Roman Lunkin
The dramatic events that have unfolded in Ukraine in 2013-14 have revealed major, painful issues of Ukrainian life: a country pressed to make the torturous choice between Russia and the West (the European Union and the U.S.) and ineffective attempts to overcome the schism between Ukraine’s East and West. The Christian churches of Ukraine are also facing serious questions that they have tried to answer throughout the past 23 years of the country’s independence. In this stressful period Christian churches have undertaken a most important task: to identify a socio-political ideology to unite Ukraine— or at least not split it even more.
Ukrainian Religious Devotion and Diversity
Russian believers can only envy the religious freedom that churches enjoy in Ukraine, and Ukraine’s religious diversity makes it the only country of the former Soviet Union with no ruling, “traditional” religion. Russia does not fully understand that Ukraine is one of the most church-minded countries in Europe with its 35,000 churches in a population of 50 million. In addition to the large number of churches, Ukraine possesses a great diversity of Christian confessions: three different Orthodox patriarchies, Eastern- and Latin-Rite Catholics, and many different Protestant churches. Baptists, Pentecostals, Adventists, and many other evangelical denominations are spread all over the whole territory of Ukraine, including megachurches with thousands of members in both eastern and western Ukraine.
With close to 20,000 Orthodox parishes and over 9,000 Protestant congregations, it is obvious that in Ukraine, Orthodoxy and Protestantism are the leading Christian churches. Among Orthodox jurisdictions the leading church is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP), with just over twothirds of all Orthodox parishes in Ukraine. Since 1996 the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches has united 18 major confessions and unions, including Orthodox Churches of the Moscow and Kyiv Patriarchies, Eastern-Rite Catholics, Baptists, Pentecostals, and even Muslims.
Where the Churches Stand on Maidan
The Orange Revolution of 2004-05 was triggered by the 21 November 2004 announcement of the victory of pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich in a fraudulent presidential election. In a subsequent revote, pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko won the election. The more recent Euromaidan Revolution, dating from 21 November 2013 on Kyiv’s Maidan Square, has supported European integration. Its protests were triggered by President Yanukovich’s decision not to sign a European association agreement in favor of closer ties with Russia. Both in 2004-05 and 2013-14 all Christian churches actively supported first “Orange Power” leaders Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Timoshenko, then Euro-integration and President Yanukovich’s removal from power (after 21 February 2014), essentially recognizing the legitimacy of the government of Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenuk and acting president Olyksandr Turchynov.
The Eastern-Rite Catholic and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP) have consistently supported pro-Western positions (the Orange Revolution and the 2014 ouster of Yanukovich), as befits the nationalistic preferences of central and western Ukraine where these churches are strongest. In the meantime, it should be noted that unlike the pro-Western churches, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate did not take public political positions that might be expected (pro-Russian statements in either 2004-05 or 2013-14 to date) and has not supported any political party to date.
The All-Ukrainian Church Council, whose members called upon all parties to seek a peaceful resolution of differences, played a public role of peacemaker in the most recent 2013-14 crisis without acting on behalf of any party. After President Yanukovich’s flight on 23 February, the Council had meetings with Turchynov and Yatsenuk, and after the actual loss of Crimea (18 March 2014), the Council supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine and spoke against Russia’s aggression in Crimea. UOC MP Metropolitan Anthony (Pakanich), head of the Council, signed the above statements. Because of the illness of UOC MP Metropolitan Vladimir (Sabodan), Metropolitan Onufry (Beresovsky) was elected locum tenens of the UOC MP and became head of the Council on 24 February 2014.
