How Orthodox Is Russia?

 Geraldine Fagan 

Cultural Orthodox and Practicing Orthodox 

How far is Russian society truly Orthodox? While recent national polls record over 70 percent self-identifying as Orthodox Christians, only some 40 percent believe categorically in God.1 In their particularly wide-ranging 2005 survey, Dmitri Furman and Kimmo Kääriainen found only 15 percent accepting the central Christian tenet of resurrection from the dead, while 42 percent trusted astrology. Believers in God had nearly doubled since 1991, yet there was no accompanying shift in moral values. In rates similar to wider society, just 30 percent of believers opposed abortion—only marginally more than in 1991—while those condemning marital infidelity declined by half.2 

Receipt of the sacraments by regular participation in Church life is central to the Orthodox faith. Yet few of Russia’s majority who identify as Orthodox conform to the Church definition. Recent surveys reveal that while some 80 percent are baptized, over 70 percent have never taken communion in their lives.3 In 2007 the independent Levada Centre polled only two percent attending Orthodox liturgy weekly.4 Easter figures for Moscow’s approximately 250 churches wavered around one percent of the population, or from 80,000 to 125,000 in 2005-07. In 2009 the Patriarchate circulated a Moscow police figure of 137,000 participating in Easter processions commencing at midnight—the point of maximum involvement—and 4.5 million attending across Russia.5 Even so, this number accounts for only some three percent of a supposedly majority Orthodox population, on the most important church festival of the year. A similar pattern characterizes another major aspect of Orthodox observance: fasting. A 2010 poll found only four percent intending to follow fully the main Lenten fast—involving a seven-week vegan diet—and a further 22 percent in part.6 

Clergy recognize the gulf between Orthodox allegiance and practice. “It’s not one sheep that’s gone astray, but the 99,” mused Fr. Oleg Stanyayev. “We’re now talking not about a lost sheep, but a lost nation.”7 The polls also suggest that the gulf is not one of ignorance, however. Furman and Kääriainen found respondents choosing to reckon as Orthodox those outside the Church’s own determination: 84 percent agreed that “a Russian, even if not baptized or attending church, is still Orthodox in his soul.”8 While the dividing line is blurred, we can thus increasingly speak of two Orthodoxies in Russia: one oriented on church canons, the other on popular perception. Sociologist of religion Sergei Filatov suggests that leading hierarchs have facilitated the second of these by publicly appealing to national tradition rather than core Christianity.9 Yet this is the Church’s only mode of engagement with wider post-Soviet society.

Religious Minorities Assuming that only some three percent—or 4.5 million—are practicing Orthodox Christians, Russia retains significant religious minorities. Mirroring the loose identification of Russian ethnicity with Orthodoxy, Aleksei Malashenko estimates around 20 million of Islamic background in Russia, but acknowledges those practicing may be as low as two million.10 The latter figure tallies roughly with Furman and Kääriainen’s and Vyacheslav Karpov and Elena Lisovskaya’s reckoning of around three percent.11 Active followers of the other so-called traditional faiths are negligible: While the 2002 national census recorded nearly a quarter of a million ethnic Jews, for example, those even self-identifying as religious are as low as 20,000.12 While Protestants are likely more numerous than Catholics, Furman and Kääriainen found one percent identifying as Protestant. Very few will be nominally so, however, which explains Patriarchate concern over heterodox competition. 

Viewed differently, Orthodox hegemony is even less sweeping. The number of registered religious organizations naturally cannot be considered in an absolute sense, as membership may vary markedly. Nevertheless, obstacles to state registration are typically encountered by non-Patriarchate communities, whereas functioning Patriarchate parishes are fewer than on paper.13 Federal statistics consistently place the number of Patriarchate organizations at above half, with the remainder mostly shared between Muslims and Protestant denominations.14 But while the Patriarchate and overall figures have risen steadily—reaching 12,727 and 23,078 respectively in 2009—increased bureaucratic pressure has seen Muslim and Protestant organizations drop by over a thousand since 2006.15 The 2009 total also omits at least 10,000 religious groups that have never registered; almost none are likely to be Patriarchate.16 

Geographic Disparities 

Filatov observes considerable fluctuations in the strength of Orthodoxy as one moves south or east across Russia, correlating with the timespan for which Moscow has controlled a given territory.17 Publicized once, in 2002, official figures for registered religious organizations in Russia’s seven federal districts confirm this topography. In the Central and North-Western Federal Districts—where Orthodoxy has the longest historical presence—Patriarchate organizations held a clear majority of 5,785 and 1,802 organizations respectively, with Protestants occupying a notable second place. In the Volga and the Southern Federal Districts, just under half of 5,269 and 2,999 organizations were Patriarchate, with Protestants and now Muslims comprising the bulk of the remainder. Beyond the Ural Mountains, the picture grew starker as it panned eastwards: The Patriarchate accounted for markedly fewer than half of the 1,253 and 1,876 organizations in the Ural and Siberian Federal Districts, and barely a third of the Far Eastern Federal District’s 908, where Protestants scored a majority 409.18 

Notes: 

