firsthand Hitler’s rise to power and his subversion of the German elite and the German church. As is typically the case with tyranny, very few Germans saw clearly that Hitler was leading their nation to destruction, not dominance. Many of the few Germans who did oppose were motivated by their faith. Bonhoeffer said that the only meaningful questions for German Christians at that time were “What does God want?” and “What is He calling me to do?” His own refusal to accept Hitler’s rule led to his early death. Sadly, however, he had to note, prior to his execution, that most Christians outside Germany had failed to support the dissident “Confessing Church” when it might have made a difference. Let us hope that Christians, inside and outside Russia, will not make the same mistake in this critical time. 

International human rights attorney Lauren B. Homer is the founder of Law and Liberty Trust, Washington, D.C.