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP)
The UOC MP navigated the situation with agility. Its priests were standing in prayer between protestors and police trying to prevent bloodshed. The internal affairs of the UOC MP were stabilized by the fact that its leadership changed almost at the same time as the government of the country. The head of the UOC MP Information Service, Archpriest Georgy Kovalenko, played an important conciliatory role, explaining the church’s Christian position, asking Russian mass media not to address all Ukrainians as fascists and Nazis. Active pro-Russian supporters of Yanukovich in the UOC MP lost out. Metropolitan Pavel (Lebed), head of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, supported Yanukovich, comparing him to Christ and the opposition He faced, but other UOC MP clergy reacted to this comparison with indignation. Most UOC MP bishops tried to support the well-balanced position of Metropolitan Onufry, who did not call for pro-Maidan actions, but in letters to Putin and Patriarch Kyrill did condemn Russia’s attempts to split Ukraine. Nevertheless, other UOC MP clerics, whose Ukrainian national pride was hurt and who could not keep silent, did make harsh statements. For example, UOC MP Metropolitan Cherkassky Sophrony (Dmitruk) declared that Putin was a bandit and that Russian politicians who have Ukrainian ancestry were aggressors and traitors. On 2 March UOC MP Metropolitan Alexander (Drabinko) of Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi condemned Yanukovich, and together with a group of parishioners addressed a letter to Patriarch Kyrill explaining the role of the UOC MP in revolutionary Ukraine: “Our bishops are being rebuked, and even though the accusations are not objective, they are not unreasonable. We are called the Church of Moscow, the Kremlin, Putin, and Yanukovich.” Metropolitan Alexander asked Kyrill not to use Orthodoxy in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine: “Even today when we are witnessing the crimes of the previous regime, we still have those who are ready to justify cruelty to effect the supposedly right ‘civilization choice – restoration of Holy Russia’s unity’.” Metropolitan Alexander regrets that the UOC MP is often identified with former President Yanukovich’s pro-Russian positions. In contrast, in fact, he declares, “In the first place, we are the Church of Christ, the Church of the Ukrainian people.” UOC MP Bishop Lvivsky Filaret (Kucherov) addressed Putin directly on 3 March with a plea not to start a fratricidal war and to take Russian troops away from Ukrainian territory.
Patriarch Kyrill
Patriarch Kyrill reacted to the Ukrainian crisis relatively late, carefully calling all parties to reconciliation. In his second statement Kyrill recognized Ukraine’s de facto right to democratic national selfidentification. The Patriarch denied any imperial territorial pretensions with which Ukrainian nationalists typically accuse Moscow. However, on 14 March, during his sermon in Christ the Savior Cathedral, Patriarch Kyrill did state,
For at least 400 years attempts have been made to break and divide the Russian world. When we say “Russian” we mean something different from our detractors speaking of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union. We mean the Russian world, the great Russian civilization which emerged from the baptismal font of Kiev and spread across the broad lands of Eurasia…. Today there are independent states on this territory, and we respect their sovereignty, their readiness and desire to build their national life independently. But this does not mean that pursuit of legitimate sovereignty should be followed by destruction of common spiritual space.
Also very important were the steps that Patriarch Kyrill did not take. He was not present for the 18 March ceremony signing the Treaty of Crimea and Sevastopol, joining them to Russia. Also, the Russian Orthodox Church Synod has made no decisions regarding parishes in Crimea which at present remain under the jurisdiction of the UOC MP. The Synod’s statement of 19 March was also very discreet. It said that the Church should be above any controversies and parties and that “The Church’s borders are not defined by political preferences, ethnic differences, and even state borders.”
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP) The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP), together with the Eastern-Rite Catholic Church, actively criticized the rampant corruption under Yanukovich and his Party of Regions and called for protection of the Ukrainian Motherland against Russian aggression. Patriarch UOC KP Filaret (Denisenko) also strongly criticized the Moscow Patriarchate and Patriarch Kyrill, accusing them of supporting a totalitarian ideology and Putin’s attempts to reconstruct an empire. Patriarch Filaret began regularly using militaristic rhetoric. For example, on 19 March he aired a public accusation:
On 18 March 2014 Russian leaders publicly broke three of God’s commandments: thou shalt not steal; thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor; and thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s house,…nor anything that is thy neighbor’s (Exodus 20: 15-17)…. President Putin in his 18 March speech in the Kremlin used the Devil’s methods—mixing together the true and the false. I am positive that the half-truth that all the world heard from the Russian leader’s mouth is worse than a pure lie—the same way poison hidden in food is more dangerous than an obvious toxin…. Vladimir Putin officially started using such phrases as “the Russian world,” “historical Russia,” “Russians are a divided nation,” and “Ukrainians and Russians are one people.” Such language, together with Putin’s regret over the fall of the U.S.S.R. and his longing for the Soviet Union’s former prominence, resembles German and Italian fascist ideology and rhetoric of the 20th century….That is why I am speaking primarily to the Ukrainian people: Our homeland has been invaded by an enemy who has occupied part of Ukraine and is trying to terminate our statehood and independence, bringing us back under Kremlin slavery.