1. “83% rossiian ne sobliudaiut ne sobliudaiut Velikii post,” SOVA, 21 April 2008: http://www.sova-center. ru/religion/discussions/how-many/2008/04/d13143/; Igor' Konovalov, “Nedovotserkovlennye,” NG-Religii, 1 July 2009: http://religion.ng.ru/events/ 2009- 07-01/3_vocerkvlenie.html; D. E. Furman and K. Kääriainen, Religioznost' v Rossii v 90-ye gody XX – nachale XXI veka, (Moscow: OGNI TD, 2006), 43.
2.  Furman and Kääriainen, Religioznost', 43-46, 76-77.
3. Furman and Kääriainen, Religoznost', 13, 56; Nikolai Mitrokhin, “Zakhozhane. Kto i kak v strane poseshchaet Tserkvi',” Politicheskii zhurnal, No. 14 (66), 25 April 2005: http://www.politjournal.ru/ preview.php?action=Articles&dirid=56&tek=3309& issue=99. 
4.  “Rossiiane stali men'she poseshchat' religioznye sluzhby – opros',” Interfax, 8 August 2007: http:// www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=19672.
5.  “V Moskve na Paskhu khramy posetili 359 tys. Chelovek, kladbishcha-580 tys.,” SOVA, 3 May 2005: http://www.sova-center.ru/religion/discussions/howmany/2005/05d4466/; “Paskhal'nye bogosluzheniia v Rossii posetilo znachital'no men'she veruiushchikh, chem predskazyvali sotsiologi,” Portal-Credo, 24 April 2006: http:www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=n ews&id42586&topic=108; “Po dannym GUVD paskhal'nye bogosluzheniia v Moskve posetili bolee 300 tys. chelovek,” Interfax, 8 April 2007: http:// www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=17589.
6.  “Velikii post sobiraiutsia sobliudat' 4 protsenta rossiian,” Religare, 12 February 2010: http://www. religare.ru/s_72801.html. 
7.  “Po mneniniiu sviashchennika Olega Steniaeva, RPTs zagoniaiut v getto, a v khristianstve chto-to ponimaet odin protsent naseleniia,” Blagovest-info, 1 February 2005: http://www.religare.ru/2_14120.html.
8. Furman and Kääriainen, Religioznost', 41. 
9.  Sergei Filatov, “Posleslovie. Religiia v postsovetskoi Rossii,” in Religiia i obshchestvo: Ocherki religioznoi zhizni sovremennoi Rossii (Moscow: Letnii sad, 2002), 474. 
10.  Aleksei Malashenko, Islam dlia Rossii (Moscow: Moskovskii Tsentr Karnegi, 2007), 10. 
11. Furman and Kääriaien, Religioznost', 43; Vyacheslav Karpov and Elena Lisovskaya, “Religious Intolerance among Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Russia,” Religion, State & Society 36 (December 2008), 365. 
12.  Sergei Filatov and Roman Lunkin, “Statistics on Religion in Russia: The Reality behind the Figures,” Religion, State & Society 34 (March 2006), 37. 
13.  Nikolai Mitrokhin, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov': sovremennoe sostoianie i actual'nye problemy (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2006), 69, 74. 
14.  “Svedeniia o religioznykh organizatsiiakh, zaregistrirovannykh v Rossiiskoi Federatsii po dannym gosudarstvennogo reestra na 1 ianvaria 2001 g.”: http://www.archipelag.ru/ru_mir/religio/ statistics/said/statistics-2001/; “Za proshedshie dva goda dolia obshchin Russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi v Rossii uvelichilas'- statistika,” Interfax, 20 September 2006: http://www.interfax-religion.ru/ national/?act=news&div=14045. 
15.  “Reportazh: Sobstvennost' – RPTs MP, ostal’nym – uchet i kontrol'. V Gosdume obsudili griadushchie izmeneniia v zakonodatel'stve o svobode sovesti,” Portal-Credo, 13 March 2009: http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/print.php?act=news&id=69222. 
16.  Andrei Mel'nikov, “Ukorochennaia propoved,” NG-Religii, 21 October 2009: http://religion.ng.ru/ events/2009-10-21/1_missionerstvo.html?mthree=2. 
17.  Sergei Filatov, “Mnogotsvetie volshebnogo sada rossiiskoi dukhovnosti: dvadtsat' let vozrastaniia religioznogo mnogoobraziia postsovetskoi Rossii,” in Dvadtsat' let religioznoi svobody v Rossii (Moscow: Moskovskii Tsentr Karnegi, 2009), 18-37. 
18.  Anatolii Krasikov, “Svoboda sovesti – vazhnoe uslovie grazhdanskogo mira i mezhnatsional'nogo soglasiia. Doklad prezidenta Evraziiskogo otdeleniia mezhdunarodnoi assotiatsii religioznoi svobody,” 27 November 2002: http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/print/ php?act=news&id=5159. 

Edited, abridged excerpts reprinted with permission from Geraldine Fagan, Believing in Russia— Religious Policy after Communism (London: Routledge, 2013). 

Geraldine Fagan is Moscow correspondent for Forum 18 News Service (www.forum18.org)