UOC MP Senior Chaplain Metropolitan Belotserkovsky Augustine also blessed Ukrainian warriors protecting the Motherland from Russia. Here it is important to note that there is no theological difference separating Ukraine’s three Orthodox churches, only emotional and political accents.
The Ukrainian Eastern-Rite Catholic Church
Ukraine’s Eastern-Rite Catholic Church was the most obvious church presence in Maidan Square in downtown Kyiv. Numerous videos of the Maidan stage from which orators spoke included icons of Our Lady and Eastern-Rite Catholic priests with crosses in the background. Many Catholic activists came to Kyiv from the Lviv Region and other parts of western Ukraine. Sermons of Eastern-Rite Catholic priest Mikhail Arsenich (from the Ivano-Frankovsk Region) gained particular fame. A December 2013 sermon of this priest called for the slaughter of Russians, Chinese, Blacks, Jews, and Party of Regions members—for which his church superiors punished him with an enforced monthlong season of repentance in a monastery. Eastern-Rite Catholic Patriarch Sviatoslav (Shevchuk) enjoined his priests not to back any political position. Yet he himself declared Russia to be the main aggressor and urged Western support against Moscow. On 7 February Shevchuk asked for U.S. mediation in the Ukrainian conflict. On 17 February 2014 Latin-Rite Catholic Church of Ukraine Metropolitan Lvivsky Mechislav declared in an interview with the Catholic Information Agency:
I believe that Maidan demonstrations give Ukraine a chance if they lead to changes in the political system and westernization in politics. Thanks to them there now is hope for healing, justice for all, simplification of international travel, and improved conditions for foreign investment…. On Maidan we had our prayer tent. Franciscan fathers served Holy Mass there and prayed daily…. Believers of the Roman Catholic Church also took part in demonstrations of Maidan. Priests accompanied them in order to create an atmosphere of solidarity, peace, and mutual respect. This atmosphere of mutual solidarity and respect prevails on Maidan. We have seen a totally different Ukraine there.
Protestants and Maidan
Beginning in December 2013 the Council of Evangelical Protestant Churches of Ukraine, together with other churches, called for civil reconciliation, condemned abuses of power by the authorities, and supported Euromaidan protestors. Baptist and Pentecostal pastors were the most active. Nevertheless, none of the largest Evangelical churches or unions took part in Maidan. In 2004, the Charismatic Church of the Embassy of God participated in the Orange Revolution, protecting its participants, but in the Maidan demonstrations its senior pastor Sunday Adelaje backed Yanukovich prior to his flight from Ukraine. On 16 March evangelical churches took part in a prayer gathering on Maidan and later decided to have such prayers on a regular basis. Secretary of Independent Churches Brotherhood and Baptist Missions Sergey Debelinsky noted when speaking at Maidan, “We should not just be called Christians; we should be Christians. Thousands of people are volunteering to join the National Guards. Even though we do not have enough strength to stop the forces that threaten our country, we do have the all-powerful Word of God.” Chairman of the Council of Independent Churches of Ukraine Anatoly Kaluzhny stated, “Today Ukraine has woken up, and God wants to bless her. He has big plans for our country. With Europe now sleeping in sinful dreams and Russia still holding to its idols, we have to bring the Word of God to both.” With the same passion, Senior Bishop Mikhailo Panochko of the Christian Evangelical Church of Ukraine (Pentecostal) reminded Maidan listeners of the parable from the Gospel of Luke about the poor widow who asked the judge for help and later received it. “Jesus told his disciples that we should always pray and not grow weary. But the question arises: How can we avoid being depressed when such a fully armed Russian armada stands by our borders? How can we avoid being depressed when churches in Russia keep silent and are afraid to say to their country’s leader that such things should not be done?... The church exists not just for rituals; it should also be standing in the gap for her people. Her ministers should not be afraid to speak the truth to the faces of high authorities.”
Sergey Kosyak, pastor of the Assembly of God Church in Donetsk, explained the position of the church in eastern Ukraine in this difficult moment: “Christians are praying here the same as in the rest of Ukraine. Some declare their positions openly; some do not. We try not to raise political issues in the church because we have people with different views. But during prayer we emphasize unity and intercede for Ukraine. Most people in Protestant churches back the idea of the preservation of Ukraine as a whole” (16 March 2014 interview, Invictory.com).
President Olyksandr Turchynov
On 23 February 2014, in the midst of the revolutionary crisis, Baptist minister Olyksandr Turchynov, a close associate of former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko, became acting president of Ukraine. The country’s Protestants felt pride as one of their own for the first time headed the government of one of the successor states of the former Soviet Union. Turchynov, born in 1964 in Dnepropetrovsk, headed the propaganda department of Ukraine’s Communist Youth League before the breakup of the Soviet Union. Later, while working for President Leonid Kuchma, Turchynov first was baptized in an Orthodox Church, but later in 1999 joined a Baptist church where he serves as a lay preacher.
Unlike Orthodox-oriented politicians who try to defend the elusive idea of Orthodox unity in Ukraine, evangelical President Turchynov has initiated regular interreligious dialogues. He is one of the founders of the All-Ukrainian Church Council. Regarding creation of the Council, Turchynov said, “Being present at this gathering I was able to see the difference between those whose words do not match their deeds and those who place God and faith in the first place, with all other issues secondary” (Faith and Life interview, No. 1, 2001).
The new Kyiv government and President Turchynov had no difficulty building relationships with all Ukrainian churches. It was Turchynov who created the place for dialogue between believers and the government, a task which Yanukovich could not and did not want to undertake. As early as 2 March Turchynov spoke by phone with Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kyrill, with the new acting president guaranteeing the rights of all churches and confirming his desire to continue dialogue with Russia.
After the 2004 Orange Revolution, Protestantism, together with Orthodoxy, became an important factor in Ukrainian public life. Time demonstrated that the desires of Ukraine’s evangelical leaders fully corresponded with the new government’s desire for further post-Soviet democratization of state institutions. Basic political positions of Ukrainian Protestants include a rejection of Soviet-style domination of public life, a strong orientation toward Europe, recognition of Ukraine’s cultural and historical bonds with Europe, and defense of democratic values.
Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant Common Ground
One result of the Maidan Revolution has been the recognition by Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant churches of their common support for an independent, democratic Ukraine. Orthodox, Eastern-Rite Catholics, and Protestants all took part in a series of joint prayers on the Euromaidan stage in Kyiv. Of course, differences among Christian confessions have not disappeared. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyiv Patriarchate went their separate ways at the beginning of the 1990s, but during Euromaidan a commission for dialogue between the two Orthodox jurisdictions resumed work. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Eastern-Rite Catholic Church is staunchly pro-Western in its orientation, as are most Protestants in central and western Ukraine and many in eastern Ukraine. Unlike Orthodox and Catholics, Protestants are spread equally across the whole territory of the country.
Churches Taking Increasingly Pro-Ukrainian Positions
The political consequences of the recent revolutionary upheavals in Kyiv are mostly visible in Orthodox churches of the Moscow and Kyiv Patriarchates. For these churches the events of 2013-14 became the moment of truth: Both have chosen to take proUkrainian political positions, their representatives meet more openly and more often, and they more frequently make joint statements regarding Ukrainian political affairs. It is increasingly recognized by both patriarchates that as long as the UOC MP is subordinate to Patriarch Kyrill, no unification of the two jurisdictions will occur. To date the UOC MP has not sought to sever ties with the Moscow Patriarchate. For his part, Patriarch Kyrill has been careful not to place any pressure on the UOC MP so as not to precipitate a rupture. The Patriarch’s statements have been circumspect, unlike the harsh, anti-Ukrainian propaganda of the Russian mass media, Russian politicians, and President Putin.
It is too early to predict Ukraine’s future, and an objective understanding of such a complex crisis is difficult to achieve. But it is clear already that during Euromaidan the UOC MP and Protestant churches were able to speak and act in ways that bridged the political, cultural, and linguistic divide between western and eastern Ukraine. In contrast, the UOC KP lost ground strategically because of its one-sided position, speaking against the Party of Regions and federalization and supporting only pro-western political positions.
Escalating tensions in southeast Ukraine, in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Luhansk, as well as attempts to establish a Donetsk Republic in April-May 2014, moved Ukrainian churches to increasingly take an anti-Russian stand. Rev. Leonid Padun, senior pastor of the Word of Life Church in Donetsk, has preached messages opposing the intervention of Russian forces in Ukraine (http://wolua.org). Similarly, Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate Metropolitan Anthony (Pakanich) in the Easter season called upon clerics to support Ukrainian patriotism and to resist separatist tendencies.
On 19 April Patriarch Kyrill knelt and prayed for peace in Ukraine and in Moscow, for upcoming elections in Kiev, and unity in Ukraine. He said, “We respect religious minorities. Nevertheless, we will continue to assert that Ukraine has an organic connection with Holy Rus’. It is an Orthodox country.”
Ukrainian and Russian Evangelicals At Odds
Evangelicals tried to overcome a deadlock in their relationships as well. On 9-11 April major Protestant leaders of Ukraine and Russia met in Jerusalem. Ukrainians in attendance were dissatisfied with the outcome of the meeting. Rev. Mikhail Panochko, head of the Churches of Christian Evangelical Faith (Pentecostal) said that Russian evangelical leaders would not take a well-defined stand against Russian aggression in Ukraine and would not characterize Russian intervention in Crimea as the act of an aggressor. They also declined to condemn anti-Ukrainian rhetoric in Russian mass media.
In contrast, Rev. Konstantin Bendas, representative of the Russian Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostal) headed by Rev. Sergey Ryakhovsky likened the stance of Ukrainian evangelical leaders to that of “aggressive politicians” and declared that “church and brotherly love are things that are not compatible with politics and state and inter-state conflicts” (http://afmedia.ru).As a result, the parties could not agree upon a joint statement for the press. Theologian and publicist Dr. Mikhail Cherenkov summarized the position of Ukrainian churches as follows:
At the dawn of a new period in the history of the Evangelical movement in Ukraine, despite all the difficulties involved, we chose freedom and dignity. We have chosen to be loyal to the people, whereas Russians have chosen to be loyal to the authorities. When Russians begin to see a strong church in Ukraine that enjoys the love and respect of the people, they will come to visit, strike up friendships, and learn from us. God will delight in this (from the interview to mirvam.org).
What Next?
In 2013 and 2014 to date Ukraine has endured political convulsions, Russia’s seizure of Crimea, and deepening East-West political and linguistic cleavages. It is too early to say whether or not the nationalistic euphoria of Euromaidan will be followed by national destruction. What is clear is that most of Ukraine’s churches so far have prayed and worked on behalf of national unity and peaceful resolution of differences.
The growing political activism of various Ukrainian churches, however, can also have its negative consequences: the possibility of church splits precipitated by differing political preferences, elected officials not meeting expectations, or guilt by association with ultra-nationalist and/or corrupt authorities. Ukrainian Orthodox, Catholics, and Protestants are still in the process of overcoming mutual distrust in their search for a common Ukrainian identity and their proper place in a European geo-political scheme. Going forward, Ukraine’s churches face the formidable task of helping create a country that can reconcile the linguistic, ethnic, cultural, and religious differences between its western and eastern halves.
Roman Lunkin is a senior researcher at the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow, Russia.